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This dissertation includes three chapters. Chapter one examines the effect of economic sanctions 
on firms and financial markets. Chapter two studies the effect of culture on cross-listing and 
CEO turnover. Chapter three looks at how geography influences capital structure. 
Chapter 1 This paper is the first comprehensive analysis of economic sanctions and measures 
the effect of imposing and lifting sanctions on the target country's exchange-listed, publicly 
traded firms and examines how the impact of sanctions on deep state-owned firms differs from 
their impact on other firms. The paper uses the case of Iran because of its developed financial 
markets, the length and variety of sanctions, the significant presence of deep state firms in the 
market, and the unique event of the 2015 nuclear deal which led to lifting some of the imposed 
sanctions. I find that a direct sanction against a firm or industry leads to cumulative short-term 
and long-term negative abnormal returns. The effect is stronger for the deep state firms. In the 
case of multiple sanctions against a firm by different jurisdictions, the effect of the first sanction 
is the strongest one. This may hint that the widely-held belief that unilateral sanctions are not 
effective is not necessarily true. The removal of sanctions leads to positive abnormal returns; the 
positive abnormal returns are weaker for the deep state firms. Firms targeted by economic 
sanctions decrease their leverage and increase their cash holding to manage their increased risk, 
and economic sanctions worsen profitability ratios. The paper provides valuable insights into the 




Chapter 2   I examine how cross-sectional differences in national culture dimensions affect the 
probability of CEO turnover and its sensitivity to firm performance after cross-listing by a non-
U.S. firm in the United States. I find that three of the Hofstede indexes (long-term orientation, 
power distance, and uncertainty avoidance) are correlated with a lower probability of CEO 
turnover. I find for two of the three indexes that when a firm from a country with higher (lower) 
index than the United States cross-list in the United States, the firm becomes more (less) 
sensitive to negative performance in comparison with non-cross-listed firms from the same 
country. This outcome is associated with an increased (decreased) probability of CEO turnover. 
The two-way effect of the national culture of the host country (the United States) on cross-listed 
firms suggests that cultural exchange affects corporate culture and consequently influences 
relevant financial decisions.  
 
Chapter 3   This study investigates the relationship between the location of a firm’s 
headquarters and its capital structure. Using the equity shock of peers firms, with peers referring 
to location, this study eliminates endogeneity concerns and shows that average idiosyncratic 
return of peers firms, firms in the same state, determines variation of firm's leverage ratio. 
Furthermore, using two measures of location, average leverage of firms in the state where the 
firm is domiciled and average leverage of firms with distance less than 50 miles from firm's 
headquarters, the study demonstrates that location has a significant effect on the firm's leverage 
ratios. The location effect is persistent and extends back to the time of the initial public offering. 
This work concludes that location of headquarters is an essential component of how a firm 
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Chapter 1: A Financial Anatomy of Economic Sanctions 
 
“Economic sanctions have become a powerful force in service of clear and coordinated foreign 
policy objectives—smart power for situations where diplomacy alone is insufficient, but military 
force is not the right response. They must remain a powerful option for decades to come. That is 
why the lessons we have learned from our experience need to guide our approach to sanctions in 
the future.” 
Jack Lew, Former United States Secretary of the Treasury 
 
“Financial measures have become far more powerful tools of statecraft, and their effects are 
multiplied in a world defined by economic interdependence…we have been able to move away 
from clunky and heavy-handed instruments of economic power. Sanctions that focus on bad 
actors within the financial sector are far more precise and far more effective than traditional trade 
sanctions.” 
David Cohen, Former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Former Under 
Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper is the first comprehensive study of how economic sanctions affect the 
exchange-listed, publicly traded firms in the target country. It contributes to three streams of 
literature: economic sanctions, political connections, and capital structure. First, it looks at how 




reaction of politically connected firms, in this case, the firms connected to the deep state, differs 
from the non-politically connected firms. Third, it studies how economic sanctions affect a 
firm’s capital structure. For the first time, this paper provides empirical evidence on how 
different players in the market react to different types of sanctions and how these sanctions affect 
a firm's performance and decisions.  
Economic sanctions and embargoes have been used since ancient times. In 432 BC, the 
Athenian empire issued the Megarian decree which imposed economic sanctions on Megara. The 
decree banned Megarian citizens from using ports, harbors, and marketplaces in the Athenian 
empire. The historian Donald Kagan interprets the order as Athens’ attempt to punish Megara for 
its malign behavior without going into war with Megara to keep peace with Sparta, Megara's 
ally. The decree was a clear use of economic sanctions as an alternative to war. However, the 
military conflict between Athens and Sparta, known as the Peloponnesian War, later broke out. 
The war lasted from 431 BC to 404 BC. In other words, in this case, the economic sanction was 
not successful in using diplomatic-economic punishment to avoid war and to achieve the desired 
goal. 
Despite that ancient failure, over the past few decades, economic sanctions have become 
a more prominent component of counties' foreign policy toolbox. Not only they are being used 
more frequently as an alternative to war, but thanks to the increasing rate of interconnection in 
the global market economic sanctions have become more sophisticated, effective, and precise. 
The new generation of sanctions, called smart sanctions for their precision and sophistication, 
can effectively target specific targets or differentiate between ordinary people and bad actors. 
The United States’ economic and diplomatic power and its exceptional position in the global 




innovations have given Washington a unique capability to impose the most severe and effective 
sanctions on its adversaries. Financial warfare has gained such prominence in the US foreign 
policy, homeland security and intelligence toolbox that in January 2015, in an unprecedented 
move, President Obama picked David Cohen as deputy director of the CIA. Before joining the 
CIA as its deputy director, Mr. Cohen, a lawyer by training, was Treasury Department’s 
undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, known as sanctions czar, and architect of 
the U.S. economic sanctions against Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The move showed the 
increasing importance of financial intelligence and warfare. As financial infrastructure is playing 
a more prominent role in designing and imposing economic sanctions, it is crucial to understand 
how they affect the financial markets of the target country. Just recently, the United States 
imposed sanctions on Russian targets which significantly affected the value of Russian publicly 
traded firms. Moreover, unlike national economic account data which are subject to high level of 
manipulation and subjective judgment, the market prices are much more reliable measures.  
This paper uses the case of Iran to study the effect of economic sanctions on financial 
markets as Iran has a relatively developed financial market and the sanctions regime against Iran 
is unique because of its length, intensity, and diversity. Iran has been subject to 4 decades of 
sanctions, right after the 1979 revolution and the subsequent attack on the US embassy by pro-
government students and 444 days of US diplomats' imprisonment in Iran. The sanctions 
intensified since 2005 when Tehran decided to reactivate its nuclear program after it had agreed 
to suspend it. This paper looks at the period between the year 2000 and 2016. The sanctions 
intensified after 2010 when the US and EU successfully limited Iran's access to the international 
financial sector and put pressure on Iran's oil customers to decrease the amount of oil they were 




problems in repatriating its exports money. Iran's GDP growth fell from 5.8 percent in 2010, to 
2.6 percent in 2011, and to -7.4 percent in 2012. Consequently, Iran entered into negotiations 
with the P5+1 (US, Russia, China, France, UK, and Germany). In July 2013, the two sides 
reached an agreement to suspend some parts of the nuclear program in exchange for some 
temporary  sanctions relief. In 2015, both sides signed a comprehensive agreement which 
removed a larger part of sanctions in exchange for suspension or rollback of a larger part of 
Iran's nuclear program. This history provides us with a rare chance to study not only the effect of 
sanctions but also the effect of lifting the sanctions. 
Additionally, firms connected to the deep state have a significant presence in the Tehran 
stock market, 23 percent of market value of the Tehran Stock Exchange, over the period of study 
in our sample, which allows us to study the effect of political connection. Iran faced different 
categories of sanctions in terms of what was the target of sanctions. Some sanctions targeted 
specific firms, some focused on particular sectors, and some targeted the whole economy; some 
were unilateral while others were multilateral; some were imposed by countries with minimal 
trade with Iran while others were imposed by its major trade partners. It included sanctions 
imposed by the United States, European Union, Canada, UK, and the United Nations. 
 Most studies on economic sanctions are in the realm of international law, international 
relations, and macroeconomics. International law scholars research the legal aspects of economic 
sanctions and try to answer when, where and how they are justified by the international law. 
International relations scholars ask whether, when, and how economic sanctions are successful. 
(Lam, 1990; Hufbauer and Oegg, 2003; Hufbauer, Elliott, Oegg and Schott, 2007).  
 Economists are interested in how economic sanctions affect the economies of the 




The financial aspect of the economic sanctions has not yet been fully explored, mainly due to 
lack of data as either the target country did not have developed financial markets or the sanctions 
were of a nature that did not allow a study of financial markets. The closest research to this paper 
is done by Draca, Garred, Stickland, and Warrinnier (2017) which looks at how firms with 
shareholders targeted by US treasury linked to EIKO and IRGC reacted to the news coverage of 
nuclear negotiation. They find that this specific portfolio had a more positive reaction to the 
positive news about the success of negotiations during the term of nuclear talks. Their study 
differs from mine in several aspects. First, my criterion to include a firm as part of the deep state 
portfolio is the same as the U.S. Treasury's definition of controlling ownership, which is either 
50 percent ownership by Supreme Leader or military or a majority of seats on the board. I do not 
include firms with lower level of ownership; inclusion of such firms in the portfolio can cause 
several problems:  
First, such firms are not the prime target of sanctions. If IRGC owns 5 percent of shares 
in a company, the company does not become a target of US sanctions just because of that 5 
percent ownership. The US Treasury has been clear about this. Second, such firms are not 
perceived by the market as an IRGC or EIKO firms. IRGC or EIKO or Mostazafan may have a 
minority stake in a firm where it has other major shareholders, in many cases the military or 
supreme leader-related shareholder does not have even a seat on the board. Third, including 
minor ownership in the portfolio causes an operational problem for the time-series aspect of such 
a panel study. In many cases, holdings do not own minor ownership for an extended period. 
Draca et al. (2017) do not explicitly say if they controlled for this all the time or not. They 
mention that they used the TSE website for their study. That website does not provide a 




the portfolio they had in mind. Fourth, they correctly mention that the Supreme Leader and 
IRGC were the primary targets of the sanctions because of their role in decision-making process 
on the nuclear program. However, they do not take into account all holdings controlled by the 
Supreme Leader or non-IRGC military entities with a presence in the stock market, direct role in 
Iran's nuclear and ballistic missiles program, and designated by the U.S., chief among these 
entities are Ministry of Defense and Mustazafan foundation. Fifth, if the military or supreme 
leader do not effectively control a firm, then they do not make the firm's financial decision which 
is something I am interested in for the last part of my study. 
Additionally, unlike Draca et al. (2017) I look at both periods of sanctions being imposed 
and removed. I also only look at the announcement date and do not study the whole period of 
negotiations based on news coverage. Also, the deep state portfolio and designated portfolio in 
my study are different from their target portfolio for the aforementioned reasons. 
 This study finds that a direct sanction against a firm is followed by the targeted firm’s 
short-term cumulative negative returns, -5 percent, as well as long-term negative abnormal 
returns, -41 percent in a 6-month period. The effect is stronger for the deep state firms. The 
results confirm that economic sanctions against a specific industry impose negative abnormal 
returns, almost -2 percent, on the firms in the sanctioned industry. In the case of multiple 
sanctions against a firm by different jurisdictions, the effect of the first sanction is the strongest 
one, -8 percent versus -5 percent. The removal of sanctions leads to positive abnormal returns, 6 
percent for firms affected by direct sanctions and 14 percent for firm targeted by industry 
sanction. The positive abnormal returns are weaker for the deep state firms. The results confirm 




In 2013 and 2015, Iran and the P5+1 signed agreements which lifted the lion's share of 
the sanctions. The data provides valuable insight into how this delisting affected the financial 
markets. We observe a 6 percent positive abnormal return for directly sanctioned firms in a two-
week window ([-7, 7]). The paper reports various time windows, the more expanded windows 
take into account the length of negotiation and the possibility that the success of the talks has 
been gradually signaled or leaked to observers. Firms exposed to the industry sanctions show a 
strong positive response, a 14 percent abnormal positive return. 
 The second aspect of the question is whether the market reaction is different for deep 
state firms, firms controlled by the supreme leader and military. It is well documented that 
politically connected firms show different characteristics and behaviors compared with the non-
politically connected firms. For example, Johnson and Mitton (2003) showed that politically-
connected firms were hit harder than their non-politically connected firms in the wake of the 
Asia financial crisis because the market's perception was that the politically connected firms 
would lose their access to government subsidies, in other words, the playing field would become 
more even.  
 This paper looks at the firms controlled by the deep state. In the case of direct sanctions 
against a firm, the study shows that these firms are hit harder. We see the same behavior when 
the whole industry is subject to sanction: the market imposes a discount on the deep state firms. 
The entire sample faces a 2 percent negative abnormal return, the negative return for firms 
connected to the revolutionary guard is around 8 percent, and for the entire deep state sample 
around 5 percent, the firms which do not belong to the deep state portfolio face a 1.5 percent 




percent discount on the deep state firms. In summary, it is clear that the market imposes a 
significant discount on deep state-controlled firms.  
As a firm's exposure to risk increases, it is reasonable for the firm to decrease its leverage 
and increase its cash holding to manage its risk. The results confirm this hypothesis. In a diff-in-
diff model, the results show that after being designated the firm decreases its leverage to improve 
its risk profile. In the case of cash-holding, designated firms increase their cash-holding ratio. I 
also find that sanctions affect profitability ratios; in a diff-in-diff setting, sanctions decrease the 
firm's profitability. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follow. Part 2 provides a literature review of related 
previous studies. Part 3 familiarizes readers with Iran's economy, sanctions against Iran, 
politically connected economic power in Iran and the nuclear deal. Part 4 describes the data and 
method. Part 5 discusses the results, and part 6 concludes. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Most studies on economic sanctions are done in the realm of international law, 
international relations, and macroeconomics. The financial aspect of economic sanctions is still 
an unexplored sea.  
In the international relations field, the central question which the researchers have asked 
is whether economic sanctions are effective in changing the target country’s policy or not. 
Several studies conclude that only harsh measures can convince the target to make a significant 
change in its plans. (Lam, 1990; Hufbauer and Oegg, 2003; Whang, 2010).  
Hufbauer, Elliott, Oegg, and Schott (2007) concluded that almost 30 percent of the 




(2003) assert that the success of sanctions is positively correlated with the closeness of relations 
between the imposer country and the target country prior to the sanctions. They also find out that 
the success has an inverse association with the relative size of the imposer country to the target 
and the target country's economic and political stability. Lukas and Griswold (2003) assessed 20 
percent of sanctions in their study were effective and by effective they mean if the imposer 
reached to its stated goal as a result of the sanction. In a theoretical paper Beladi (2008) argues 
that from the target country point of view partial compliance plus mild sanctions is an 
equilibrium outcome and Pareto superior to non-compliance and harsh economic sanctions. This 
paper provides the theoretical framework for the results that other researchers have found 
empirically. 
Another critical question is what the macroeconomic effects of economic sanctions are. 
Evenett (2002) shows that the United States' Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act played the 
largest role in reducing bilateral imports between the two countries by a third. Neuenkirch and 
Neumeier (2014) show that on average, UN sanctions decreases the target country’s real per 
capita GDP growth rate by 2.3–3.5 percentage points (pp). According to their study, the adverse 
effect can last for 10 years. They also calculate that comprehensive UN economic sanctions lead 
to 5 percentage point decrease in GDP growth rate. Caruso (2003) shows that US sanctions lead 
to a reduction in GDP growth of the target country. The value over a 7-year period is estimated 
to be 0.5–0.9 percentage points on average. Unilateral extensive sanctions have a substantial 
negative impact on trade between target countries and the other G-7 countries. It is interesting 
that limited and moderate sanctions actually lead to a small increase in trade between the target 
country on other G-7 nations. Bapat and Morgan (2009) argue that multilateral sanctions work 




decrease in trade between the imposer and target while the threat of sanction actually increases 
the flow of trade.  
Shirazi, Azerbaiejani, and Sameti (2015) conclude that the sanctions imposed on Iran 
negatively affected Iran's exports to its traditional trade partners. From 2012 to 2014 the 
country's export exports fell 33 percent on average amounting to 104 billion dollars in loss.  
When it comes to the financial markets of the sanctioned country or the directly 
designated firms, there are not many studies. In the case of South Africa, studies show that 
despite the publicity the boycott received and even though some companies divested, the 
financial markets’ valuations of targeted companies or the South African financial markets 
themselves were not easily visibly affected.  
In a qualitative study regarding the sanctions against Russia, Golikova and Kuznetsov 
(2015) uses a recent survey of manufacturing companies, the managers of these companies claim 
that sanctions could have the most harmful effect on the better performing and globalized 
Russian firms. The closest study to mine is Draca, Garred, Stickland, and Warrinnier (2017) 
which measures stock returns of a specific portfolio to news coverage of nuclear negotiations to 
argue that sanctions against Iran were successful in hitting IRGC and EIKO as the primary target 
of US Treasury. They show that their specific portfolio had an excess abnormal return in 
comparison with another portfolio they created as a non-targeted portfolio. They conclude that it 
shows that sanctions were successful in targeting the income of Treasury's target. They use the 
comprehensive Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT) to identify the news 
about the negotiations and create a coverage measures and then use the coverage measure to see 




respond positively to good news about negotiations but find out that the targeted group portfolio 
reacts more positively. 
The second topic related to this paper is a political connection and how it affects different 
aspects of a firm. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) show the government officials' role in 
allocating contracts to politically connected firms. Fisman (2001); Faccio (2006); Faccio and 
Parsley (2007); Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) study the impact of political connection on the 
value of firm value. Chaney, Faccio, Parsley (2011) show that accounting data of politically 
connected firms have a lower quality. Fisman (2001) studies how political connection in 
Indonesia, in the form of connection with the Suharto family and how negative news about 
Suharto's health negatively affected these firms. Faccio (2006) looks at political connections at a 
country cross-section level and show that higher frequency of political connection is associated 
with corruption and weak legal system. Faccio (2006) provides evidence that in countries with 
high level of corruption as the company's executives assume political offices, the company's 
value increases. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) demonstrate that the higher probability 
of getting bailed out by the government in one channel that increases the value of politically 
connected firms. Faccio and Parsley (2009) study the geographical effect of political connection. 
They show when a senior politician meets an unexpected death, the companies in his hometown 
experience a decrease in value. Shon (2009) looks at the 2000 election and show that industries 
which typically donated more to Republicans had a positive stock reaction when Bush won. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, Kwak, Mitton (2013) show that political connection in the United 




There is a limited body of studies on the role of deep state firms, the firms controlled by 
the IRGC and the supreme leader's financial empire, in Iran's economy. Alfoneh
1
 (2010) 
conclude that the IRGC's business activities are a burden on the country's public sector because 
of the funds directed to the IRGC-controlled companies from public funds. Golkar (2012) 
explains that Basij, the paramilitary branch of the IRGC, entered the economy first to increase 
the welfare of its members. However, it ended to become a dominant force in Iran's economy 
with a presence in many sectors. Stacklow and Dehghan Pisheh (2013) estimated that one of the 
three main foundations controlled by the supreme leader, Execution of Imam Khomeini Order 
(EIKO), owns $95 billion of assets. Dubowitz and Ghasseminejad (2018) estimated the value of 
the assets controlled by the three foundations controlled by the Supreme Leader to be around 
$200 billion. Ottolenghi, Ghasseminejad, Fixler, and Toumaj (2016) summarized the expert 
estimates of the percentage of IRGC's control over Iran's economy to be around 25 to 40 percent. 
Ottolenghi and Ghasseminejad (2015) used the Tehran Stock Exchange as a proxy for Iran's 
economy and estimated the deep state's share to be at least 25 percent of Iran's economy. They 
explained that given the deep state's control of Iran's underground economy which has been 
estimated to be 6 to 36 percent of the country's GDP by different experts at different times, the 
deep state's share of Iran's economy should be higher than the 25 percent. 
This paper also discusses the effect of sanctions on the targeted firms' capital structure. 
Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Leland (1994, 1998), and Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 
(2001) show that firms periodically readjust their capital structure toward a target ratio. The 
target ratio changes as firm's characteristics and environment change. High leverage is associated 
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with higher risk, as a result when a firm becomes risky one of its options would be to reduce its 
leverage. For example, cash flow volatility is associated with lower leverage (Bradley, Jarrell, 
and Kim, 1984; Wald, 1999; Booth et al., 2001).  Faccio, Lang and Young (2003) show that in 
weak protection environment, higher leverage gives the controlling shareholder more 
opportunity to expropriate. Faccio (2010) looks at firms from 47 countries and finds that 
politically connected firms have higher leverage. Saeed, Belghitar, and Clark (2014) find that 
Pakistani firms with political connection had  higher leverage between 2002 and 2010. They also 
find that politically connected firms are less efficient in their investment decisions and political 
connection is associated with negative firm performance. Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2009) 
show  firm increases its leverage after it becomes politically connected. 
1.3 Background on Iran, Its Economy and Sanctions 
1.3.1 A Brief History of Sanctions against Iran 
Iran is one of the most sanctioned countries on earth. Table 1 provides a list and 
descriptions of sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States, United Nations and European 
Union between 1979 and 2013. 
 Following the Islamic revolution of 1979, where the Shah of Iran, an important ally of 
the United States, was toppled and replaced with an Islamist government, the relation between 
Iran and the United States has been stormy. On November 4, 1979, Islamist students, backed by 
Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini attacked the U.S. embassy in Tehran and 
took US diplomats hostage. Tehran kept the U.S. hostages in Tehran for 444 days. This led to the 
first round of US sanctions against Tehran which blocked the Iranian regime's properties and 




accord and release of hostages. In 1983, the pro-Tehran groups in Beirut bombed the US. 
Embassy and marines barrack which killed more than 400 people, the majority of them 
Americans. As a result, the U.S. designated Iran as the state sponsor of terror and in 1984 banned 
arms sales to Iran. In 1987, the import of all goods, including oil, from Iran was forbidden. In 
1995, the Clinton administration banned US investment in Iran. One year later, the U.S. banned 
any investment more than $20 million in Iran's oil sector. In the early 2000s, the United States 
introduced a few authorities to sanction Iran for supporting terrorism and its proliferation of 
WMD (weapons of mass destruction). 
In 2003, IAEA confirmed the presence of undeclared nuclear sites in Iran which led to 
negotiation between Iran and the three European powers. As a result of the negotiations, Iran 
agreed to freeze its nuclear program. However, in 2005, Tehran reactivated the program. 
Following Iran's reactivation of the nuclear program, a new series of sanctions have been 
imposed on Iran to force it to suspend its nuclear program. This new round of sanctions was an 
international effort which included sanctions imposed by the United Nations, the United States, 
and the European Union.  
In July 2006, the UN Security Council issued UNSCR 1696 which asked states to 
"exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer" of material to Iran, related to the country's nuclear 
and ballistic missile program. In September 2006, the United States Congress passed the Iran 
Freedom Support Act which whose target was Iran's weapons of mass destruction program and 
sophisticated conventional weapons. It also codified the U.S. trade ban.  
In December 2006, the UN Security Council issued UNSCR 1797 which prohibited the 
export of "items, materials, equipment, goods and technology" related to nuclear weapon and its 




In February 2007, the European Union issued the Council Common Position 
2007/140/CFSP against Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program and persons and entities 
involved in it. There were a few other resolutions till 2010; none of them had the sharp teeth to 
strongly pressure Iran. In 2010, both US and EU targeted Iran's oil and gas industry. The United 
States sanctioned the sale of gasoline to Iran or supporting its domestic gasoline industry. 
Additionally, the U.S. Sanctioned foreign financial institutions connected with WMD or 
terrorism. The EU also banned the export of all arms to Iran and banned the export of vital oil 
and gas equipment and technology.  
In 2011, the United States expanded its sanction on Iran's energy and financial sector. It 
used the executive order 13590 to ban assistance to maintain or expand petroleum resources in 
Iran. Iran's financial sector was designated as jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern. 
The United States demanded other countries to limit their import of oil from Iran. In January 
2012, the EU prohibited the import of oil and petrochemical products and related insurance, 
reinsurance and transport services and prohibited sales of precious metals to Iran. Two months 
later, EU denied Iran the access to SWIFT. In July 2012, the United States, via the executive 
order 13622, sanctioned foreign financial institutions that assisted Iran to sell its oil. 
In August 2012, the United States demanded that Iran's oil purchasers to not to send Iran 
its oil money and keep it in escrow accounts. Two months later, EU banned the purchase of 
natural gas from Iran. In January 2013, the United States sanctioned the country's energy sector, 
including shipping, shipbuilding and insurance and reinsurance of related activities. It also 
sanctioned trading of precious metals with Iran. Additionally, the U.S. sanctioned the automotive 




The financial and oil sanctions were the most effective sanctions imposed on Iran. Not 
only Iran was not able to sell its oil as before, the country was not able to repatriate the money. 
As shown in Table 2 and graph 1, Iran's oil export in the pre-sanction era was $2.5 million barrel 
per day, after the sanction it went down to 1 million barrel per day. Iran's access to hard currency 
was significantly reduced which showed itself in the form of extreme devaluation of its currency.  
As graph 2 shows Iran's GDP growth fell from 5.8 percent in 2010, to 2.6 percent in 
2011, and to -7.4 percent in 2012. The same trend was present in the numbers provided by the 
Central bank of Iran for Persian years. Table 3 shows that Iran's GDP growth was -6.8 percent in 
March 2012- March 2013 period, next year the GDP growth rate was -1.9%. The inflation in 
March 2012-March 2013 period was 28.6 percent; next year's inflation was 32.1 percent. Graph 
3 shows that the main source of the drop in GDP growth came from the oil sector. 
 Consequently Iran entered into negotiations with the P5+1 (US, Russia, China, France, 
UK, and Germany). In November 2013, the two sides reached to an agreement to temporarily 
suspend part of the nuclear program and the sanctions. As a result of the JPOA, Iran's economy 
started to gain, the inflation went down and the GDP growth rate went up. In 2015, both sides 
signed a comprehensive agreement which removed a more substantial part of sanctions in 
exchange for suspension or roll back of a larger portion of Iran's nuclear program. 
1.3.2 The Nuclear Deal and Sanctions Relief 
In July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 reached an agreement called the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran agreed to suspend and roll back part of its nuclear program in 




The JCPOA linked the initial sanctions relief to preliminary nuclear benchmarks. In the 
JCPOA, the most significant sanctions relief was granted on Implementation Day. This included 
all companies owned by the supreme leader but the sanctions relief provided to the IRGC-owned 
companies was much less generous. Following the implementation day, after periods of time 
ranging from five to fifteen years, more sanctions will be removed.  
Majority of sanctions on Iran were imposed by the United States and EU, even though 
Canada Japan and a few other countries had their own sanctions beyond what the UN Security 
Council resolutions have asked for.  
Below are some specific terminology to understand the sanctions timetable and process 
of the sanctions relief under the JCPOA: 
 Joint Plan of Action: Iran offered a temporary freeze of portions of its 
nuclear program in exchange for partial temporary economic sanctions relief provided by 
the international community, as long as both sides were negotiating a long-term 
agreement. November 24, 2013 
 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: In July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 
reached an agreement called the Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action (JCPOA).  
 Adoption Day: Iran started implementing measures in line with JCPOA. 
The P5+1 took the required regulatory steps to lift or suspend sanctions. (October 18, 
2015) 
 Implementation Day: the U.S., EU, and UN suspended some sanctions as 





 Transition Day: Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA 
announces its broader conclusion regarding Iran's nuclear activities are peaceful. The 
U.S., EU, and UN terminate specific sanctions. (October 18, 2023) 
The removal of sanctions led to a slow but steady improvement in Iran's economic 
indicator. According to the World Bank, in 2016, the year that the nuclear deal was implemented 
the country saw a 13.4 percent GDP growth. According to OPEC, in 2016, Iran almost doubled 
its exports of crude oil almost. Tehran’s income from oil exports grew by more than two-thirds 
in 2016-2017, a $24 billion increase, IMF reported. Iran also successfully curbed the inflation 
which went from 40% in 2013 to around 13 percent in 2015. 
1.3.3 The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is Iran's main military force and a key 
player in the country's economy and politics. Established in 1979 by supporters of Ayatollah 
Rouhollah Khomeini, its goal was to consolidate the Islamic Revolution, fight its enemies, and a 
counterweight to Iran's Army, previously known as the Royal Army, to neutralize any potential 
coup. Over the years, the IRGC has evolved to become a full-fledged conventional army, a 
business empire, and a political powerhouse. 
It is essential to understand the military, economic, and political power of the IRGC and 
its critical role in Iran. The Guards exploits growing economic clout to influence the country's 
domestic and foreign policy. Its economic capability advances the IRGC's general agenda. Its 
revenues from economic activities allow the Guards to gain political leverage, buy loyalty and 
positions of power. On the other hand, its political power permits the Guards to secure lucrative 




The IRGC sees the economy through revolutionary ideology glass rather than market 
logic. The Islamic Republic Constitution notes, “The economy is a means that is not expected to 
do anything except better facilitate reaching the goal.”
2
 The Guards wants to ensure the system 
against disrupting market forces. Its goal is to ensure that market forces, as they bring prosperity 
and progress, do not turn against the revolution. Over the past few years, Supreme Leader 
Khamenei has quietly acted to create a “Resistance Economy”.
3
 Resistance economy doctrine 
tries to ensure the economy against future sanctions while the regime pursues its goals, 
domestically and internationally. 
The IRGC's significant involvement in Iran’s economy began at the end of the Iran-Iraq 
war in 1989. After the eight-year war with Iraq, the country's infrastructures were almost 
destroyed and Iran faced low oil prices. Consequently, Tehran focused on economic 
reconstruction. The IRGC claims Rafsanjani, at the time president, asked them to enter the 
economy. The Guards had already been receiving a significant portion of the countries' resources 
during the war, especially in the construction sector. The new president reportedly ordered state 
entities to finance themselves by getting involved in business activities. Consequently, by 
branching out into the economy, the IRGC was able to secure independent financing sources 
which led to a more independent IRGC. In the 90s, the IRGC dived into Iran's economy through 
its construction conglomerate Khatam al-Anbiya, and created numerous of subsidiaries across 
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the Iranian economy, the Guards business empire.
4
 I have identified more than 700 IRGC-owned 
companies and 1600 managers related to these companies. 
When Rafsanjani began his presidency, IRGC had a limited role in Iran’s economy. 
When he left office, the IRGC had become a leading player. Over the next decade, the IRGC 
became a dominant actor, involved in almost every sector of the economy such as the food 
industry, manufacturing companies, telecommunications, and the energy sector.  
The IRGC penetrated Iran’s economy gradually; a historic point was in 2004 when the 
Guards seized Tehran’s new Imam Khomeini Airport to protest the involvement of a Turkish 
company in the managing the airport. IRGC forces shut down the runway; they claimed the 
Turkish firm, picked to manage the airport, had ties to a “Zionist company.” In fact, the IRGC's 
goal was to control the airport itself. The takeover of Iran’s main international airport signaled a 
change to everyone: henceforth, the IRGC would hold a right of first refusal for large projects in 
Iran. 
A turning point was May 2005 when Supreme Leader Khamenei issued a decree 
demanding a vast privatization program over a five-year period.
5
 The industries involved 
included “large-scale oil and low-end gas industries, mines, foreign trade, many banks, 
shareholder-owned cooperatives, power generation, many postal services, roads, railroads, 
aviation, and shipping.”
6
 The primary beneficiary of the privatization as the Parliament Research 
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Center later announced was not the private sector. The quasi-public sector, a euphemism for the 
IRGC and Supreme Leader, was the most important beneficiary. 
7
 
Following the disputed election of 2009 which led to the widespread protests known as 
the green revolution, it was the IRGC that successfully saved the system; the "Guards" was 
rewarded by lucrative deals which increased its influence over Iran's economy. Chief among 
them was the deal to buy the Telecommunication Company of Iran, at the time worth $8 billion. 
Since then the guards have kept their significant role in Iran's economy, no matter who has been 
the president. 
1.3.4 The Foundation Controlled by the Supreme Leader 
The Supreme Leader also controls significant portions of the Iranian economy. According 
to the U.S. Treasury, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s financial empire is a “shadowy network 
of off-the-books front companies.”
8
 The Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order, or EIKO; the 
Mostazafan Foundation; and the Astan Quds Razavi are involved almost every sector of Iran's 
economy.  
All three of them have acquired a considerable share of their assets from the systematic 
confiscation of dissidents' properties. They do not pay taxes, and they cannot be audited unless 
the supreme leader's office allows it. They use their political connections to receive lucrative 
contracts from the government. A Reuters investigation estimated EIKO's worth to be around 
$95 billion.  
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The Mostazafan foundation controls hundreds of companies and a massive portfolio of 
real estate assets. The foundation recently published its annual financial statements which 
declared its assets to be around $16 billion. Such numbers should be interpreted with caution, as 
the foundation has every incentive to under-declare its assets. However, even if we believe that 
the accounts are accurate, we need to keep in mind that these numbers reflect the book value of 
these assets when in fact the market value of Mostazafan's assets may far exceed this; in 
particular since the Mostazafan foundation has a sizeable real estate portfolio, the majority of it 
acquired either through confiscation or political connections at reduced prices or even at zero 
cost which keeps the door open for manipulation of its accounts.  
Astan Quds Razavi and its business arm, the Razavi Economic Organization, is the third 
entity. Astan controls three eastern provinces of Iran. Its absolute control over these three states 
has earned  the custodian of the Astan Quds Razavi  a nickname: Sultan of Khorasan. Its real 
estate portfolio is valued at around $20 billion, and it owns nearly half of the lands in Mashhad, 
the second largest city in the country. The Astan owns companies in almost all lucrative sectors 
of Iran's economy from oil and gas to agriculture.  
The U.S. Treasury Department designated EIKO and 37 of its Iranian and overseas 
subsidiaries in June 2013, saying that the goal of the designation was “to generate and control 
massive, off-the-books investments, shielded from the view of the Iranian people and 
international regulators.”
9
 Then-Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David 
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Cohen said, “Even as economic conditions in Iran deteriorate, senior Iranian leaders profit from a 
shadowy network of off-the-books front companies.”
10
 
Treasury sanctioned EIKO and subsidiaries – including a number of foreign companies – 
under Executive Order 13599, which targeted Iran’s government-owned entities. As the Treasury 
explained, EIKO was specifically “tasked with assisting the Iranian Government’s circumvention 
of U.S. and international sanctions.”
11
  
U.S. sanctions had a chilling effect on EIKO’s business ventures abroad, especially in 
Europe.
12
 An EIKO subsidiary, Tadbir Energy Group, unsuccessfully bid for a refinery in France 
in 2012; and in April 2015, another EIKO bid to buy a refinery in Switzerland was rejected, 
reportedly due to concerns over U.S. sanctions. In July 2015, under the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Obama administration delisted EIKO and its subsidiaries  
1.3.5 A Brief History of the Tehran Stock Exchange 
The Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) opened on February 4, 1968, before the Islamic 
revolution of 1979.
13
 In the 68-79 period, number of listed stocks grew from 6 to 105 with a 
market value around $2.3 billion. After the revolution for a decade, the TSE was in a semi-recess 
due to political unrest, the Iran-Iraq war, and anti-capitalist sentiment and mentality of the new 
revolutionary government. Number of listing went down from 105 to 56, and the trading volume 
decreased from $340 million in 1979 to $10 million in 1989.  
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After the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the new 
government led by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani adopted a more market-friendly policy with an 
emphasis on privatization. As a result, Rafsanjani's government decided to revive the TSE. 
Khatami followed Rafsanjani’s economic policy. As a result, the TSE experienced steady 
growth, number of listings increased from 56 in 1989 to 422 in 2005.  
In May 2005, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared his decree reinterpreting Article 44 
permitting the government to privatize many industries
14
 including “large-scale oil and low-end 
gas industries, mines, foreign trade, many banks, shareholder-owned cooperatives, power 
generation, many postal services, roads, railroads, aviation, and shipping. Khamenei's directive 
obliged the government to transfer ownership of 25 percent of Iran's economy to the cooperative 
sector by the end of the five-year plan and to support expansion of cooperatives with tax rebates 
and loan guarantees with the aim of encouraging cooperatives to participate in all spheres of the 
economy, including banking and insurance.”  
Following Khamenei’s decree, from 2005 t0 2015, the executive branch sold 55 percent 
of its assets in the stock exchange; $8.3 billion of it in 2015 alone. This is a testimony to the 
importance of TSE in the privatization and capital raising process. 
The market value of Tehran’s Stock Exchange has been about 15 to 20% of Iran’s GDP 
in the past few years.
15
 This is lower than the average number for advanced post-industrial 
economies, World Bank study shows.
16
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The IRGC's involvement in the stock market is focused on strategic industries, such as 
mining, telecom, petrochemical, and automotive industry. The Khamenei-owned empire has a 
presence in many other sectors, including less strategic sector. Former senior IRGC 
commanders, sit on many of the boards of these and other companies. The IRGC’s share of TSE, 
around 20 percent in the past few years, is a good indicator of the Guards’ control over Iran’s 
economy. It shows that the post-2005 privatization process has helped the IRGC to expand its 
control. 
1.4 Data and Methods 
The paper relies on Rahavard Novin software and TSE website to gather market data and 
accounting data at the firm, industry, and market level from 2000 to 2016. The data availability 
widely varies across variables. As a result, the paper uses different time periods for different 
regressions based on the availability of the data. I use the U.S. treasury, EU Council, and the 
United Nation Security Council’s press releases to create our sanctions database. I identify the 
announcement date of each sanction or UNSC resolution and their target which can include an 
entity, industry or the whole country. These sanctions and their dates are explained in table 1 and 
appendix 1, 2, and 3. 
Next, I identify two types of politically-connected firms: the companies controlled by the 
Iranian military and those controlled by the Supreme Leader’s business empire. This is the 
Iranian-deep state. To do this, I rely on a project I have been doing at the Foundation for Defense 
of Democracies and its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance where I have identified more than 
1000 firms controlled by the Iranian deep state. 
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The total number of firms in my study is 350, of which 50 companies, 14 percent, belong 
to the deep state. The IRGC owns 28 firms and the supeme leader owns 24 firm. The detail is 
provided in Appendix 5. Keep in mind that, the number of firms with available data for different 
tests varies. On Average, deep state firms account for 23 percent of the market value of the 
Tehran Stock Exchange in the period of interests, with the market value calculated at the end of 
each year. The rest of the sample consists of firms controlled by private investors or other 
government-controlled entities, the executive branch. The bulk of the latter category consists of 
firms controlled by the country's national pension and insurance funds. I consider a firm 
controlled by the deep state if entities controlled by them have more than 50 percent of the share 
of the company or majority of the seats on the board. This is a very conservative measure and a 
rule used by the U.S. Treasury to designate firms effectively controlled by a DSN entity until 
now. There is currently a bill in the U.S. Congress under consideration which will change this 
standard, but for the purpose of this study, I follow what has been the rule in place during the 
timeframe of interest of this study. A military-controlled firm is a firm which is either controlled 
by the IRGC or the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Armed Forces. A firm is IRGC-controlled if the 
IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Basij Cooperative Foundation, Khatam-al-Anbiya Construction 
Headquarter or entities controlled by them control 50 percent plus 1 shares or majority of the 
seats on the board. A company is controlled by the Armed forces if it is controlled by the Armed 
Forces pension fund, Armed forces social security fund, or armed forces insurance fund. A 
Khamenei-controlled firm is a firm controlled by the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order, 
Mostazafan Foundation, Astan Quds Razavi or their subsidiaries. In appendix 4, I explain in 
detail how I identify the IRGC-controlled firms. I use the same method to identify the firms 




The trade data is available between 1995 and 2016. I look at the sanctions imposed after 
2005 and use the data between 2000 and 2016.  The trade data is available for 19 events of direct 
sanctions against a firm, which means either the U.S. or EU sanctioned a firm for the firm's 
previous action. These 19 events belong to 14 unique firms. In some cases, the firm was 
designated twice.  
For the industry sanctions, where the U.S. or EU designated a whole industry, and as a 
result, the publicly traded firms in that industry became subject to sanctions. The trade data is 
available for 89 observations of this kind of sanctions. When I eliminate the firms which had 
already been designated at the time that the industry sanction was imposed, the number of 
observations shrinks to 72. 
I also look at the sanctions removal effect which happened in 4 waves described as 
below: 
 Joint Plan of Action: Iran offered a temporary freeze of portions of its 
nuclear program in exchange for partial temporary economic sanctions relief provided by 
the international community, as long as both sides were negotiating a long-term 
agreement. (November 24, 2013) 
 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: In July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 
reached an agreement called the Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran 
agreed to suspend and roll back part of its nuclear program in return for the lifting of 
international sanctions. (July 14, 2015) 
 Adoption Day: Iran started implementing measures in line with JCPOA. 





 Implementation Day: the U.S., EU, and UN suspended some sanctions as 
the IAEA announced Iran completed specific activities required by the JCPOA. (January 
16, 2016) 
Cumulatively these 4 sanction removal waves provided this study with 250 observations 
related to industry sanctions and 70 observations related to direct sanctions. I also give the results 
for each of the four events.  
The second part of the analysis focuses on the capital structure and firm's performance. 
Table 4, I gather data for all firms from Rahavard Novin between 2000 and 2016. I exclude 
public-sector firms, financial institutions, and utilities. I do not retain firms with book leverage 
above one or a negative cash holding ratio; independent variables are trimmed at the 1% level. 
The availability of data varies for differs across variables from 2206 observation to 3096 
observations.  
Compared with the same variables in the US for the period of 1963 to 2013, the Iranian 
firms have a higher level of tangibility, almost twice the US level, 48 vs. 25 percent in terms of 
median. They also have a higher market to book ratio median, 1.36 vs. 0.99; Iranian firms in my 
sample keep a lower percentage of cash, almost half of US average over the past 50 years, are 
less leveraged and have higher profitability ratio. When talking about profitability, we should 
keep in mind that Iran suffers from high inflation and  these measures are in local currency. Rial 
depreciates each year significantly. Between 2000 and 2016, rial lost 78 percent of its values 
against dollar in terms of the market rate, the market value of rial against dollar. In terms of the 
official rate, the limited cheap dollar provided by the Central Bank of Iran to certain persons and 
entities, rial lost 95percent of its value. The data shows some difference between the mean value 




For example, the directly sanctioned firms prior to designation have a higher average market to 
book ratio, higher profitability, and cash holding. The pre-designation values are close to each 
other for firms targeted by industry sanction and the whole sample. Firms connected to the deep 
state in the sample have a lower average profitability ratio than the entire sample.  
I use several events study methods for several windows; these methods are 
simultaneously applied to provide a broader picture and a higher level of confidence in the 
results. I explain these methods below: 
Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR): Realized buy-and-hold return minus the 
expected buy-and-hold return calculated as below 
Market Adjusted Return Model and Market Model are used to calculate CAR. The 
presented results are based on the market adjusted returns; market model results are used for 
robustness test but not reported. 
Patell test: Patell (1976) tests the null hypothesis that the "cumulative average abnormal 
return is equal to zero." It assumes that "abnormal returns are uncorrelated and variance is 
constant over time." Patell test standardizes individual abnormal returns by their estimated 
standard deviation. 
T-test: Assumes cross-sectional independence according to Serra (2002, p. 4). 
CDA test: The crude dependence adjustment test according to Brown and Warner (1980, 
pp. 223, 253).  
Boehmer test: Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) provide this measure which is a 
combination of standardized residuals test and an estimated variance estimate. (Boehmer et al., 




Corrado rank test (Corrado, 1989, pp. 387-388): For cumulative (average) abnormal 
returns, the aggregation formula in Cowan (1992, p. 346) is applied. 
The Corrado and Zivney rank test: Corrected for the event-induced volatility of 
rankings (Corrado and Zivney, 1992, pp. 345-346). For cumulative (average) abnormal returns, 
the aggregation formula in Cowan (1992, p. 346) is applied. 
The generalized sign test: This is a test suggested by Cowan (1992) which uses the ratio 
of positive cumulative abnormal returns over the event window. It tests the null hypothesis that 
the aforementioned ratio and the ratio of positive cumulative abnormal returns over the 
estimation window should not deviate from each other. 
I use several estimation windows from day -7 to day 7. The reason to have such long 
window is that in some cases the negotiations were taking place for several days; as a result, it is 
possible the outcome was partially known before the announcement day. 
 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Market Reaction to Sanctions and Sanctions Relief 
1.5.1.1 Imposed Sanctions 
First, I look at how the market responds to the news that a firm has been directly 
sanctioned. These are the firms which have been sanctioned either by the United States or the 
European Union. Some of them were sanctioned by both entities. Keep in mind that these are the 




available around the designation event. Nineteen of these events are available for the purpose of 
this study, of which 14 are first-time designations. 
I find that these firms experience a negative abnormal return around the announcement 
day. The results, provided in table 5, show a negative 1.9 percent for the [0;1] window and a 
negative 5.7 percent for [-4;4] window. The Patell test shows all windows to be significant at 1 
percent level; other methods provide statistically significant results for some windows. For 
example, the t-test and CDA show the results are significant for 6 of 10 windows. This provides 
a high level of confidence that the results are reliable.  
Next, I look at the subsample of first-time designations. The question is whether it is 
justified to assume that when the U.S. designates a firm, if a few months later EU decides to 
sanction it, the market reaction is going to be smaller. In other words, the response for the first-
time sanctions is stronger. That is what the data confirms. The first time designations have a 
much stronger effect. As we see in table 6 not only they are more statistically significant, they 
are also more economically significant.  
As I mentioned, t-test and CDA show the results are significant for 6 of 10 windows for 
the whole sample; for the subsample of first-time designations, t-test shows 9 of 10 windows to 
be significant, and CDA shows 8 of 10. 
As we see in table 7, differences in economic magnitude are also considerable. The 
difference in the cumulative abnormal return ranges from -3 percentage points to -1.2 percentage 
points. For the [-7;3] the effect is three percentage points larger for the first time designation 




bigger for the first time designation subsample in the [0;3] window and twice in the [0;7] 
window. 
The results clearly show that the first time designation is the most important one. The 
result also makes a valuable suggestion that unilateral sanctions actually work, at least at the firm 
level, even though it does not provide conclusive evidence. This is an important suggestion 
because it goes against the mainstream consensus that unilateral sanctions do not actually work. 
However, the results suggest that they actually do, if a powerful country such as the United 
States or an important economic/political block such as the European Union imposes those 
sanctions.  
In 2011 and 2012 the United States and European Union imposed crippling sanctions on 
Iran's energy, petrochemical, and financial sector. In 2013, Iran's automotive industry was also 
targeted by the United States. It is noteworthy that the automotive sanction happened 8 months 
before the JPOA was signed. These sanctions included 90 firms.  
I predict that firms in the sanctioned industries experience a negative abnormal return 
around the public announcement of the sanction, the effect is stronger for the deep state firms. 
Table 8 shows the results for the whole sample of firms affected by the industry 
sanctions. The number of significant windows is less than the direct sanctions case, so is the 
economic significance. There is a negative 1.5 percent abnormal return. 
Then I look at the first time designated subsample. In this version, if a firm belongs to the 
sanctioned industry and it had already been sanctioned at the time when the industry sanction 




significance and economic magnitude improve. Results are provided in table 9. More windows 
are statistically significant and the highest abnormal return, [-7;7] window, goes up to -2 percent.  
The comparison table, table 10, shows an increase in the negative abnormal return in all 
windows, up to -0.8 percentage points. This proves the previously mentioned point that the first 
sanctions are the most important ones.  
Next, I look at the long-term effect of sanctions on the firms' return via a buy and hold 
analysis. The results are provided in table 11 and graph 4. The result shows a strong negative 
abnormal return trend over the long term for the directly-sanctioned firms. For the whole sample, 
it is almost -8 percent after a month and -41 percent after 6 months. For the subsample of first-
time designations, it is -12 percent after a month and -43 percent after 6 months. Jahan Parvar 
and Mohammadi (2013) show that the Tehran Stock Exchange is CAPM-efficient at the monthly 
level. They also indicate that Tehran Stock Exchange is integrated with the international 
financial market at the regional level. The long-term cumulative abnormal return of these 
sanctions is worth a deeper study which is beyond the defined scope of this research. 
1.5.1.2 Sanctions Removal 
In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 reached an agreement to temporarily suspend parts 
of the nuclear program and the sanctions. In 2015, both sides signed a comprehensive agreement 
which removed a more significant portion of sanctions in exchange for suspension or rollback of 
a more substantial part of Iran's nuclear program. The sanctions removal process went through 4 
phases and important dates: 
 Joint Plan of Action: Iran offered a temporary freeze of portions of its 




the international community, as long as both sides were negotiating a long-term 
agreement. November 24, 2013 
 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: In July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 
reached an agreement called the Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action (JCPOA).  
 Adoption Day: Iran started implementing measures in line with JCPOA. 
The P5+1 took the required regulatory steps to lift or suspend sanctions. (October 18, 
2015) 
 Implementation Day: the U.S., EU, and UN suspended some sanctions as 
the IAEA announced Iran completed certain activities required by the JCPOA. (January 
16, 2016) 
Cumulatively these 4 sanction removal waves provide this study with 250 observations 
related to industry sanctions and 70 observations related to direct sanctions. I also provide the 
results for each of the four events for industry sanctions. In other words, for the direct sanctions 
portfolio the study only looks at the cumulative case, but for the industry sanction, the paper 
provides the results for the cumulative case and also for each delisting event. 
Let's first look at the firms which have been part of the direct sanctions portfolio. Results 
are provided in table 12. As we see, there is a healthy positive abnormal return associated with 
these four waves of sanctions removal. The results are statistically significant for most tests and 
windows. For a two week[-7;7] window the associated cumulative abnormal return is 6 percent. 
For the industry sanctions portfolio when I combine all 4 waves, I have around 250 
observations. The results in table 13 show a strong, statistically and economically, positive 
abnormal return for this portfolio, as high as 14 percent for the two-week window, [-7;7]. For 




In the JPOA event, the first wave of sanctions removal, I see a more considerable 
reaction. The results are shown in tables 14-A and 14-B and are statistically and economically 
significant for most tests and windows. In this case, for the [-7;7] window I see a 17 percent 
cumulative abnormal return, roughly 3 percent more than the whole sample. The same trend is 
observable in other windows. It is essential to keep in mind that the JPOA temporarily suspended 
the sanctions on Iran's automotive and petrochemical sector, more than 80 percent of the firms in 
this portfolio. In table 14-B I only look at the firms in the petrochemical and automotive 
industry; the two sectors which received full sanctions relief under the JPOA. I find that the 
positive abnormal return for them has been stronger, 19 percent compared with 17 percent for the 
whole sample of JPOA; and 5 percent more than the full sample for the 4 waves of sanctions 
relief. 
In July 2015, P5+1 and Iran signed the JCPOA. Interestingly, this event is associated 
with negative abnormal return for the industry sanction which is statistically significant. The 
results are presented in table 14-C. This can have several reasons. Either this portfolio has 
already cashed out the maximum benefit it could get from the sanctions relief or the market 
expectation was higher than what Iran achieved in the nuclear deal for this portfolio. The results 
for the next waves of sanctions relief suggest that the latter is more convincing. This portfolio 
experienced a negative 4 percent abnormal return in a two weeks window [-7;7] and a negative 
10 percent abnormal return in [0;7] window. The combination shows the negative weight is 
much stronger in the post-event window, a sign that the market was disappointed in the actual 
results. 
The industry sanction portfolio had a more positive reaction to the October 18, 2015 




across he windows to this event as big as 3 percent. We see some negative abnormal return for 
two windows which are not statistically significant. 
The last event is the implementation day in January 2016. The result in table 14-E shows 
another strong positive abnormal return for the portfolio across the windows, which are 
statistically significant. The two-week window, [-7;7], shows 18 percent cumulative abnormal 
return. 
1.5.1.3 Deep State Firms 
The firms controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the business empire 
controlled by Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are called deep state firms because 
the supreme leader and the guards are the ones with the real power in Iran.  
Looking at the industry sanctions sample, I will find that the adverse effect is stronger for 
the IRGC firms in those sanctioned industries. The results are presented in table 15. For all 
events, it is -3.6 percent for IRGC firms versus -1.4 percent for the sample of all firms for the [-
7;7] window. Looking at the first-time designation sample, the cumulative abnormal negative 
return is -8 percent for IRGC firms versus -2.4 percent for all firms for the [-7;7] window. 
Looking at the whole sample of the deep state firms, I see the same pattern for the sample of first 
designation firms. The deep state firms in the [-7;7] window experience a -5.3 percent 
cumulative abnormal return versus -2 percent return for all firms: -3.2 percent percentage points 
difference. The most interesting part is the subsample of non-deep state firms for the first time 
designation sample. The non-deep state firms face a -1.5 percent cumulative abnormal return 
which is 0.5 percentage point less than the whole sample of first designation firms. The results 




I also look at how being part of the deep state portfolio affects the cumulative abnormal 
return following the delisting. For the cumulative abnormal return, I use the two-week window. 
Something important to keep in mind is that the supreme leader's business empire was also 
delisted as part of the nuclear deal while the revolutionary guards' business empire was not. This 
is actually reflected in the results.  
In table 16, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for a two-week 
window. The deep state variable is one if the firm is part of the IRGC or supreme leader's 
business empire. The deep state variable has a 4 percent negative effect, which is statistically 
significant. The supreme leader dummy variable, one if the company is part of the supreme 
leader's business empire, is not significant, economically or statistically. However, the 
coefficient is negative five percent and significant for the IRGC dummy. The results for deep 
state, the supreme leader, and IRGC dummies remain the same after controlling for size, 
leverage and return on assets. The results show that firms with more assets and leverage had 
higher positive abnormal returns in response to the sanctions delisting. Larger firms have always 
been the prime target of sanctions and have been more dependent on foreign trade which can 
explain why they had a more positive reaction. Larger firms were perceived to have a higher risk 
of being designated when the threat of sanction decreased, they had a better reaction.   
Next, I do the same analysis for directly sanctioned firms. Results are provided in table 
17. The deep state dummy is significant; the coefficient value is -19 percent. After controlling 
for size, leverage, and profitability, the coefficient is still significant and -23 percent which is 




1.5.2 Sanctions and Capital Structure 
Another important question is how the sanctions affect the capital structure of firms. It is 
rational to assume that firms which are subject to sanction reduce their leverage and increase 
their cash holding as a response to their higher level of risk perceived by the market. 
In table 18, I run a regression with leverage as the dependent variable and market to 
book, return on asset, size, and tangibility as independent variables. Industry (direct) Sanction 
Policy is a dummy variable which is always 1 for the firms subject to industry (direct) sanctions 
and zero otherwise. Industry (direct) Sanction Post is 1 for firms subject to industry (direct) 
sanctions after time t at which the sanction was imposed and zero otherwise. Here we have a 
diff-in-diff environment. The second variable measures the net effect of sanction on leverage, the 
first variable makes sure that what we see in the net effect is not present in the firm's behavior 
before and after the event. The regression is mainly interested in the second coefficient. The 
results suggest that sanctions force firm to reduce their leverage.  
Another interesting point is that the deep state portfolio and its subgroup, military firms, 
have a lower leverage ratio. Deep state firms have almost 2 percent and military firms have 
almost 4 percent less leverage. This is in line with the explanation that these types of firms are 
perceived as riskier by the market; to manage their risk they keep their leverage low, at least in 
my sample and in this specific range of time. 
In Table 19, I look at the cash holding ratio. My dependent variable is the cash holding 
ratio. My dependent variables are cash flow ratio, size, and market to book ratio, leverage, deep 
state dummy and sanctions variables. I have 6 sanctions variables belonging to 3 groups. The 




policy and post. The "Policy" is 1 all the time for firms which are sanctioned. The "Post" is  1 
only after when the designation is announced.  
I find that firms with higher market to book and cash flow ratio have lower cash holding 
ratio while larger firms have higher cash holding. I also find that deep state firms in my sample 
have a lower level of cash holding ratio but, almost -0.8 percentage point.  
 Only the post variable in the "all sanctions" category is significant and positive, 1.6 
percent increase in cash holding ratio. It means that as a result of sanctions, the designated firms 
increase their cash holding ratio. This is in line with the expectation that these firms are 
managing their perceived increase in risk by increasing their cash holding ratio. The Post 
variable for the two other sanctions categories is positive but not significant. 
In table 20, I look at how different groups of sanctions affect different profitability 
measures of targeted firms. Panel A, includes all sanctions. Panel B includes the industry 
sanctions and panel C only includes the direct sanctions. The three measures I include are return 
on assets, return on sales and return on  working capital which are my independent variables. I 
do not include many control variables as I am only interested in the general effect of these 
sanctions. I include size. Sanction Policy variable is 1 all the time for firms which have been 
sanctioned at some point. Sanction Post variable is 1 for the sanctioned firm only after the 
designation is announced.   The results show a substantial negative impact on profitability 
measures as a result of the sanctions. All measures show the negative effect but the effect is 
stronger for direct sanctions. Direct sanction is associated with 7 percent drop in return on assets 





In this paper for the first time, I comprehensively document the effect of economic 
sanction on the financial markets, using the case of Iran. Iran is a great case to study this topic 
because of the length and diversity of sanctions imposed on it, its big economy, and its 
developed financial markets. Also, the case of Iran offers an excellent opportunity to study the 
effect of the reversal of sanctions as the sanctions imposed on Iran were lifted partially between 
2013 and 2016. I also look at the difference in behavior of firms controlled by the deep state and 
other firms, listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.  
I find that a direct sanction against a firm is followed by the targeted firm’s short term 
and long term abnormal negative returns. The effect is stronger for the deep state firms. My 
results confirm that a sanction against a specific industry causes short term and long term 
negative abnormal returns for the firms in the sanctioned industry. Again, the effect is stronger 
for deep state firms. In case of multiple sanctions against a firm, the first sanction is the strongest 
one. I do not reject the consensus that multilateral sanctions are more successful than unilateral 
ones, but I shod that at least for sanctions against firms, in my limited sample, in terms of short-
term stock return, it is the first sanction that really matters. Additionally, sanctions removal leads 
to positive abnormal returns; the positive abnormal returns are weaker for the deep state firms. 
The study finds that firms targeted by sanctions decrease their leverage and increase their cash 
holding to manage their increased risk. Also, sanctions lead to worse return ratios. 
My results show that sanctions are an effective tool of foreign policy. They cause long-
term negative consequences for the target firms, and the harm is stronger for malign actors, 








Table 1.1 List of Executive Orders and Sanctions Targeting Iran 
Source: Sanctions Against Iran: A Guide to Targets, Terms, and Timetables, Gary Samore, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy 
School 
Name of Executive 
Orders/Acts 
Date Description of Select Elements 
12170, 12205, 12211 November 1979-
April 1980 
Blocked Iranian Property and Prohibited some trade, including 
import of all goods from Iran. This Ban lifted in 1981 
State Sponsor of Terror 
Designation 
Jan-84 Banned Arms sales and Foreign Assistance to Iran 
E.O. 12613 Oct-87 Banned import of all goods from Iran, including oil. 
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act 
Oct-92 Sanctioned Transfer of goods or technology related tow WMD and 
some conventional arms 
E.O. 12938 Nov-94 Imposed Export controls on sensitive WMD technology. 
E.O. 12957 and 12959 March-May 
1995 
Prohibited all U.S. investment in Iran, including in oil sector. Banned 
export of American goods to Iran 
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act Aug-96 Sanctioned companies that invest more than $20 million in Iranian oil 
sector 
E.O. 13059 Aug-97 Expanded ban on exports to Iran 
Iran Non-Proliferation Act Mar-00 Sanctioned entities providing goods related to WMD or ballistic 
missiles 
E.O. 13224 Sep-01 Blocked property of Terrorists and Financial supporters.  
E.O. 13382 Jun-05 Blocked Property of WMD proliferators. 
E.O. 1696 Jul-06 Called upon states to "exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer" of 







Iran Freedom Support Act Sep-06 Sanctioned involvement in Iranian development of WMD/advanced 
conventional weapons. Codified U.S. trade ban.  
E.O. 1737 Dec-06 Banned export to Iran of "all items, materials, equipment, goods and 
technology" related to nuclear activities or development of nuclear 
weapon delivery systems. Banned Provision to Iran of technical or 
financial assistance related to nuclear activities. Banned Iranian 
export of nuclear-related equipment and material. Froze assets of 
individuals and companies involved in nuclear and ballistic missile 
programs. 
Council Common Position 
2007/140/CFSP 
Feb-07 Banned Export of Sensitive Nuclear and ballistic missile technology. 
Prohibited financial and technical assistance related to nuclear or 
missile activities. Froze assets and denied travel pf design individuals 
and companies.  
E.O. 1747 Mar-07 Banned Export by Iran of "any arms or related material." Expanded 
list of sanctioned individuals and Companies 
E.O. 13438 Jul-07 Blocked Property of those involved in destabilizing Iraq 
E.O. 1803 Mar-08 Expanded prohibitions on trade in sensitive nuclear equipment and 
materials. Banned travel by sanctioned individuals. Expanded List of 
Sanctioned Individuals and Companies.  
E.O. 1835 Sep-08 Reaffirmed Previous Resolutions 
E.O. 1929 Jun-10 Prohibited Iranian investment in foreign nuclear activities. Banned 
export to Iran of major weapons systems and banned provision to 
Iran of technical or financial assistance related to acquiring these 
systems. Called on states to inspect "all cargo to and from Iran" if 
suspected of transferring illicit materials. Called on states to prevent 
the provision of financial services that would facilitate Iranian 
sanctions evasion. Expanded list of Sanctioned individuals and 
Companies.  
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability & Divestment 
Act 
Jul-10 Sanctioned sale to Iran of gasoline or supporting domestic gasoline 
industry. Sanctioned foreign financial institutions connected with 
WMD or terrorism. 
Council Decision 
2010/413/CFSP 
Jul-10 Banned Export to Iran of all arms and material. Prohibited financial 







acquisition. Banned export to Iran of "key equipment and 
technology" related to oil and natural gas industry. Prohibited 
provision of insurance or reinsurance to Iranian entities. Expanded 
list of designated individuals and companies.  
E.O. 13553 Sep-10 Blocked Property of those involved in human rights abuses in Iran. 
Council Decision 
2011/235/CFSP 
Apr-11 Froze Assets and denied travel of individuals involved in human 
rights abuses. 
E.O. 13572 Apr-11 Blocked property of those involved in human rights abuses in Syria, 
including Iranians. 
E.O. 13590 Nov-11 Sanctioned Contributing to Maintenance or expansion of Iranian 
petroleum resources.  
Sect. 311 Money Laundering 
Designation, USA Patriot ACT 
Nov-11 Designated Iranian Financial Sector as Jurisdiction of "primary 
money laundering concern." 
Section 1245 NDAA FY 2012 Dec-11 Restricted Export of Iranian Oil. Codified Section 311 Money 
Laundering designation. 
Council Decision 2012/35/ 
CFSP 
Jan-12 Banned "import, purchase or transport' of Iranian crude oil and 
petrochemical products. Prohibited provision of financing insurance 
or reinsurance related to Iranian Crude oil sale or transport. 
Prohibited export to Iran of equipment for petrochemical industry and 
provision of technical or financial assistance. Prohibited sale of gold, 
precious metals and diamonds to Iran.  
E.O. 13599 Feb-12 Blocked all Iranian government property under U.S. jurisdiction.  
Council Decision 
2012/152/CFSP 
Mar-12 Banned Provision of financial messaging services to designated 
Iranian banks (i.e. denied access to SWIFT) 
E.O. 13606 Apr-12 Blocked Property of those involved with human rights abuses 
perpetrated through information technology. 
E.O. 13608 May-12 Sanctioned Evaders of sanctions. 








Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
Human Rights Act of 2012 
Aug-12 Sanctioned support of petroleum sector. Mandated that Iran's oil 
revenue be "locked up" in special escrow accounts. 
Council Decision 2012/635/ 
CFSP 
Oct-12 Banned "purchase, import or transport" of natural gas from Iran. 
Banned export of shipbuilding technology. 
E.O. 13628 Oct-12 Expanded Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
Iran Freedom and Counter-
Proliferation Act of 2012 
Jan-13 Sanctioned involvement in Iranian energy, shipping or shipbuilding, 
or provision of insurance or reinsurance to shipping firms. Sanctioned 
provision of precious metals to Iran. 
E.O. 13645 Jun-13 Sanctioned Involvement in Iranian automotive industry. Blocked 












Table 1.2 The Effect of Sanctions on Iran's Oil Exports 
Source: Sanctions Against Iran: A Guide to Targets, Terms, and Timetables, Gary Samore, Belfer Center for 





Average Post Interim 
Agreement (2014) 
Percent Change 
European Union 600,000 Negligible -100% 
China 550,000 410,000 -25% 
Japan 325,000 190,000 -40% 
India 320,000 190,000 -40% 
South Korea 230,000 130,000 -40% 
Turkey 200,000 120,000 -40% 
South Africa 80,000 0 -100% 
Malaysia 55,000 0 -100% 
Sri Lanka 35,000 Negligible -100% 
Taiwan 35,000 10,000 -70% 
Singapore 20,000 0 -100% 
Other 55,000 Negligible -100% 















Table 1.3 Iran's GDP 
Table 1.3.A: Iran's GDP Growth Rate (Persian Year) 




Table 1.3.B: Contribution of Each Sector to Iran's GDP 






Persian Year 1391 1392 1393
Gregorian Year March 2012 - March 2013 March 2013 - March 2014 March 2014 - March 2015
GDP Growth (percent) -6.8 -1.9 3
Inflation (percent) 28.6 32.1 14.8
Sector 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Avg 
Agriculture 7.9 7.5 7.2 6.6 7.2 7.4 6.4 7.3 6.9 5.9 7.9 7.1 
Oil 20.9 20.9 22.2 25.9 24.5 24.3 22.4 17.6 20.1 25.0 16.4 21.8 
Industries and 
Mines 
25.0 24.7 23.2 21.0 20.9 21.7 22.8 22.9 21.3 21.4 24.9 22.7 
Mines 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.7 
Industries 15.2 15.0 14.5 13.5 13.5 11.8 11.9 12.4 12.0 11.0 12.6 13.0 
Water, Gas, and 
Electricity 
1.4 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.5 1.2 
Construction 7.9 7.9 6.8 5.7 5.8 8.2 9.3 9.0 7.6 7.9 9.8 7.8 












2.3 2.9 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.9 3.6 3.9 3.2 
Real Estate and 
Professional 
Services 
12.5 12.6 12.3 11.9 12.8 14.1 14.7 15.4 14.3 13.2 14.2 13.4 









Table 1.4 Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the data. Panel A looks at all firms in the dataset and the variables of 
interest. 
 Panel B looks at the military-owned firms. Before and after refers to the designated military-owned firms and the 
value of the variables of interests form the designated military-owned firms before and after the designation.  
Panel C looks at the deep state firms which are firms owned by the military and the foundations controlled by the 
Supreme Leader. Before and after refers to the designated deep state-owned firms and the value of the variables of 
interests form the designated military-owned firms before and after the designation. 
Panel D looks at the firms targeted by the industry sanctions and the values of the variables of interests before and 
after the designation. 






Panel A – Summary Statistics of All Variables 
All Firms  
Variable N Mean Median SD 
Tangibility 2206 48.1% 49.45% 19.89% 
Market to Book 2206 1.65 1.36 1.00 
Size 2206 13.02 12.82 1.53 
Profitability 2368 16.0% 14.1% 11.96% 
Leverage 2904 19.2% 17.0% 14.89% 
Net Working Capital 2904 10.1% 9.8% 20.72% 
EBIT 3096 24.3% 20.7% 23.88% 









Panel B – Characteristics of Military-Owned Firms 
Military-Owned Firms 
  All Before After 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Tangibility 101 40.22% 30 40.85% 15 52.39% 
Market to Book 101 1.44 30 1.19 15 1.44 
Size 101 14.56 30 14.34 15 15.41 
Profitability 102 14.47% 29 13.36% 15 14.06% 
Leverage 130 14.21% 37 11.03% 18 13.74% 
Net Working Capital 130 8.11% 37 13.50% 18 10.88% 
EBIT 131 29.63% 36 20.05% 18 34.70% 
Cash Holding 130 4.51% 37 3.98% 18 7.46% 
 
Panel C – Characteristics of Deep State Firms 
Deep State Firms 
  All Before After 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Tangibility 270 45.7% 73 52.3% 24 50.8% 
Market to Book 270 1.77 73 1.58 24 1.51 
Size 270 13.49 73 13.57 24 15.16 
Profitability 284 17.54% 76 18.96% 24 14.38% 
Leverage 355 16.72% 98 13.80% 28 17.24% 
Net Working Capital 355 9.39% 98 14.59% 28 10.05% 
EBIT 370 28.73% 101 23.03% 28 30.46% 












Panel D – Characteristics of Firms Targeted by Industry Sanctions 
Industry Sanction 
  Before After 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Tangibility 397 47.3% 106 43.29% 
Market to Book 397 1.47 106 1.42 
Size 397 13.41 106 14.25 
Profitability 426 16.28% 107 11.27% 
Leverage 516 19.11% 121 19.22% 
Net Working Capital 516 7.47% 121 12.72% 
EBIT 552 22.49% 122 20.08% 
Cash Holding 516 4.50% 121 5.79% 
 
Panel E – Characteristics of Firms Targeted by Direct Sanctions 
Directly Sanctioned Firms 
  Before After 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Tangibility 32 48.9% 18 48.39% 
Market to Book 32 2.93 18 1.21 
Size 32 13.52 18 15.25 
Profitability 35 26.08% 18 9.74% 
Leverage 42 14.56% 20 15.97% 
Net Working Capital 42 -2.08% 20 -2.98% 
EBIT 45 29.98% 20 12.36% 












Table 1.5 Direct Sanctions - Event Study 
This table provides the results for different event-study tests. The included tests are t-test, CDA, Patell, and 
Boehmer. The main test of interest is Patell. Significance levels are shown by *, **, *** which represent 10 percent 
significance, 5 percent and 1 percent. 
Window Observations CAR t-test CDA Patell Boehmer 
[-7;7] 19 -0.054 * ** *** * 
[-5;5] 18 -0.050 *** ** ***   
[-4;4] 18 -0.057 *** *** *** * 
[-3;3] 18 -0.009     **   
[-2;2] 18 -0.014     ***   
[-1;1] 18 -0.020 ** * ***   
[0;1] 18 -0.019 ** ** ***   
[0;3] 18 -0.012     ***   
[0;7] 19 -0.012     ***   




Table 1.6 Direct Sanctions – Event Study – First-Time Subsample 
This table provides the results for different event-study tests. The included tests are t-test, CDA, Patell, General Sign 
and Boehmer. The main test of interest is Patell. Significance levels are shown by *, **, *** which represent 10 
percent significance, 5 percent and 1 percent. 
Window Observations CAR t-test CDA Patell Boehmer GenSign 
[-7;7] 14 -0.073 ** ** *** *   
[-5;5] 12 -0.075 *** *** *** * * 
[-4;4] 12 -0.082 *** *** *** * ** 
[-3;3] 12 -0.034 *   *** * * 
[-2;2] 12 -0.032 * * ***     
[-1;1] 12 -0.039 *** *** ***   * 
[0;1] 12 -0.041 *** *** *** *   
[0;3] 12 -0.031 * * ***     
[0;7] 14 -0.024     ***     








Table 1.7 Comparison of First-Time Sanctions with the Whole Sample 
This table compares the cumulative abnormal returns for different windows for the whole sample of firms targeted 
by direct sanctions and firms targeted by direct sanctions for the first time. It shows that the effect is stronger for the 
first-time designated subsample. 
Whole Sample First Time Designated Difference 
Window #Obs CAR Window #Obs CAR ∆CAR 
[-7;7] 19 -5.4% [-7;7] 14 -7.3% -1.9% 
[-5;5] 18 -5.0% [-5;5] 12 -7.5% -2.5% 
[-4;4] 18 -5.7% [-4;4] 12 -8.2% -2.5% 
[-3;3] 18 -0.9% [-3;3] 12 -3.4% -2.5% 
[-2;2] 18 -1.4% [-2;2] 12 -3.2% -1.8% 
[-1;1] 18 -2.0% [-1;1] 12 -3.9% -2.0% 
[0;1] 18 -1.9% [0;1] 12 -4.1% -2.2% 
[0;3] 18 -1.2% [0;3] 12 -3.1% -1.9% 
[0;7] 19 -1.2% [0;7] 14 -2.4% -1.2% 
[-7;3] 18 -5.3% [-7;3] 12 -8.3% -3.0% 
 
 
Table 1.8 Industry Sanctions – Whole Sample 
This table provides the results for different event-study tests for industry sanctions. The included tests are t-test, 
CDA, Patell, General Sign, Corrado Rank test, Corrado and Zivney Rank test, and Boehmer. The main test of 
interest is Patell. Significance levels are shown by *, **, *** which represent 10 percent significance, 5 percent and 
1 percent. 
Window #Obs CAR t_test CDA Patell Boehmer Corrado  Zivney GenSign 
[-7;7] 89 -1.5%     ***   ** * * 
[-5;5] 86 -0.4%               
[-4;4] 82 0.0%               
[-3;3] 85 0.3%               
[0;1] 83 0.2%               
[0;3] 85 -0.2%               
[0;7] 89 -0.8%     ***         









Table 1.9 Industry Sanction – First Time Subsample 
This table provides the results for different event-study tests for industry sanctions for the first-time designated 
subsample. The included tests are t-test, CDA, Patell, General Sign, Corrado Rank test, Corrado and Zivney Rank 
test, and Boehmer. The main test of interest is Patell. Significance levels are shown by *, **, *** which represent 10 
percent significance, 5 percent and 1 percent. 
Window NoFirms CAR t_test Patell Boehmer Corrado Zivney GenSign 
[-7;7] 72 -2.0%   ***   ** ** * 
[-5;5] 70 -0.7%       * *   
[-4;4] 66 -0.2%       * **   
[-3;3] 69 0.0%         * * 
[0;1] 67 0.0%             
[0;3] 69 -0.7%   ***       * 
[0;7] 72 -1.3%   *** *     ** 
[-7;3] 69 -1.7%   ***   ** ** ** 
 
Table 1.10 Industry Sanctions – Comparison Table 
This table compares the cumulative abnormal returns for different windows for the whole sample of firms targeted 
by industry sanctions and firms targeted by direct sanctions for the first time. It shows that the effect is stronger for 
the first-time designated subsample. 
 
Whole Sample First Designation Subsample Difference 
Window #Firms CAR Window #Firms CAR ∆CAR 
[-7;7] 89 -1.45% [-7;7] 72 -2.04% -0.6% 
[-5;5] 86 -0.36% [-5;5] 70 -0.67% -0.3% 
[-4;4] 82 0.01% [-4;4] 66 -0.16% -0.2% 
[-3;3] 85 0.33% [-3;3] 69 -0.01% -0.3% 
[0;1] 83 0.20% [0;1] 67 -0.02% -0.2% 
[0;3] 85 -0.24% [0;3] 69 -0.69% -0.4% 
[0;7] 89 -0.78% [0;7] 72 -1.27% -0.5% 










Table 1.11 Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
This table provides the results for the buy and hold abnormal return test for firms targeted by industry sanctions over 
a 9-month period. 
Directly Sanctioned Firms/All Events   Directly Sanctioned Firms/First Events 
Window Observations BHAR   Window Observations BHAR 
[0;30] 21 -7.66%   [0;30] 13 -12.30% 
[0;90] 21 -16.01%   [0;90] 13 -23.83% 
[0;180] 21 -40.72%   [0;180] 13 -45.29% 
[0;270] 21 -59.46%   [0;270] 13 -69.39% 
 
Table 1.12 Sanctions Removal – Direct Sanctions 
This table provides the results for different event-study tests for the removal of direct sanctions. The included tests 
are t-test, CDA, Patell, General Sign, Corrado Rank test, Corrado and Zivney Rank test, and Boehmer. The main test 
of interest is Patell. Significance levels are shown by *, **, *** which represent 10 percent significance, 5 percent 
and 1 percent. 
Window Observations CAR t test Patell Boehmer Corrado  Zivney  GenSign 
[-7;7] 70 6.04% ** *** *** *** *** *** 
[-5;5] 63 5.51% ** *** *** *** *** *** 
[-4;4] 65 4.25% ** *** *** *** *** *** 
[-3;3] 64 5.00% *** *** *** *** *** *** 
[-2;2] 70 3.08% ** *** *** *** ** *** 
[-1;1] 54 2.21% ** *** *** *** *** *** 
[0;3] 64 0.73%   **       * 
[-7;3] 64 6.16% *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
Table 1.13 Sanctions Removal – Industry Sanctions 
This table provides the results for different event-study tests for the removal of industry sanctions. The included 
tests are t-test, CDA, Patell, General Sign, Corrado Rank test, Corrado and Zivney Rank test, and Boehmer. The 
main test of interest is Patell. Significance levels are shown by *, **, *** which represent 10 percent significance, 5 
percent and 1 percent. 
Window #Firms CAR t test Patell Boehmer Corrado Zivney GenSign 
[-7;7] 248 14.19% *** *** *** *** *** *** 
[-5;5] 253 10.12% *** *** *** *** *** *** 
[-4;4] 248 9.53% *** *** *** *** *** *** 
[-3;3] 259 7.50% *** *** *** *** *** *** 
[-2;2] 258 4.85% *** *** *** *** *** *** 
[0;3] 259 3.40% *** *** *** **   *** 
[0;7] 248 7.27% *** *** *** *** *** *** 







Table 1.14 Sanctions Removal 
Table 1.14.A: Sanction Removal – Firms Exposed to Industry Sanctions (November 24, 2013) 
This table provides the results for different event-study tests for the first wave of removal of industry sanctions in November 2013. The included tests are t-test, 
CDA, Patell, General Sign, Corrado Rank test, Corrado and Zivney Rank test, and Boehmer. The main test of interest is Patell. Significance levels are shown by 
*, **, *** which represent 10 percent significance, 5 percent and 1 percent. 
 
Window Observations CAR t-test CDA Patell Boehmer Kolari Corrado Zivney GenSign  
[-7;7] 66 0.168497 *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** 
[-5;5] 67 0.130739 *** ** *** *** * *** *** *** 
[-4;4] 64 0.127141 *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** 
[-3;3] 65 0.101942 *** ** *** *** ** *** *** *** 
[-2;2] 63 0.07423 *** ** *** *** * *** ** *** 
[0;3] 65 0.056008 ** * *** ***   **   *** 
[0;7] 66 0.09013 *** ** *** *** ** ** * *** 
[-7;3] 65 0.131974 *** ** *** *** ** *** *** *** 















Table 1.14.B: Sanction Removal – Firms Exposed to Industry Sanctions (November 24, 2013) Auto and Petro 
This table provides the results for different event-study tests for the first wave of removal of industry sanctions in November 2013, but only for firms in the 
automotive and petrochemical sectors. The included tests are t-test, CDA, Patell, General Sign, Corrado Rank test, Corrado and Zivney Rank test, and Boehmer. 
The main test of interest is Patell. Significance levels are shown by *, **, *** which represent 10 percent significance, 5 percent and 1 percent. 
Window Observations CAR t_test CDA Patell Boehmer Kolari Corrado Zivney GenSign 
[-7;7] 45 19.1% *** ** *** *** ** *** *** *** 
[-5;5] 45 14.7% *** ** *** *** * *** *** *** 
[-4;4] 42 12.9% ** ** *** *** * *** *** *** 
[-3;3] 43 10.3% ** * *** ***   *** ** *** 
[-2;2] 41 8.2% ** * *** ***   ** ** *** 
[0;3] 43 6.1% **   *** ***   *   ** 
[0;7] 45 10.1% ** * *** *** * ** ** ** 
[-7;3] 43 14.9% *** ** *** *** ** *** *** *** 
















Table 1.14.C: Sanction Removal – Firms Exposed to Industry Sanctions (July 14, 2015) 
This table provides the results for different event-study tests for the first second of removal of industry sanctions in July 2015. The included tests are t-test, CDA, 
Patell, General Sign, Corrado Rank test, Corrado and Zivney Rank test, and Boehmer. The main test of interest is Patell. Significance levels are shown by *, **, 
*** which represent 10 percent significance, 5 percent and 1 percent. 
Window Observations CAR t_test CDA Patell Boehmer Kolari Corrado Zivney GenSign 
[-7;7] 57 -0.04091     ***         * 
[-5;5] 43 -0.06213     ***         * 
[-4;4] 46 -0.05405     ***       *   
[-3;3] 46 -0.0099     ***           
[-2;2] 55 -0.00186     ***       *   
[-1;1] 58 0.009955             * ** 
[0;1] 58 -0.01796 **   ***           
[0;3] 46 -0.02952 **   ***         *** 
[0;7] 57 -0.10234     *** ***   ***   *** 
















Table 1.14.D: Sanction Removal – Firms Exposed to Industry Sanctions (October 18, 2015) 
This table provides the results for different event-study tests for the third wave of removal of industry sanctions in November 2013. The main test of interest is 
Patell. Significance levels are shown by *, **, *** which represent 10 percent significance, 5 percent and 1 percent. 
Window Observations CAR t_test CDA Patell Boehmer Kolari Corrado Zivney GenSign 
[-7;7] 54 0.028161     *** **       *** 
[-5;5] 55 0.015773     *** *       ** 
[-4;4] 54 0.020465     *** ***       *** 
[-3;3] 63 0.027376     *** ***       *** 
[-2;2] 65 0.028785 **   *** ***       *** 
[-1;1] 65 0.028055 **   *** *** **     *** 
[0;1] 65 0.005325     ** **       * 
[0;3] 63 -0.01577               * 
[0;7] 54 -0.01641                 
















Table 1.14.E: Sanction Removal – Firms Exposed to Industry Sanctions (January 16, 2016) 
This table provides the results for different event-study tests for the fourth wave of removal of industry sanctions in November 2013. The included tests are t-test, 
CDA, Patell, General Sign, Corrado Rank test, Corrado and Zivney Rank test, and Boehmer. The main test of interest is Patell. Significance levels are shown by 
*, **, *** which represent 10 percent significance, 5 percent and 1 percent. 
 
Window Observations CAR t_test CDA Patell Boehmer Kolari Corrado Zivney GenSign 
[-7;7] 62 0.184436 *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** 
[-5;5] 64 0.112625 *** *** *** ***   *** *** *** 
[-4;4] 66 0.09473 *** ** *** *** ** ** *** *** 
[-3;3] 66 0.067347 *** ** *** *** * ** ** *** 
[-2;2] 67 0.019334 *   *** ***       ** 
[-1;1] 66 0.024102 ***   *** ***   * * *** 
[0;1] 66 0.023985 ***   *** ***       *** 
[0;3] 66 0.038105 ***   *** ***       *** 
[0;7] 62 0.113081 *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** 









Table 1.15 Deep State Firms – Industry Sanctions 
This table looks at firms targeted by industry sanctions. These are firms in the industries targeted by blanket sanctions. Version 1 looks at all firms while version 





Table 1.16 CAR Analysis – Deep State Firms - Industry Sanctions Delisting 
This table uses the cumulative abnormal return for delisting of the firms targeted by industry sanctions over a two-
week window [-7;7] as the dependent variable. This includes all 4 waves of delisting from 2013 to 2016.  
 CAR CAR CAR CAR 
Deep State -0.041 -0.048 -0.042 -0.049 
 (1.81)* (1.69)* (1.47) (1.67)* 
Size  0.016 0.016 0.016 
  (2.61)*** (2.65)*** (2.66)*** 
Debt Ratio    0.119 
    (2.09)** 
ROA   0.000 0.001 
   (0.14) (0.99) 
R
2
 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.43 
N 200 151 145 145 
 
Table 1.17 CAR Analysis - Deep State Firms – Direct Sanctions 
This table uses the cumulative abnormal return for the firms targeted by industry sanctions over a two-week window 
[-7;7] as the dependent variable. Independent variables are size, return on asset, and debt over book value of assets. 
Debt ratio is calculated as the value of total debt to the book value of assets. 
 CAR CAR CAR CAR 
Deep State -0.197 -0.232 -0.232 -0.228 
 (1.96)* (2.35)** (2.27)** (2.21)** 
Size  -0.026 -0.025 -0.024 
  (1.62) (1.63) (1.37) 
Debt Ratio   -0.005 -0.109 
   (0.06) (0.43) 
ROA    -0.004 
    (0.58) 
R
2
 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.51 










Table 1.18 Leverage Analysis 
This table analyzes the effect of sanctions on leverage. The dependent variable is leverage whichis defined as the 
sum of long-term debt and short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Profitability (return on assets) is defined as 
operating income before depreciation over the book value of assets .Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of 
total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment, over the book value of assets. Market/book 
is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009) recommend. Deep state is 1 if firms is part of the deep state portfolio. 
Military is a dummy variable and is 1 if the firm belongs to a military holding. Industry (direct) Sanction Policy is a 
dummy variable which is always 1 for the firms subject to industry (direct) sanctions and zero otherwise. Industry 
(direct) Sanction Post is 1 for firms subject to industry (direct) sanctions after time t at which the sanction was 
imposed and zero otherwise. 
 Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  
M2B -1.643 -1.631 -1.693 -1.609 -1.666 
 (2.66)*** (2.58)*** (2.74)*** (2.62)*** (2.70)*** 
ROA -0.612 -0.617 -0.613 -0.613 -0.612 
 (16.99)*** (16.69)*** (16.99)*** (17.06)*** (16.96)*** 
Size 0.522 0.507 0.526 0.547 0.628 
 (2.15)** (2.03)** (2.14)** (2.24)** (2.57)** 
Tangibility 3.045 2.620 3.089 2.801 2.634 
 (1.81)* (1.52) (1.83)* (1.65)* (1.55) 
Ind. Sanction (Policy)  -12.260    
  (2.90)***    
Ind. Sanction (Post)  -2.194    
  (1.36)    
Direct Sanction (Policy)   3.890   
   (1.82)*   
Direct Sanction (Post)   -5.162   
   (1.90)*   
Deep State    -1.748  
    (2.06)**  
Military     -4.368 
     (4.05)*** 
R
2
 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 












Table 1.19 Cash Holding Analysis 
This table analyzes the effect of sanction on cash holding ratio. 
 Cash Holding  Cash Holding  Cash Holding  Cash Holding  Cash Holding  Cash Holding  
M2B 0.869 0.872 0.872 0.862 0.883 0.869 
 (4.49)*** (4.45)*** (4.46)*** (4.40)*** (4.51)*** (4.51)*** 
Cash Flow Ratio 1.381 1.367 1.368 1.359 1.392 1.401 
 (3.55)*** (3.59)*** (3.59)*** (3.56)*** (3.58)*** (3.61)*** 
Leverage -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 
 (1.23) (1.34) (1.33) (1.37) (1.17) (1.19) 
Size -0.281 -0.286 -0.287 -0.274 -0.291 -0.271 
 (2.63)*** (2.73)*** (2.72)*** (2.45)** (2.65)*** (2.52)** 
Sanction  1.269     
  (1.88)*     
All Sanction (Policy)   0.272    
   (0.31)    
All Sanction (Post)    1.231    
   (1.70)*    
Ind. Sanction (Policy)    -0.003   
    (0.00)   
Ind. Sanction (Post)    1.173   
    (1.52)   
Dir. Sanction (Policy)     -0.313  
     (0.29)  
Dir. Sanction (Post)     1.569  
     (1.10)  
Deep State      -0.771 
      (1.99)** 
R
2
 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 





Table 1.20 Profitability Measure Analysis 
Dependent variables are the return on assets, return on  working capital, and return on sales. The three panel studies 
the effect of all sanctions, industry  sanctions, and direct sanction. Policy variable is 1 all the time for firms which 
have been designated. The "post" is 1 only for designated firms after the designation is announced. 
Panel A – All Sanctions 
 ROA  RWC  ROS  
Size 0.222 0.389 3.675 
 (1.08) (0.65) (6.86)*** 
All Sanctions (Policy) 0.651 20.382 1.296 
 (0.23) (1.67)* (0.41) 
All Sanctions (Post) -3.788 -15.276 -5.830 
 (2.50)** (3.78)*** (1.88)* 
R
2
 0.24 0.28 0.26 
N 2,204 2,204 2,204 
 
 
Panel B – Industry Sanctions 
 ROA  RWC  ROS  
Size 0.202 0.384 3.593 
 (0.98) (0.64) (6.85)*** 
Industry Sanction (Policy) 0.841 6.321 -7.202 
 (0.32) (1.12) (1.08) 
Industry Sanction (Post) -3.107 -12.274 -6.064 
 (1.86)* (2.89)*** (1.83)* 
R
2
 0.24 0.28 0.26 
N 2,204 2,204 2,204 
 
 
Panel C – Direct Sanctions 
 ROA  RWC  ROS  
Size 0.242 0.437 3.644 
 (1.17) (0.72) (6.96)*** 
Direct Sanction (Policy) 2.072 16.590 4.618 
 (0.81) (1.68)* (1.73)* 
Direct Sanction (Post) -7.156 -26.842 -4.329 
 (2.38)** (2.41)** (0.47) 
R
2
 0.24 0.28 0.25 
















Figure ‎1.1: Islamic Republic of Iran's GDP Growth Rate 
This figure shows Iran's GDP growth rate between 2006 and 2012. 
















Figure 1.2: Share of GDP for Each sectors 
This figure shows the share of each of four main sectors of economy of Iran's GDP between 
2002 and 212. 
 
Figure 1.3  Direct Sanctions – Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
The x axis shows the number of days after the event and the y axis shows the abnormal buy and 



















Appendix 1.1 A comparison of designation and delisting 
Source: Foundation for Defense of Democracies 
Designated Entity/Individual Type Program 
Status (Red/1= Lifted 
on Implementation Day, 




BEHSAZ KASHANE TEHRAN 
CONSTRUCTION CO. Entity IRAN 1 
COMMERCIAL PARS OIL CO. Entity IRAN 1 
CYLINDER SYSTEM L.T.D. Entity IRAN 1 
DEY BANK Entity IRAN 1 
EXECUTION OF IMAM KHOMEINI'S 
ORDER Entity IRAN 1 
GHADIR INVESTMENT COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
GHAED BASSIR PETROCHEMICAL 
PRODUCTS COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
GOLDEN RESOURCES TRADING 
COMPANY L.L.C. Entity IRAN 1 
HORMOZ OIL REFINING COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
IRAN & SHARGH COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
KARAFARIN BANK Entity IRAN 1 
MAHAB GHODSS CONSULTING 
ENGINEERING COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
MARJAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
MCS ENGINEERING Entity IRAN 1 
MCS INTERNATIONAL GMBH Entity IRAN 1 
MODABER Entity IRAN 1 
OMID REY CIVIL & CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
ONE CLASS PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD. Entity IRAN 1 
ONE VISION INVESTMENTS 5 (PTY) LTD. Entity IRAN 1 
PARDIS INVESTMENT COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
PARS OIL AND GAS COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
PARS OIL CO. Entity IRAN 1 





PERSIA OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 
DEVELOPMENT CO. Entity IRAN 1 
POLYNAR COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
REY INVESTMENT COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
REY NIRU ENGINEERING COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
REYCO GMBH. Entity IRAN 1 
RISHMAK PRODUCTIVE & EXPORTS 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
ROYAL ARYA CO. Entity IRAN 1 
SADAF PETROCHEMICAL ASSALUYEH 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
SINA BANK Entity IRAN 1 
SINA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
TADBIR BROKERAGE COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
TADBIR CONSTRUCTION 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
TADBIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
GROUP Entity IRAN 1 
TADBIR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
GROUP CO. Entity IRAN 1 
TADBIR INVESTMENT COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
TOSEE EQTESAD AYANDEHSAZAN 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
ZARIN RAFSANJAN CEMENT COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
AA ENERGY FZCO Entity IRAN 1 
ABAN AIR Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ADVANCE NOVEL LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
AFZALI, Ali Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
AGHA-JANI, Dawood Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
AL AQILI GROUP LLC Entity EO13645 1 
AL AQILI, Mohamed Saeed Individual EO13645 1 
AL FIDA INTERNATIONAL GENERAL 
TRADING Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
AL HILAL EXCHANGE Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ALPHA EFFORT LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
AMERI, Teymour Individual EO13622 1 





ANTARES SHIPPING COMPANY NV Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ARASH SHIPPING ENTERPRISES 
LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
ARIAN BANK Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ARTA SHIPPING ENTERPRISES LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
ASAN SHIPPING ENTERPRISE LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
ASCOTEC HOLDING GMBH Entity IRAN 1 
ASCOTEC JAPAN K.K. Entity IRAN 1 
ASCOTEC MINERAL & MACHINERY 
GMBH Entity IRAN 1 
ASCOTEC SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 
GMBH Entity IRAN 1 
ASCOTEC STEEL TRADING GMBH Entity IRAN 1 
ASHTEAD SHIPPING COMPANY 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ASIA BANK Entity EO13622 1 
ASIA ENERGY GENERAL TRADING 
(LLC) Entity IRAN 1 
ASIA MARINE NETWORK PTE. LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ASSA CO. LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ASSA CORP. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ATLANTIC INTERMODAL Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF 
IRAN Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
AZORES SHIPPING COMPANY LL FZE Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
BAHADORI, Masoud Individual IRAN 1 
BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE 
DESARROLLO, C.A. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
BANDAR IMAM PETROCHEMICAL 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
BANK KARGOSHAEE Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
BANK KESHAVARZI IRAN Entity IRAN 1 
BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI 
IRAN Entity IRAN 1 
BANK MASKAN Entity IRAN 1 
BANK MELLAT  Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 1 
BANK MELLI IRAN Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 1 
BANK MELLI IRAN INVESTMENT 





BANK MELLI PRINTING AND 
PUBLISHING CO. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 




BANK REFAH KARGARAN Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 1 
BANK SEPAH Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 1 
BANK SEPAH INTERNATIONAL PLC Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
BANK TEJARAT Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 1 
BANK TORGOVOY KAPITAL ZAO Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 1 
BANK-E SHAHR Entity IRAN 1 
BATENI, Naser Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
BAZARGAN, Farzad Individual IRAN 1 
BEHZAD, Morteza Ahmadali Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
BELFAST GENERAL TRADING LLC Entity EO13622 1 
BEST PRECISE LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
BIIS MARITIME LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
BIMEH IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY 
(U.K.) LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
BLUE TANKER SHIPPING SA Entity IRAN 1 
BMIIC INTERNATIONAL GENERAL 
TRADING LTD Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
BOU ALI SINA PETROCHEMICAL 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
BREYELLER STAHL TECHNOLOGY 
GMBH & CO. KG Entity IRAN 1 
BUSHEHR SHIPPING COMPANY 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
BYFLEET SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
CAMBIS, Dimitris Individual IRAN, ISA 1 
CASPIAN MARITIME LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
CAUCASUS ENERGY Entity 
FSE-IR (non-
SDN) 1 
CEMENT INVESTMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
CENTRAL INSURANCE OF IRAN Entity IRAN-TRA 1 
CISCO SHIPPING COMPANY CO. LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
COBHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 





CREDIT INSTITUTION FOR 
DEVELOPMENT Entity IRAN 1 
CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
DAJMAR, Mohhammad Hossein Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
DANESH SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
DARYA CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION 
GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
DAVAR SHIPPING CO LTD Entity IRAN 1 
DENA TANKERS FZE Entity IRAN 1 
DERAKHSHANDEH, AHMAD Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
DETTIN SPA Entity ISA 1 
DFS WORLDWIDE Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
DIVANDARI, Ali Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
DORKING SHIPPING COMPANY 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
EDBI EXCHANGE COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
EDBI STOCK BROKERAGE COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
EFFINGHAM SHIPPING COMPANY 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
EGHTESAD NOVIN BANK Entity IRAN 1 
EIGHTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION 
GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
EIGHTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ELEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION 
GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ELEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH 
AND PRODUCTION CENTER Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ESLAMI, Mansour Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
EUROPAISCH-IRANISCHE 
HANDELSBANK AG Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 1 
EUROPEAN OIL TRADERS Entity 
FSE-IR (non-
SDN) 1 
EVEREX Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 1 
EZATI, Ali Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FAIRWAY SHIPPING LTD Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FAL OIL COMPANY eNTITY 
NS-ISA (non-
SDN) 1 
FARNHAM SHIPPING COMPANY 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 







FAYLACA PETROLEUM Entity EO13645 1 
FERLAND COMPANY LIMITED Entity 
EO13645, FSE-
IR, ISA 1 
FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FIRST ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK 
LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FIRST OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FIRST PERSIA EQUITY FUND Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION 
GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
FUTURE BANK B.S.C. Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 1 
GALLIOT MARITIME INC Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
GARBIN NAVIGATION LTD Entity IRAN 1 
GEORGIAN BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT Entity 
FSE-IR (non-
SDN) 1 
GHALEBANI, Ahmad Individual IRAN 1 
GHARZOLHASANEH RESALAT BANK Entity IRAN 1 
GHAVAMIN BANK Entity IRAN 1 
GHEZEL AYAGH, Alireza Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
GOLDENTEX FZE  Entity ISA 1 
GOLPARVAR, Gholamhossein Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
GOOD LUCK SHIPPING L.L.C. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
GRACE BAY SHIPPING INC Entity IRAN 1 
GREAT BUSINESS DEALS  Entity 
FSE-IR (non-
SDN) 1 
GREAT METHOD LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
HADI SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
HARAZ SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
HATEF SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
HEKMAT IRANIAN BANK Entity IRAN 1 
HERCULES INTERNATIONAL SHIP Entity IRAN 1 
HERMIS SHIPPING SA Entity IRAN 1 
HIRMAND SHIPPING COMPANY 





HODA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
HOMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
HONAR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
HONG KONG INTERTRADE COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
HOUSSEINPOUR, Houshang Individual 
FSE-IR (non-
SDN) 1 
HTTS HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST AND 
SHIPPING, GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IDEAL SUCCESS INVESTMENTS 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IFIC HOLDING AG Entity IRAN 1 
IHAG TRADING GMBH Entity IRAN 1 
IMPIRE SHIPPING COMPANY Entity IRAN, ISA 1 
INDUS MARITIME INC Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
RENOVATION ORGANIZATION OF IRAN Entity IRAN 1 
INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
INTRA CHEM TRADING GMBH Entity IRAN 1 
IRAN & SHARGH LEASING COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
IRAN AIR Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IRAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
IRAN O HIND SHIPPING COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IRAN O MISR SHIPPING COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IRAN PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
IRAN ZAMIN BANK Entity IRAN 1 
IRANAIR TOURS Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IRANIAN MINES AND MINING 
INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT AND 
RENOVATION ORGANIZATION Entity IRAN 1 
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
IRANIAN-VENEZUELAN BI-NATIONAL 
BANK Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IRASCO S.R.L. Entity IRAN 1 
IRINVESTSHIP LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IRISL (MALTA) LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IRISL (UK) LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 





IRISL EUROPE GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IRISL MARINE SERVICES & 
ENGINEERING COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IRISL MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT CO. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
IRITAL SHIPPING SRL COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ISI MARITIME LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ISIM AMIN LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ISIM ATR LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ISIM OLIVE LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ISIM SAT LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ISIM SEA CHARIOT LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ISIM SEA CRESCENT LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ISIM SININ LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ISIM TAJ MAHAL LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ISIM TOUR LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ISLAMIC REGIONAL COOPERATION 
BANK Entity IRAN 1 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING 
LINES Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
JABBER IBN HAYAN Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
JAM PERTROCHEMICAL COMPANY Entity EO13622 1 
JASHNSAZ, Seifollah Individual IRAN 1 
JUPITER SEAWAYS SHIPPING Entity IRAN 1 
KADDOURI, Abdelhak Individual EO13645 1 
KAFOLATBANK Entity IRAN 1 
KALA LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
KALA PENSION TRUST LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
KASB INTERNATIONAL LLC Entity IRAN 1 
KAVERI MARITIME INC Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
KAVOSHYAR COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
KERMAN SHIPPING CO LTD Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
KHALILI, Jamshid Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
KHAVARMIANEH BANK Entity IRAN 1 
KHAZAR SEA SHIPPING LINES Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
KISH INTERNATIONAL BANK Entity IRAN 1 
KISH PROTECTION & INDEMNITY Entity IRAN-TRA 1 
KONING MARINE CORP Entity IRAN 1 
KONT INVESTMENT BANK Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
KONT KOSMETIK Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 







KUO OIL PTE. LTD Entity 
NS-ISA (non-
SDN) 1 
LANCELIN SHIPPING COMPANY 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
LEADING MARITIME PTE. LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC Entity EO13645 1 
LOGISTIC SMART LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
LOWESWATER LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MACHINE SAZI ARAK CO. LTD. Entity IRAN 1 
MAHDAVI, Ali Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MARANER HOLDINGS LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MAZANDARAN TEXTILE COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MEHR CAYMAN LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MEHR IRAN CREDIT UNION BANK Entity IRAN 1 
MEHRAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
MELLAT BANK SB CJSC Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MELLAT INSURANCE COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
MELLI AGROCHEMICAL COMPANY, 
P.J.S. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MELLI BANK PLC Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MELLI INVESTMENT HOLDING 
INTERNATIONAL Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MELODIOUS MARITIME INC Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MERSAD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
METAL & MINERAL TRADE S.A.R.L. Entity IRAN 1 
MID OIL ASIA PTE LTD Entity EO13645 1 
MILL DENE LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MINAB SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
MINES AND METALS ENGINEERING 
GMBH Entity IRAN 1 
MIR BUSINESS BANK ZAO Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MOALLEM INSURANCE COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MOBIN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
MODALITY LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MOGHADDAMI FARD, Mohammad Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 





MOINIE, Mohammad Individual IRAN 1 
MONSOON SHIPPING LTD Entity IRAN 1 
MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INC Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
MSP KALA NAFT CO. TEHRAN Entity IRAN 1 
N.I.T.C. REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE Entity IRAN 1 
NABIPOUR, Ghasem Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) 
LIMITED Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
IRGC, NPWMD 1 
NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) 
SARL Entity IRAN 1 
NAFTIRAN TRADING SERVICES CO. 
(NTS) LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING 
GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
NASIRBEIK, Anahita Individual EO13622 1 
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
IRGC, NPWMD 1 
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE 
LTD Entity IRAN 1 
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER 
COMPANY LLC Entity IRAN 1 
NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
NAYEBI, Pourya Individual 
FSE-IR (non-
SDN) 1 
NEFERTITI SHIPPING COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
NEUMAN LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
NEW DESIRE LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
NEW YORK GENERAL TRADING Entity 
FSE-IR (non-
SDN) 1 
NEW YORK MONEY EXCHANGE Entity 
FSE-IR (non-
SDN) 1 
NICO ENGINEERING LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
NIKOUSOKHAN, Mahmoud Individual IRAN 1 
NIKSIMA FOOD AND BEVERAGE JLT Entity EO13622 1 
NINTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION 
GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
NIOC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
(LONDON) LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 





NOOR AFZAR GOSTAR COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
NOOR ENERGY (MALAYSIA) LTD. Entity IRAN 1 
NOURI PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
NPC INTERNATIONAL LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR 
AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION 
GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
OIL INDUSTRY INVESTMENT COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
ONERBANK ZAO Entity IRAN 1 
ORCHIDEA GULF TRADING Entity 
FSE-IR (non-
SDN) 1 
P.C.C. (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
PACIFIC SHIPPING DMCEST Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
PAJAND, Mohammad Hadi Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
PARS MCS Entity IRAN 1 
PARS PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
PARS PETROCHEMICAL SHIPPING 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
PARS TRASH COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
PARSAEI, Reza Individual IRAN 1 
PARTNER CENTURY LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
PARVARESH, Farhad Ali Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
PASARGAD BANK Entity IRAN 1 
PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, SA Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
PERSIA INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
PETRO ENERGY INTERTRADE 
COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
PETRO ROYAL FZE Entity IRAN 1 
PETRO SUISSE INTERTRADE COMPANY 
SA Entity IRAN 1 
PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL 
COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL 
COMPANY FZE Entity IRAN 1 
PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL 





PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
(PEDCO) LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA S.A. 
(PDVSA) Entity No Entity Found 1 
PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE Entity IRAN 1 
PETROPARS LTD. Entity IRAN 1 
PETROPARS UK LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
PIONEER ENERGY INDUSTRIES 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
POLAT, Muzaffer Individual EO13645 1 
POLINEX GENERAL TRADING LLC Entity IRAN 1 
POST BANK OF IRAN Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 1 
POURANSARI, Hashem Individual IRAN 1 
PROTON PETROCHEMICALS SHIPPING 
LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE 
TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA 
BUKOVYNA Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
QANNADI, Mohammad Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
QULANDARY, Azizullah Asadullah Individual EO13622 1 
RAHIQI, Javad Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
RASOOL, Seyed Alaeddin Sadat Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
REZVANIANZADEH, Mohammed Reza Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
RISHI MARITIME INC Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ROYAL OYSTER GROUP Entity ISA 1 
ROYAL-MED SHIPPING AGENCY LTD Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SABET, Javad Karimi Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SAMAN BANK Entity IRAN 1 
SAMAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
SAMBOUK SHIPPING FZC Entity IRAN 1 
SANDFORD GROUP LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SANTEX LINES LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SARKANDI, Ahmad Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SARMAYEH BANK Entity IRAN 1 
SARV SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION 





SECOND OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SEIBOW LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SEIFI, Asadollah Individual EO13622 1 
SEPID SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION 
GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SEYYEDI, Seyed Nasser Mohammad Individual IRAN 1 
SEYYEDI, Seyedeh Hanieh Seyed Nasser 
Mohammad Individual EO13645 1 
SHAHID TONDGOOYAN 
PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
SHALLON LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SHAZAND PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
SHERE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SHOMAL CEMENT COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SIMA GENERAL TRADING CO FZE Entity IRAN 1 
SIMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
SINGA TANKERS PTE. LTD Entity EO13645 1 
SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SINOSE MARITIME PTE. LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP. Entity EO13645 1 
SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SMART DAY HOLDINGS GROUP 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 




SORINET COMMERCIAL TRUST (SCT) 
BANKERS Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SOROUSH SARZAMIN ASATIR SHIP 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
SPEEDY SHIP FZC Entity ISA 1 
SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
STARRY SHINE INTERNATIONAL 





SWISS MANAGEMENT SERVICES SARL Entity IRAN 1 
SYNERGY GENERAL TRADING FZE Entity IRAN 1 
SYSTEM WISE LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
TABATABAEI, Seyyed Mohammad Ali 
Khatibi Individual IRAN 1 
TABRIZ PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY Entity IRAN 1 
TAFAZOLI, Ahmad Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
TALAI, Mohamad Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
TAMAS COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
TAT BANK Entity IRAN 1 
TC SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED Entity IRAN 1 
TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
THE EXPLORATION AND NUCLEAR 
RAW MATERIALS PRODUCTION 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
THE NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION 
GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
TONGHAM SHIPPING CO LTD Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
TOSEE TAAVON BANK Entity IRAN 1 
TOURISM BANK Entity IRAN 1 
TRADE TREASURE LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION 
GMBH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
UPPERCOURT SHIPPING COMPANY 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE CO SSK Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
VOBSTER SHIPPING COMPANY LTD Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
WEST SUN TRADE GMBH Entity IRAN 1 
WIPPERMANN, Ulrich Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
WOKING SHIPPING INVESTMENTS 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 1 
YASINI, Seyed, Kamal Individual EO13622 1 





ZADEH, Hassan Jalil Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ZANJANI, Babak Morteza Individual IFSR, NPWMD 1 
ZEIDI, Houssein Individual 
NS-ISA (non-
SDN) 1 
ZHUHAI ZHENRONG COMPANY Entity 
NS-ISA (non-
SDN) 1 
ZIRACCHIAN ZADEH, Mahmoud Individual IRAN 1 
ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidoun Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
ADVANCE ELECTRICAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES SL Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
ALUMINAT Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
ANDISHEH ZOLAL Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
ARIA NIKAN MARINE INDUSTRY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
BUJAR, Farhad Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
DAYENI, Mahmoud Mohammadi Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
EYVAZ TECHNIC MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
FAKHRIZADEH-MAHABADI, Mohsen Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
FARATECH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
FARAYAND TECHNIQUE Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
FULMEN GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
IMANIRAD, Arman Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
IMANIRAD, Mohammad Javad Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
IRAN POOYA Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
JAHAN TECH ROOYAN PARS Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
KAHVARIN, Iradj Mohammadi Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
KALAYE ELECTRIC COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
KHAKI, Parviz Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
MANDEGAR BASPAR KIMIYA 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
MARO SANAT COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
NEDA INDUSTRIAL GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
NEKA NOVIN Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
PARTO SANAT CO. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
PAYA PARTOV CO. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 





PETRO GREEN Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
PISHRO SYSTEMS RESEARCH 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
POUYA CONTROL Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
PUNTI, Pere Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
RAHIMYAR, Amir Hossein Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
SIMATIC DEVELOPMENT CO. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
TAGHTIRAN KASHAN COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
TANIDEH, Hossein Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
TARH O PALAYESH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
THE ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE 
INNOVATION AND RESEARCH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
TOWLID ABZAR BORESHI IRAN Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
WISSER, Gerhard Individual IFSR, NPWMD 2 
YASA PART Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
ZOLAL IRAN COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 2 
7TH OF TIR Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
ADVANCED INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 
CENTER Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES 
ORGANIZATION Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
AHMADIAN, Ali Akbar Individual 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
AMIDI, Reza Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
AMIN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
AMMUNITION AND METALLURGY 
INDUSTRIES GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
AMNAFZAR GOSTAR-E SHARIF Entity IRAN-TRA 3 
ANSAR BANK Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 3 
ARMAMENT INDUSTRIES GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
ARMY SUPPLY BUREAU Entity 
IFSR, NPWMD, 
SYRIA 3 
BAHMANYAR, Bahmanyar Morteza Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
BANK SADERAT IRAN Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
SDGT 3 
BANK SADERAT PLC Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
SDGT 3 
BAQIYATTALLAH UNIVERSITY OF 
MEDICAL SCIENCES Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
BEIJING ALITE TECHNOLOGIES CO., 





BELVNESHPROMSERVICE Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
BONYAD TAAVON SEPAH Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
BOZORG, Marzieh Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
CANKO, Ali Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
CARVANA COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
CENTER FOR INNOVATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
CENTER TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED 
CRIME Entity IRAN-TRA 3 
CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES & 
DEVELOPMENT OF MATERIALS GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
CHINA NATIONAL PRECISION 
MACHINERY IMPORT/EXPORT 
CORPORATION Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
COMMITTEE TO DETERMINE 
INSTANCES OF CRIMINAL CONTENT Entity IRAN-TRA 3 
CPMIEC SHANGHAI PUDONG COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
DALIAN ZHENGHUA MAOYI YOUXIAN 
GONGSI Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
DALIAN ZHONGCHUANG CHAR-WHITE 
CO., LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
DASTJERDI, Ahmad Vahid Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
DEEP OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGY 
COMPANY, P.J.S. Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
DEFENSE INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
DIGITAL MEDIA LAB Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
DOOSTAN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
DOURAN SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES Entity IRAN-TRA 3 
DURANSOY, Muammer Kuntay Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS 
INDUSTRIES CO Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
ENERGY GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL FZE Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
ERTEBAT GOSTAR NOVIN Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
ESBATI, Mostafa Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
ESMAELI, Reza-Gholi Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
FADAVI, Ali Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
FAJR INDUSTRIES GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
FALSAFI, Mahin Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
FAN PARDAZAN Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 





FATER ENGINEERING INSTITUTE Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
FATTAH, Parviz Individual 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
FAZLI, Ali Individual IRAN-TRA 3 
FROSCH, Daniel Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
GHARARGAHE SAZANDEGI GHAEM Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
GHOLAMI, Ali Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
GHORB KARBALA Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
GHORB NOOH Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
GLOBAL SEA LINE CO LTD Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
HARA COMPANY Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
HEJAZI, Mohammad Individual 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
HOJATI, Mohsen Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
HONG KONG ELECTRONICS Entity NPWMD 3 
IMAM HOSSEIN UNIVERSITY Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 




INFORMATION SYSTEMS IRAN Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
INTERNATIONAL GENERAL 
RESOURCING FZE Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
IRAN AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRIAL COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
IRAN AVIATION INDUSTRIES 
ORGANIZATION Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
IRAN COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES Entity 
IFSR, IRAN-
TRA, NPWMD 3 
IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES Entity 
IFSR, IRAN-
TRA, NPWMD 3 





REGULATORY AUTHORITY Entity IRAN-TRA 3 
IRANIAN CYBER POLICE Entity IRAN-TRA 3 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 









IRGC, NPWMD 3 
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD 
CORPS AIR FORCE Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD 
CORPS MISSILE COMMAND Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
JAFARI, Mani Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
JAFARI, Milad Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 




JAFARI, Mohammad Javad Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
JALILI, Rasool Individual IRAN-TRA 3 
JOINT IRAN-VENEZUELA BANK Entity IRAN 3 
JOZA INDUSTRIAL COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
KARAT INDUSTRY CO., LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
KAVEH CUTTING TOOLS COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
KETABACHI, Mehrdada Akhlaghi Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
KHATAM OL ANBIA GHARARGAH 
SAZANDEGI NOOH Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
KHORASAN METALLURGY INDUSTRIES Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
LI, Fangwei Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
LIMMT ECONOMIC AND TRADE 
COMPANY, LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
M. BABAIE INDUSTRIES Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
MACHINE PARDAZAN CO. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
MACPAR MAKINA SAN VE TIC A.S. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
MAKIN INSTITUTE Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
MALEK ASHTAR UNIVERSITY OF 
TECHNOLOGY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
MALEKI, Naser Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
MARINE INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
MEHR BANK Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
MEHR-E EQTESAD-E IRANIAN 
INVESTMENT COMPANY Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND ISLAMIC 
GUIDANCE Entity IRAN-TRA 3 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FOR ARMED 





MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS 
EXPORT Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
MIZAN MACHINE MANUFACTURING 
GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
MOBILE VALUE-ADDED SERVICES 
LABORATORY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 




MOZAFFARINIA, Reza Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
MTTO INDUSTRY AND TRADE LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TICARET 
PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 




NAVAL DEFENCE MISSILE INDUSTRY 
GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
NAVID COMPOSITE MATERIAL 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
NEGIN PARTO KHAVAR Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
NIRU BATTERY MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
OFOGH SABERIN ENGINEERING 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY Entity IRAN-TRA 3 
OMRAN SAHEL Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
ORIENTAL OIL KISH Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
PARCHIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
PARS AMAYESH SANAAT KISH Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
PEYKASA Entity IRAN-TRA 3 
PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD Entity IRAN-TRA 3 
QASEMI, Rostam Individual 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
QODS AVIATION INDUSTRIES Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
RABIEE, Hamid Reza Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 
RAH SAHEL INSTITUTE Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
RAHAB INSTITUTE Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
REZAIE, Morteza Individual 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
SAD IMPORT EXPORT COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 






SAFETY EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT 
COMPANY Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
SAHEL CONSULTANT ENGINEERS Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
SALIMI, Hosein Individual 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
SANAM INDUSTRIAL GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
SAZEH MORAKAB CO. LTD Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 




SEPASAD ENGINEERING COMPANY Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
SHAHID AHMAD KAZEMI INDUSTRIES 
GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
SHAHID BAKERI INDUSTRIAL GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
SHAHID HEMMAT INDUSTRIAL GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
SHAHID SATTARI INDUSTRIES Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
SHAHID SAYYADE SHIRAZI 
INDUSTRIES Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
SHIRAZ ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
SINOTECH DALIAN CARBON AND 
GRAPHITE MANUFACTURING 
CORPORATION Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
SINOTECH INDUSTRY CO., LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
SOLEIMANI, Qasem Individual 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD, 
SDGT, SYRIA 3 
STEP A.S. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
SUCCESS MOVE LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
TAGHIPOUR, Reza Individual IRAN-TRA 3 
TAMADDON, Morteza Individual IRAN-TRA 3 
TEHRAN GOSTARESH COMPANY, P.J.S. Entity 
IFSR, IRGC, 
NPWMD 3 
TEREAL INDUSTRY AND TRADE 
LIMITED Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
TIDEWATER MIDDLE EAST CO. Entity IRGC, NPWMD 3 
TIVA DARYA Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
TIVA KARA CO. LTD. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
TIVA POLYMER CO. Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
TIVA SANAT GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
TRADE CAPITAL BANK Entity 
IFSR, IRAN, 
NPWMD 3 
VAHIDI, Ahmad Individual IFSR, NPWMD 3 





YA MAHDI INDUSTRIES GROUP Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 
YAZD METALLURGY INDUSTRIES Entity IFSR, NPWMD 3 






















































































































Appendix 1.3 A Selected Comparative List of Entities Sanctioned by the U.S., EU, & UN 
Entity 






Ansar Bank December 21, 2010 May 24, 2011 n/a 
Aryan Bank August 16, 2010 July 26, 2010 n/a 
Bank Keshavarzi Iran March 20, 2008 n/a n/a 
Bank Maskan March 20, 2008 n/a n/a 
Bank Mellat August 16, 2010 July 26, 2010 n/a 
Bank Melli Iran August 16, 2010 July 26, 2010 n/a 
Bank Of Industry And Mine (Of 
Iran) 
May 17, 2011 May 24, 2011 n/a 
Bank Refah Kargaran February 17, 2011 May 24, 2011 n/a 
Bank Saderat Iran August 16, 2010 July 26, 2010 n/a 
Bank Saderat Plc August 16, 2010 July 26, 2010 n/a 
Bank Sepah August 16, 2010 April 20, 2008 March 24, 2007 
Bank Tejarat January 23, 2012 January 24, 2012 n/a 
Bimeh Iran Insurance Company 
(U.K.) Limited 
June 16, 2010 n/a n/a 
Bonyad Taavon Sepah December 21, 2010 April 20, 2008 March 24, 2007 
Bou Ali Sina Petrochemical 
Company 
May 31, 2013 n/a n/a 
Commercial Pars Oil Co. June 4, 2013 n/a n/a 
Dey Bank July 12, 2012 n/a n/a 
Eghtesad Novin Bank July 12, 2012 n/a n/a 
Execution Of Imam Khomeini'S 
Order 
June 4, 2013 n/a n/a 
Ghadir Investment Company June 4, 2013 n/a n/a 
Ghavamin Bank August 29, 2014 n/a n/a 
Iran Marine Industrial Company, 
Sadra 
March 28, 2012 May 23, 2011 n/a 
Iran Zamin Bank July 12, 2012 n/a n/a 
Irisl Marine Services & Engineering 
Company 




Jabber Ibn Hayan August 12, 2008 April 23, 2007 March 8, 2008 
Karafarin Bank July 12, 2012 n/a n/a 
Khatam Al-Anbiya Construction 
Headquarters 





Khavarmianeh Bank August 29, 2014 n/a n/a 
Machine Sazi Arak Co. Ltd. August 3, 2010 July 26, 2010 n/a 
Mahab Ghodss Consulting 
Engineering Company 
August 3, 2010 n/a n/a 
Mazandaran Cement March 3, 2009 July 26, 2010 n/a 
Mehr Bank December 21, 2010 July 26, 2010 n/a 
Mehr-E Eqtesad-E Iranian 
Investment Company 
June 23, 2011 n/a n/a 
Mobin Petrochemical May 31, 2013 n/a n/a 
Pardis Investment June 4, 2013 n/a n/a 
Pars Oil And Gas Company May 31, 2013 n/a n/a 
Pars Oil Co. May 31, 2013 n/a n/a 
Parsian Bank July 12, 2012 n/a n/a 
Pasargad Bank July 12, 2012 n/a n/a 
Persia Oil & Gas Industry 
Development Co. 
June 4, 2013 n/a n/a 
Post Bank August 16, 2010 October 25, 2010 n/a 
Rey Investment Company June 4, 2013 n/a n/a 
Saman Bank July 12, 2012 n/a n/a 
Sarmayeh Bank July 12, 2012 n/a n/a 
Shahr Bank July 12, 2012 n/a n/a 
Shazand Petrochemical May 31, 2013 n/a n/a 
Shomal Cement March 3, 2009 n/a n/a 
Sina Bank August 3, 2010 July 26, 2010 n/a 
Tabriz Petrochemical Company May 31, 2013 n/a n/a 
Tadbir Economic Development 
Group 
June 4, 2013 n/a n/a 
Tadbir Energy Development Group 
Co. 
June 4, 2013 n/a n/a 
Tadbir Investment Company June 4, 2013 n/a n/a 
Tat Bank July 12, 2012 n/a n/a 
Tidewater Middle East Co. June 23, 2011 January 24, 2012 n/a 
Tosee Eqtesad Ayandehsazan 
Company 
June 4, 2013 n/a n/a 







Appendix 1.4 IRGC-Controlled Firms in Tehran Stock Exchange 
Introduction 
This memorandum outlines the ownership structures and board memberships of companies 
where Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is the controlling shareholder.  
In detailing the extent of these entities’ involvement in these companies, I looked at two criteria:  
1. Do they own at least 50 percent of the total shares in the company? 
2. If not, do they control a majority of the seats on the board of directors (excluding the 
CEO, who is chosen by the shareholders’ representatives on the board)?  
Their ownership and board membership structures are described below.  
Entities controlled by the IRGC are identified by *;  
Entities controlled by the armed forces are identified by **;  
Entities controlled by the Supreme Leader are identified by ***. 
The IRGC-Controlled Companies 
 
I. Telecommunication Company of Iran 
II. Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran 
III. Calcimin 
IV. Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company 





VI. Iran Tractor Foundry Company  
VII. Iran Zinc Mines Development Company 
VIII. National Iranian Lead and Zinc Company 
IX. Iran Mineral Products Company 
Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI) 
TCI is Iran’s largest telecom company. It is controlled by the IRGC in conjunction with 
two entities under the direct control of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Execution of Imam 
Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) and the Mostazafan Foundation. The Guard, EIKO, and Mostazafan 
Foundation bought the formerly government-owned company in September 2009 after a highly 
contentious bidding process in which the only non-IRGC offer to buy the firm was disqualified 
for security concerns at the last minute.
17
 
TCI has a monopoly over Iran’s landlines and it controls much of the country’s internet 
traffic. Because of this, the IRGC is in a position to employ sensitive monitoring technology that 
can enhance its surveillance abilities against the country’s dissidents. In 2012, Reuters reported 
the sale to TCI, by China’s Shenzen-based ZTE Corporation, of “a powerful surveillance system 
capable of monitoring landline, mobile and internet communications.”
18
 
TCI Shareholders Percentage of Shares (%)  
Etemad Mobin Development Company*, *** 50% 
Provincial Investment Companies 20% 
Government of Iran 19.76% 
 
                                                 
17
 Michael Slackman, “Elite Guard in Iran tightens Grip with Media Move,” The New York Times, 8 October 2009. 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/09/world/middleeast/09iran.html?_r=0) 
18






TCI’s main shareholder is Etemad Mobin Development Company (TEMC), which owns 
50 percent of the shares.
19
 TEMC is controlled by the IRGC jointly with the supreme leader’s 
financial empire. Khamenei exercises his influence through the Mostazafan Foundation, owner 
of Sina Bank, and EIKO, which owns the Tadbir Group, which in turn is the owner of the Mobin 
Electronic Development Company.
20
 Together, Sina Bank and Mobin Electronic Development 
Company own 48 percent of TEMC.
21
 The IRGC-owned Shahriar Mahestan Company and 
Etemad Mehr Pars Group Company own 51 percent of the shares of TEMC.
22
  
On TCI’s recently elected board of directors, 3 of the 5 members, including the chairman 
of the board, represent the Etemad Mobin Development Company and its affiliates and two 
represent the Government of Iran.
23
 Moreover, MCI has been awarded a contract to become 




Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran (MTCI or MCI) 
                                                 
19
 Please refer to the official TCI statement reproduced in Appendix 1. 
20
 Board of Director changes show Mobin is controlled by Tadbir Group. “Agahi-ye Taghirat-e Sherkat-e Gostaresh 
Electronic Mobin Iran (Bulletin for Changes in Gostaresh Mobin Eletronic Company),” Iranian Official Journal, 
August 18, 2012. (http://www.gazette.ir/Detail.asp?NewsID=970852037162495&paperID=925195503665037). 
Tadbir is a subsidiary of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order, or EIKO, the business conglomerate controlled 
by the supreme leader. See: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Targets Assets of Iranian 
Leadership,” June 4, 2013. (http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1968.aspx)  
21
 “About US,” Etemad Mobin Development Company, accessed January 22, 2018. 
(http://www.teminvestco.com/fa/about-us) 
22
 “Bozorgtarin Moamele-ye Tarikh-e Bours-e Iran Anjam Shod (Iran’s Largest Stock Exchange Deal Took Place),” 
Deutsche Welle (Germany), September 27, 2009. (http://www.dw.com/fa-ir/انجام-ایران-بورس-تاریخ-معامله-بزرگترین-
 a-4728169); “Bozorgtarin Moamele-ye Tarikh-e Bours-e Iran Anjam Shod (Iran’s Largest Stock Exchange Deal/شد
Took Place),” Deutsche Welle (Germany), September 27, 2009. (http://www.dw.com/fa-ir/تاریخ-معامله-بزرگترین-
 (a-4728169/شد-انجام-ایران-بورس
23
 “Members of the board and CEO of TCI have been picked,” Fars News Agency (Iran), January 12, 2018. 
(http://www.farsnews.com/13961022000175)  
24
 Tony Badran and Saeed Ghasseminejad, “After Nuclear Deal, Iran Looks to Profit in Syria,” The Cipher Brief, 





MCI is the largest mobile operator in Iran.
25




Shareholders Percentage of Shares (%) 
Telecommunication Company of Iran*, ***  90.06% 
Saba Capital Management and Development 1.86% 
 
The MCI board of directors listed below demonstrates that two IRGC-controlled entities, 
TCI and Mehr Eghtesad, hold the most senior positions on the board.
27
 As noted above, Mobin 
Electronic Development Company (TEMC), which holds one seat on the board, is controlled by 
the supreme leader through EIKO and its subsidiary, the Tadbir Group. IRGC owns the Mehr 
Eghtesad Mobin Company. The rest of the seats on the board belong to the TCI and its 
subsidiaries.  
There have been reports about a possible deal between Orange, the French telecom giant, 
and MCI, where Orange will buy shares of MCI.
28
 MCI has also been awarded a contract in 
Syria to operate as the country’s third mobile operator.
29
 
Board of Directors 
Member Current Representative  Position 
Telecommunication Company of 
Iran*,*** 
Seyyed Asadollah Dehnad Chairman 
Mehr Eghtesad Mobin Company* Ali Baghayi Vice Chairman 
                                                 
25
 “Moarefi-ye Sherkat (Company Introduction),” Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran, accessed October 5, 
2015. (http://www.mci.ir/web/guest/glance-to-mci-history) 
26
 “Moarefi-ye Sherkat (Company Introduction),” Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran, accessed October 5, 
2015. (http://www.mci.ir/web/guest/glance-to-mci-history) 
27
 “Sherkat-e Ertebatat-e Sayyar-e Iran - Heyyat Modire (Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran - Board of 
Directors), Tehran Stock Exchange, accessed January 15, 2018. 
(http://www.tsetmc.com/Loader.aspx?ParTree=151311&i=68635710163497089#)  
28
 Saeed Ghasseminejad, “Orange Telecom Mulls Partnership with IRGC-Controlled Firm,” Foundation for Defense 




 Tony Badran and Saeed Ghasseminejad, “After Nuclear Deal, Iran Looks to Profit in Syria,” The Cipher Brief, 





Mobin Electronic Development 
Company***  
Mojtaba Jafari Member 
Karashap*,*** Behza Khan Sefid Member  









Calcimin is an IRGC-owned company active in mineral exploration, extraction, and 
processing.  
Shareholders Percentage of Shares (%) 
Iran Zinc Mines Development Company* 57.3% 
Bank Maskan Investment Group 1.53% 
Gheshm Zinc Smelting Company* 1.19% 
 
Calcimin is a subsidiary of Iran Zinc Mines Development Company, an IRGC-controlled 
company that owns 57.3 percent of Calcimin’s stocks. Its IRGC representative is the Chairman 
of the board.
30
 Calcimin also has five subsidiaries.
31
 All board seats are controlled by the 
IRGC.
32
 Andisheh Mehvaran Investment Company, Zinc Industry Development Commercial 
Company and Non-Iron Metals Research and Engineering are subsidiaries of the IRGC-
controlled Iran Zinc Mines Development Company.
33
 Gheshm Zinc Smelting Company is a 
                                                 
30
 “Calcimin - Sahamdaran (Calcimin - Stockholders),” Tehran Securities Exchange Technology Management 
Company, accessed February 13, 2018. 
(http://www.tsetmc.com/Loader.aspx?ParTree=151311&i=66701874099226162#)  
31
 “Moarrefi (Introduction),” Calcimin, accessed February 13, 2018. (http://www.calcimin.com/?page_id=363)  
32
 “Calcimin - Heyat Modireh (Calcimin - Board of Directors),” Tehran Securities Exchange Technology 
Management Company, accessed February 13, 2018. 
(http://www.tsetmc.com/Loader.aspx?ParTree=151311&i=66701874099226162#)  
33
 “Sherkatha-ye Vabaste (Subsidiary Companies) Iran Zinc Mines Development Company, accessed February 13, 





subsidiary of Calcimin and is represented on the board
34
 – a frequent pattern in IRGC-controlled 
firms where subsidiaries of the firm are among the major shareholders or board members. As a 
result, all board members are IRGC entities. 
 
 
 Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company  
Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company is an IRGC-owned company and manufacturer of tractor, 
automobile, auto-parts, and heavy machines; it is headquartered in Tabriz, Iran. 
 
Shareholders Percentage of Shares (%) 
Mehr Eghtesad Iranian Investment Company* 49.55% 
Bahman Investment Group 10.8% 
Melli Iran Investment Company 4.07% 
Negin Sahel Royal Company* 4.78% 
Boursiran Mutual Fund 1.50% 
Sepah Investment Company 1.35% 
Mehr Eghtesad Financial Group* 2.35% 
 
Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company is 49.55 percent owned by Mehr Eghtesad Iranian 
Investment Company.
35
 Mehr Eghtesad was designated by US Department of the Treasury in 
2011 as an IRGC commercial interest.
36
 Mehr Eghtesad Financial Group, another IRGC entity, 
owns another 2.35 percent of the shares. Negin Sahel Royal is also IRGC entity. IRGC 
                                                 
34
 “Mojtama-e Zob va Ehya-e Rouy-e Gheshm (Gheshm Zinc Smelting Company),” Calcimin Company, accessed 
February 13, 2018. (http://www.calcimin.com/?page_id=73) 
  
35
 “Teraktor Sazi-e Iran (Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company),” Tehran Stock Exchange, accessed February 13, 
2018. (http://new.tse.ir/instrument/%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A71_IRO1TRIR0001.html)  
36
 U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Release, “Fact Sheet: Treasury Sanctions Major Iranian Commercial 





companies control 56.68 percent of shares of Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company. Majority of 
the seats on the board are controlled by the IRGC-owned companies. 
 
Iran Tractor Motors Manufacturing Company  
Iran Tractor Motors Manufacturing Company is an IRGC-owned company and a 
subsidiary of Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company. 
Shareholders Percentage of Shares (%)  
Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company* 86.5% 
 
Iran Tractor Motors Manufacturing Company is 86.5 percent owned by Iran Tractor 
Manufacturing Company, an IRGC-controlled company
37
. All seats on the board are controlled 
by the IRGC-owned companies. 
 
Iran Tractor Foundry Company  
A subsidiary of Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company, Iran Tractor Foundry Company is 
a manufacturer of casting parts for automobiles and tractors. 
Shareholders Percentage of Shares (%)  
Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company* 79.65% 
Karafarin Insurance Company 1.40% 
  





                                                 
37
 “Motorsazan-e Terktor-e Iran - Sahamdaran (Iran Tractor Motors Manufacturing Company - Shareholders),” 






Iran Zinc Mines Development Company  
The publicly-traded Iran Zinc Mines Development Company is the principal owner and 
producer of Iranian zinc and controls an important chunk of the country’s extractive activities. 
Shareholders Percentage of Shares (%) 
Mehr Eghtesad Investment Company* 18.39% 
Ofogh Nili Khalij Fars* 13.71% 
Khadamat Bazargni Ayandenegar Mehr* 9.67% 
Negin Sahel Royal Company* 8.24% 
Calcimin* 2.66% 
 
The IRGC owns a combined 52.67 percent of Iran Zinc through the five above 
companies.
39
 All of the board members are IRGC entities. 
 
National Iranian Lead and Zinc Company 
A subsidiary of Iran Zinc Mines Development Company, the National Iranians Lead and 
Zinc Company controls the production of lead and zinc in Iran. 
Shareholders Percentage of Shares (%) 
Iranian Zinc Mines Development Company* 56.01% 
 




                                                                                                                                                             
38
 “Rikhtegari-e Teraktorsazi-e Iran - Sahamdaran (Iran Tractor Foundry Company - Shareholders),” Tehran Stock 
Exchange, accessed February 13, 2018. 
(http://new.tse.ir/instrument/%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%831_IRO1RTIR0001.html)  
39
 “Toseyeh Ma’adan Rouyeh Iran - Sahamdaran (Iran Zinc Mines Development Company - Shareholders),” Tehran 
Stock Exchange, accessed February 13, 2018. 
(http://new.tse.ir/instrument/%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%8A1_IRO1ROOI0001.html)  
40
 “Melli Sorb va Rooy-e Iran - Sahamdaran (National Iranian Lead and Zinc - Shareholders),” Tehran Stock 







Iran Mineral Products Company 
A subsidiary of Iran Zinc Mines Development Company, Iran Mineral Products 
Company produces Metallurgic Coke, Iron Ore, Gold, Ferrochrome, Nepheline Syenite, 
Phosphate, Limestone, Potash, Titanium, Lead and Zinc. 
 
Shareholders Percentage of Shares (%) 
Iranian Zinc Mines Development Company* 51.85% 
Armed Forces Social Security Investment Company** 15.83% 
  
 
Iran Zinc Mines Development Company owns 51.85 percent of Iran Mineral Products 
Company.
41
 The Armed Forces Social Security Investment Company also has a 15.83 percent 
ownership. Four out of the five board members are IRGC-controlled companies. The fifth one is 
controlled by the armed forces. 
 
Source 1: The ownership structure of TCI on December 31, 2017 based on the statement 
published by the TCI. 
 
                                                 
41
 “Faravari-e Mavadd-e Madani-e Iran - Sahamdaran (Iran Mineral Products Company - Shareholders), Tehran 






















Appendix 1.5 List of Firms in This Study and Their Ultimate Owner 
Company IRGC Supreme Leader Deep State  
Abadan Petrochemical 0 0 0 
Absal 0 0 0 
Abureihan Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Agriculture Services & Industry 0 0 0 
Alborz Cable 0 0 0 
Alborz Carton 0 0 0 
Alborz Ceramic 0 0 0 
Alborz Packaging 0 0 0 
Alborz Tire 0 0 0 
Alborzdaru Pharmaceutical 0 1 1 
Aliyazhi Iran Steel 0 0 0 
Alomorad 0 0 0 
Aluminium Industries 0 0 0 
Alvand Tile & Ceramic 0 0 0 
Alyaf 0 0 0 
Alyaf Poly Poropilen 0 0 0 
Ama Industrial 0 0 0 
Amin Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Amirkabir Steel 0 0 0 
Ansar Bank 1 0 1 
Arak Machinery 0 0 0 
Ardakan Industrial Ceramics 0 0 0 
Ardebil Cement 0 0 0 
Aria electronic iran 0 0 0 
Arj 0 0 0 
Artavil tayer 0 0 0 
Atmosphere 0 0 0 
Azadi Weaving 0 0 0 
Azar Fireproof Bricks 0 0 0 
Azarab Industries 0 0 0 
Bafgh Mining 0 0 0 
Bahman Group 1 0 1 
Bahman Group 1 0 1 
Bahman Industrial 1 0 1 
Bakhtar Cable 0 0 0 
Bama 0 0 0 





Behbahan Cement 0 0 0 
Behceram 0 0 0 
Behnoosh Iran Beverages 0 0 0 
Behran Oil 0 1 1 
Behshahr Industrial 0 0 0 
Behshahr Industrial Development 0 0 0 
Bimeh Parsian 0 1 1 
Bistoon Sugar 0 0 0 
Bojnoord Cement 0 0 0 
Borujerd Textile 0 0 0 
Boutan Industries 0 0 0 
Car Parts Manufacturing 0 0 0 
Chador Maloo Mining and Industry 0 0 0 
Charkheshgar 0 0 0 
Chin Chin 0 0 0 
Dade Pardazi Iran 0 0 0 
Damavand Mining 0 1 1 
Darab Cement 0 0 0 
Darupakhsh 0 0 0 
Darupakhsh Factories 0 0 0 
Darupakhsh Pharmaceutical Chemical 0 0 0 
Darupakhsh Raw Material 0 0 0 
Dashte Morghab Vegetable Oil 0 0 0 
Dashtestan Cement 1 0 1 
Dena Tire 0 0 0 
Derakhshan Tehran 0 0 0 
Dorin Kashan 0 0 0 
Doroud Cement 0 0 0 
Dr Abidi Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Eelam Cement 0 1 1 
Electric Khodro Shargh 0 0 0 
Ertebatate Sayyar 1 1 1 
Eshtad Motors 0 0 0 
Exir Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Fanavaran Petrochemical 0 0 0 
Farabi Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Fars & Khuzestan Cement 0 0 0 
Fars Cement 0 0 0 
Fars Chemical 0 0 0 





Farsit Doroud Factury 0 0 0 
Farsnoo Cement 0 0 0 
Foundry Sand Producer 0 0 0 
Fromolibden Kerman 0 0 0 
Gas & Pipe 0 0 0 
General Industries 0 0 0 
Ghaemshahr Paper 0 0 0 
Ghaen Cement 0 0 0 
Ghahestan Sugar 0 0 0 
Gharb Cement 0 0 0 
Ghazvin Sugar 0 1 1 
Gilan Packaging 0 0 0 
Glass & Gas 0 0 0 
Glucozan 0 0 0 
Goltash 0 0 0 
Gorji Biscuit 0 0 0 
Hafari Shomal 0 1 1 
Hafez Tile & Ceramic 0 0 0 
Hakim Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Hamedan Glass 0 0 0 
Hegmatan Cement 0 0 0 
Hegmatan Sugar 0 0 0 
Hormozgan Cement 0 0 0 
Indamin Shock Absorber 0 0 0 
Information Services 0 0 0 
International Tosea Sakhteman 1 0 1 
Iran & Gharb 0 0 0 
Iran Aluminum 1 0 1 
Iran Argham 0 0 0 
Iran Brake Pads 0 0 0 
Iran Building Investment 0 0 0 
Iran Cable 0 0 0 
Iran Carton 0 1 1 
Iran Ceramic 0 0 0 
Iran Ceramic Powder 0 0 0 
Iran Chemical Investment 0 0 0 
Iran Combine Machine 0 0 0 
Iran Compressor 0 0 0 
Iran Counter 0 0 0 





Iran Fiber 0 0 0 
Iran Fireproof Bricks 0 0 0 
Iran Foundry 1 0 1 
Iran Gas Cooler 0 0 0 
Iran Khodro 0 0 0 
Iran Khodro Axel Manufacturing 0 0 0 
Iran Khodro Diesel 0 0 0 
Iran Long Distance Telecommunication 1 1 1 
Iran Maghare Manufacturing 0 0 0 
Iran Magnesium 0 0 0 
Iran Merinoos 0 0 0 
Iran Mining 0 0 0 
Iran Mining Manufacturing 0 0 0 
Iran Oxygen & Welding 0 0 0 
Iran Packaging 0 0 0 
Iran Pipe & Machine 0 0 0 
Iran Polyacril 0 0 0 
Iran Pooya Profile & Fridge 
Manufacturing 
0 0 0 
Iran Poplin 0 0 0 
Iran Pump Manufacturing 0 0 0 
Iran Radiator 0 0 0 
Iran Steel Parts Manufacturing 0 0 0 
Iran Syringe 0 0 0 
Iran Textile 0 0 0 
Iran Tire 0 1 1 
Iran Tractor Forging 1 0 1 
Iran Tractor Foundry 1 0 1 
Iran Tractor Machinery 1 0 1 
Iran Tractor Motors 1 0 1 
Iran Transformator 0 0 0 
Iran Wool & Glass 0 0 0 
Iran Yasa Tire and Rubber 0 0 0 
Iran Zinc Development 1 0 1 
IranBall Bearing 0 0 0 
Irandaru Pharmaceutical 0 1 1 
Iranit 0 0 0 
IranTractor 1 0 1 
IRI Marine Co 1 0 1 





Isfahan Building 0 0 0 
Isfahan Cement 0 0 0 
Isfahan Petrochemical 0 0 0 
Isfahan Sugar 0 0 0 
Isfahan Tile 0 0 0 
Italran 0 0 0 
Jaber Ebne Hayan Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Jahan Vegetable Oil 0 0 0 
Jamdaru Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Jame Jahan Nama 0 0 0 
Jooshkabe Yazd Industries 0 0 0 
Kaf 0 0 0 
Kalber 0 0 0 
Kalsimin 1 0 1 
Karafarin Bank 0 1 1 
karafarin Investment 0 1 1 
Karoon Cement 0 0 0 
Kashan Spinning & Weaving 0 0 0 
Kaveh Industrial 0 0 0 
Kaveh Paper 0 0 0 
Kerman Cement 0 0 0 
Kermanshah Petrochemical 1 0 1 
Keyvan 0 0 0 
Khark Petrochemical 0 0 0 
Khash Cement 0 0 0 
Khavar Shock Absorber 0 0 0 
Khazar Cement 0 0 0 
Khorasan Steel 0 0 0 
Khoy Suger 0 0 0 
Khoy Textile 0 0 0 
Khozestan Steel 0 0 0 
Kimidaru Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Kowsar Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Lamiran 0 0 0 
Loabiran 0 0 0 
Loghman Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Lorestan Sugar 0 0 0 
Magsal Agro Industry 0 1 1 
Mahdi Tools 0 0 0 





Malayer Industrial 0 0 0 
Mapna 0 0 0 
Margarin 0 0 0 
Marvdasht Sugar 0 0 0 
Mashad Carton 0 0 0 
MashadPackaging 0 0 0 
Mashhad Ringsazi 0 0 0 
Maskan Investment 0 0 0 
Mazandaran Cement 0 0 0 
Mehrabad Industries 0 0 0 
Mehrkam Pars 0 0 0 
Mehvar Khodro 0 0 0 
meli sanaie mes iran 0 0 0 
Melli Industries Investment 0 0 0 
Melli Shimi Keshavarz 0 0 0 
Mobarakeh Esfehan Steel 0 0 0 
Moratab 0 0 0 
Motozhen 0 0 0 
Nab Vegetable Oil 0 0 0 
Naghshe Jahan Sugar 0 0 0 
Nasir mashin 0 0 0 
National Iranian Lead & Zinc 1 0 1 
Negin Tabas Coal 0 0 0 
Neishabur Sugar 0 0 0 
Niloo Tile 0 0 0 
Niroo Color 0 0 0 
Niroo Mohareke Machinery 0 0 0 
Niroo Moharekeh 0 0 0 
Niroo Trans 0 0 0 
Noosh Mazandaran Beverages 0 0 0 
Nylon Fiber Manufacturing 0 0 0 
Offset 0 0 0 
Osveh Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Pak Dairy 0 0 0 
Pakris Spinning & Weaving 0 0 0 
Paksan 0 0 0 
Pakvash 0 0 0 
Palayeshe Naft Tabriz 1 0 1 
Pardis Petrochemical 1 0 1 





Pars Animal Food 0 0 0 
Pars Battery 0 0 0 
Pars Black Carbon 0 0 0 
Pars Carton 0 0 0 
Pars Ceram 0 1 1 
Pars Electric 0 0 0 
Pars Fireproof Bricks 0 0 0 
Pars Household 0 0 0 
Pars Khazar 0 0 0 
Pars Khodro 0 0 0 
Pars Metal 0 0 0 
Pars Minoo 0 0 0 
Pars Oil 0 1 1 
Pars Packaging 0 0 0 
Pars Pamchal Chemical 0 0 0 
Pars Products 0 0 0 
Pars Profile 0 0 0 
Pars Pump Manufacturing 0 0 0 
Pars Shahab 0 0 0 
Pars Sugar 0 0 0 
Pars Switch 0 0 0 
Pars Tile 0 0 0 
Pars Tin Packaging 0 0 0 
Pars Vegetable Oil 0 0 0 
Parsdaru Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Parsilon 0 0 0 
Payam Industrial 0 0 0 
Paysaz 0 0 0 
Pegah Azerbaijan 0 0 0 
Pegah Isfahan Pasteurized Milk 0 0 0 
Pegah khorasan 0 0 0 
Permit 0 0 0 
Persit 0 0 0 
Petrochemical Transportation 0 0 0 
Piazar 0 0 0 
Pichak 0 0 0 
Piranshahr Sugar 0 0 0 
Plasco 0 0 0 
Plastiran 0 0 0 





Razak Laboratories 0 0 0 
Rena Investment 0 0 0 
Renewal &Building Tehran 0 0 0 
Roozdaru Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Saba Noor Steel Material 0 0 0 
Sabet Khorasan Sugar 0 0 0 
Sadi Tile & Ceramic 0 0 0 
Sadid Pipe & Equipment 0 0 0 
Sadid Industries 0 0 0 
Sahand Lifttruck 0 0 0 
Sahand Rubber 0 0 0 
Saipa 0 0 0 
Saipa Azin 0 0 0 
Saipa Diesel 0 0 0 
Saipa Glass 0 0 0 
Sakht Ajand 0 0 0 
Salemin 0 0 0 
Sanaati barez 0 0 0 
Sange Ahan Golgohar 0 0 0 
Sarma Afarin 0 0 0 
Sasan 0 0 0 
Saze Poyesh 0 0 0 
Sefid Neyriz Cement 0 0 0 
Sepahan Cement 1 0 1 
Sepahan Industrial Group 0 0 0 
Sepanta 0 0 0 
Shahd Iran Sugar 0 0 0 
Shahed sherkat 0 0 0 
Shahid Bahonar Copper 0 0 0 
Shahid Ghandi 0 0 0 
Shahin Plastic 0 0 0 
Shahrood Cement 0 0 0 
Shahrood Sugar 0 0 0 
Shargh Cement 1 0 1 
Shiraz Petrochemical 1 0 1 
Shiraz Petrochemical 1 0 1 
Shirin Khorasan 0 0 0 
Shishe Darui Razi 0 0 0 
Shocopars 0 0 0 





Siman Kordestan 1 0 1 
Sina Bank 0 1 1 
Sina Chemical 0 1 1 
Sina Tile & Ceramic 0 1 1 
Sinadaru Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Sobhan Pharmaceutical 0 1 1 
Soliran 0 0 0 
Soufian Cement 0 0 0 
Super Paint 0 0 0 
Tabriz Compressor 0 0 0 
Tajhiz Niroo Zanjan 0 0 0 
Takceram Ceramic 0 0 0 
Takin Ko 0 0 0 
tamin daru investment 0 0 0 
Team Manufacturing 0 0 0 
Tecnotar Engineering 0 0 0 
Tehran Cement 0 1 1 
Tehran Chemical 0 0 0 
Tehrandaru Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Tejareate Electronic Parsian 0 0 0 
Tide water ME 1 0 1 
Tizro Manufacturing 0 0 0 
Tolid Somom Alaf kosh 0 0 0 
Tolidi Tehran 0 0 0 
Tolipers 0 0 0 
Tooka Transportation 0 0 0 
Toristi & Refahi Abadgaran 0 0 0 
Urumieh Cement 0 0 0 
Varziran 0 0 0 
Vitana 0 0 0 
Yazd Baf 0 0 0 
Zahravi Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 
Zamyad 0 0 0 








Chapter 2: National Culture, Cross-Listing, CEO Turnover, and Sensitivity to 
Performance 
2.1 Introduction 
In this paper, I examine how cross-sectional differences in the national culture, measured 
by Hofstede Indexes, influence CEO turnover. This possibility is important because replacing the 
CEO of a firm is the most critical decision board members make during their tenure. CEO 
turnover provides a corporation with an opportunity to amend and revise its direction, leadership, 
and policies. In the international context, one critical question is how and why the decision-
making process to replace a CEO varies across countries. It is well-established in the literature 
that national-level factors which can affect a company's corporate governance influence the 
turnover decision. As a result, it is fair to ask whether national cultural characteristics have a 
similar effect or not. Additionally, the literature documents the effect of cross-listing on firm-
level corporate governance; the main engine behind this effect is the difference between the legal 
characteristics of the country of origin and the host. In other words, as a firm becomes subject to 
a new legal system, its corporate governance changes. In the same manner, one can ask when a 
firm cross-lists in a country with different cultural characteristics whether it affects its corporate 
governance or not. If it does, we should see this effect on the firm's key decisions including the 
CEO turnover. In other words, the change in cultural characteristics should change how the 
board approaches the CEO turnover decision which in turn should change the probability of 





I use the national cultural indexes developed by Hofstede. I am interested in three of his 
measure which I can argue to have a relation with the turnover decision. These three measures 
are power distance, long-term orientation, and uncertainty avoidance. 
 As Hofstede explains, power distance index (PDI) measures how much other members 
of the society accept the unequal distribution of power in the society. It measures how much the 
most influential person in a society can be challenged. Its link to the CEO turnover is clear. How 
much a CEO, the top person at a firm, can be challenged. 
 Long-term orientation (LTO) index measures whether people in a country are focused on 
a long-term or short-term horizon. Hofstede explains that in the business context LTO  is 
associated with short-term versus long-term decision making. He also calls it normative versus 
pragmatic. In the CEO turnover context, LTO translates into whether the board and shareholders 
are ready to wait and give time to CEO to prove his ability despite short-term bumps in 
performance or not. 
Uncertainty avoidance refers to people's fear of diving into uncertain situations. In the 
CEO turnover context, one can perceive it as the shareholders and board' reluctance to fire the 
CEO, a known person, and hire a new one and increase the uncertainty.  
The first question is if the cultural characteristics of a country affect its corporate culture 
and may guide decisions made by a firm, including the choice to replace a CEO. I study this 
question first through a general cross-sectional regression of cultural indexes. In this setting, I 
add national culture variables to the baseline regression, established in the literature, to study if 





 Next, I use cross-listing as an event to study how the national culture affects the 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. A similar question has been extensively 
explored in the cross-listing literature based on the differences in legal systems of origin and host 
countries. I study how the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance changes after cross-listing 
and how this change is related to the national culture dimensions. The results suggest that cross-
listing alters the organizational culture in a way that cannot be fully explained by the legal 
bonding hypothesis. That hypothesis posits that firms commit to a better legal system and 
corporate governance by cross-listing in the United States. I show that after controlling for legal 
system variables, differences between the national culture dimensions of the host and origin 
countries explain variations in CEO turnover’s sensitivity to performance which cannot be fully 
explained by the legal bonding hypothesis. 
Extensive literature exists on the relation between firm performance and CEO turnover 
(Denis and Denis 1995, Huson, Parrino, and Starks 2001, Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino 2004, 
Bhagat and Bolton 2008). In the international context, previous studies show that in an effective 
corporate governance environment, CEOs with poor performance are identified and replaced 
(Kaplan 1994, Coffee 1999, Murphy 1999, Volpin 2002, Gibson 2003, DeFond and Hung 2004, 
Lel and Miller 2008). Puffer and Weintrop (1991) find that probability of turnover increases as 
the realized performance and the expected performance of CEO diverge. They use analysts' 
forecast as a proxy for the board expectation of CEO's performance.  
Lel and Miller (2008) tested the bonding hypothesis by measuring the sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to performance. They find that when companies from countries with weak investor 
protection legal code cross-list on a major U.S. exchange the probability that they terminate 





were not cross-listed. I build on this work by incorporating the cultural dimension into the 
model, and I find that cultural indexes have a bidirectional effect. In other words, the cultural 
index can increase or decrease sensitivity to firm performance. From the legal bonding point of 
view, companies come to the United States to show their commitment to a better legal system 
and improvement of corporate governance. This commitment consequently increases the 
probability of CEO turnover following the lousy performance. However, from the cultural 
dimension point of view, the direction of the effect can go both ways. 
I use five sets of data to build the dataset for this study. My final dataset is composed of  
firms from 31 countries, with legal, cultural, and financial information for each firm. I begin by 
using a probit model to examine how cross-listing, size, performance, and several cultural and 
legal variables affect the probability of CEO turnover.  
The results in table 2 support the following conclusions. Positive past performance 
decreases the probability of turnover; larger companies tend to have a higher turnover rate; firms 
which cross-list are more likely to terminate their CEO. As firms get larger, the probability of 
turnover increases; higher total compensation in the year before for the CEO is associated with a 
lower probability of leaving the company. Higher power distance index correlates with a lower 
probability of turnover, which means a CEO has a higher level of job security and less challenge. 
Furthermore, a higher level of long-term orientation leads to a lower probability of turnover.  
Additionally, a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance correlates with a lower probability of 
turnover, and a higher degree of the rule of law leads to a higher probability of turnover. Firms in 





In Tables 3 to 5, I use the interaction of cross-listing and performance to see how cross-
listing modifies the performance sensitivity of CEO turnover decisions. I find substantial 
evidence that cultural variables have a two-way effect. In other words, the country of origin 
significantly influences how the cross-listing affects the CEO turnover decision. Cross-listed 
firms from countries with a higher (lower) power distance and long-term orientation index 
become more (less) sensitive to poor performance with respect to CEO turnover, compared with 
non-cross-listed firms from the same country. However, the result shows an inverse relation for 
uncertainty avoidance index.  
This work adds a cultural dimension to the cross-listing and international CEO-turnover 
literature. This work also contributes to the corporate governance literature by showing that the 
cultural dimension has significant explanatory power for the CEO turnover decision. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows, starting with part 2 offering a review of the 
literature. Part 3 explains the data and method. Part 4 provides the results and their interpretation, 
and part 5 concludes this work. 
2.2 Literature Review 
This paper relates to three streams of literature: CEO turnover, cross-listing and 
international corporate governance, and cross-cultural research. The first stream contains an 
extensive investigation of the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. Denis 
and Denis (1995) show that forced turnover is usually the result of poor operating performance 
by a CEO. Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) find that firm performance is the dominant reason 
for disciplinary CEO turnover, and Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) show that operating 





literature, and they conclude that in firms with better corporate governance environment, the 
probability of forced turnover following poor firm performance is higher. Puffer and Weintrop 
(1991) find that probability of turnover increases as the realized performance and the expected 
performance of CEO diverge. They use the analysts' forecast as a proxy for the board expectation 
of CEO's performance. Mitsudome, Weintrop, & Hwang (2008) show that short-term 
improvement in operating income leads to an increase in CEO's wealth. My results show that 
negative stock return performance or profitability performance increases the probability of 
turnover which is in line with the literature.  
Jenter and Kanaan (2008) look at the effect of firm performance on the forced CEO 
turnover. They decompose the performance into two parts: shocks that affect the industry and 
negative performance relative to the firm's competitors. They find that both components 
influence the decision to fire the CEO. Terviö (2008) studies the effect of CEO on firm's 
performance at large firms. He finds that CEOs in these firms have not made a significant effect 
on the firm's value. Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) find that CEO turnover decisions are associated 
with firm performance relative to the industry and by the manager's set of skills. 
In the international context, previous research indicates that effective corporate 
governance leads to the identification and replacement of poorly performing CEOs (Kaplan 
1994, Coffee 1999, Murphy 1999, Volpin 2002, Gibson 2003, DeFond and Hung 2004, Lel and 
Miller 2008.) My findings are in line with the literature that effective country-level corporate 
governance influences the replacement of poorly performing CEOs. 
There are other factors which affect the CEO turnover and have been investigated by 





probability of turnover increases and it decreases afterward. Coates and Kraakman (2010) 
conclude that turnover beyond the fifth year is rarely related to performance. They also find that  
CEO age and company size are correlated with an increased probability of turnover, while total 
compensation has a negative correlation with a turnover. They also imply that a high growth 
opportunity is correlated with the high probability of turnover due to M&A. These are all in line 
with my findings. 
The second stream of literature deals with cross-listing and corporate governance. La 
Porta et al. (1998) review how the legal system protects investors (shareholders and creditors). 
They demonstrate that common-law countries have the most robust legal protection for investors 
and the French civil law countries have the weakest. German and Scandinavian countries fall in 
the middle, between the two extremes. The early literature finds short-term valuation gains in 
cross-listing (Miller, 1999; Forester and Karolyi, 1999). A set of literature finds that cross-listing 
in the US leads to  long-term valuation gains  (Doidge et al., 2009). Sarkissian and Schill (2008, 
2016) show this is not persistent. They introduce the cross-listing wave. In general, the early 
cross-listing literature focused on the market segmentation and liquidity motive (Foerster and 
Karolyi, 1999, 1998), while later research concentrated on the bonding hypothesis (Coffee et al., 
1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999). Karolyi (2006) lists factors that motivate cross-listing, such as the 
desire to obtain investment capital at a lower rate, increase share valuation, increase liquidity and 
market depth, and achieve a greater market share for a firm’s products and services. Many 
researchers observe short-term valuation gains for firms following their cross-listing (Miller, 
1999; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999). 
 Furthermore, a subset of literature suggests that cross-listing in the United States leads to 





show that the valuation gain is not persistent, and they introduce the idea of the cross-listing 
wave. 
Why firms cross-list has been a central query in the international finance literature. The 
bonding hypothesis (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999) provides one answer to this question. This 
hypothesis suggests that firms which cross-list on a major U.S. stock exchange experience 
improved corporate governance in comparison with non-cross-listed firms from the same 
country, ceteris paribus, because they become subject to strong U.S. investor protections. The 
effect of cross-listing on corporate governance has been studied extensively, and findings 
suggest that firms from countries with weak investor protection have more substantial stock price 
reactions after cross-listing (Miller 1999, Foerster and Karolyi 1999), higher valuation (Mitton 
2002, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004), lower cost of capital (Errunza and Miller 2000), better 
and more precise coverage by financial analysts (Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver 2002), better 
information environments (Bailey, Karolyi and Salva 2006), and better access to financial 
markets (Reese and Weisbach 2002, Lins, Strickland and Zenner 2005).  
However, another line of research shows that bonding through cross-listing in the United 
States is not very effective. Licht (2003) argues that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
does not rigorously enforce corporate governance regulations for foreign issuers. Sarkissian and 
Schill (2008, 2016) find some support for the bonding hypothesis, but the effect is stronger when 
the cross-listing firms are already known to the market. Siegel (2005) refines the bonding 
hypothesis by identifying two components: legal and reputational. He defines reputational 
bonding as a market-based mechanism that allows firms to build reputation capital by listing in 
the United States. Using a sample of Mexican firms, Siegel does not find support for legal 





My results can shed light on this contradiction in the literature. My results show that the 
only influential factor is not the one-way effect of cross-listing in the US. Cultural factors are 
essential and unlike the legal setting, the United States is not always culturally at the top of the 
places with national culture friendly to shareholders and hostile to poor performing managers.   
The third stream of literature encompasses the cross-cultural research developed by Hall, 
Hofstede, and Schwartz. Hall and his colleagues identify two classic dimensions of culture, the 
high-context and low-context cultures, based on how information was communicated (Hall, 
1976, p. 101). 
Hofstede developed his culture dimensions in the 1970s, dividing culture into four 
dimensions: power distance, individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity, and uncertainty 
avoidance. He later added two more dimensions. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) 
classify cultures based on a mixture of behavioral and value patterns.  Schwartz (1992, 1994, 
2014) use a different approach by employing his “SVI” (Schwartz value inventory). Schwartz 
asked respondents to arrange 57 values based on their importance as guiding principles in life. 
In the finance literature, Hazarika, Nahata, and Tandon (2014) examine the effect of 
cultural distance within the global venture capital industry and find that a higher cultural distance 
between the investor and the portfolio company leads to a higher probability of success. Lucier, 
Speigel, Schuyt (2003) find that CEO's in Europe are more in danger than in Asia. They cite 
some legal and cultural reasons for this.  Dodd, Frijns, and Gilbert (2013) show that firms cross-
list in markets with similar cultural indexes. They argue this happens because of investor's 
preference to invest in culturally similar places and firms and because of CEO's intention to 





main cultural indexes affecting the cross-listing decisions are uncertainty avoidance and 
individualism. Daugherty and Georgieva (2011) study how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act influences 
the cross-delisting decision of foreign firms, taking into account the level of individualism and 
the overall culture of the home country. They find that before the introduction of the Sarbanes-
Oxley, firms from countries with cultural similarities to the U.S. had a lower probability of 
delisting while the probability was higher for firms from individualistic societies. This reversed 
after the Sarbanes-Oxley. 
2.3 Data and Method 
I use five datasets in this study: Worldscope, Capital IQ, ADR database, Laporta’s legal 
environment database, and Hofstede’s national culture indexes. Worldscope provides data on 
international firm’s financial and accounting information. I use the Capital IQ to gather 
information about CEOs. This allows me to obtain information on CEO turnovers, her 
compensation, age, and tenure. The list of cross-listed firms comes from the Bank of New York 
and Citibank’s ADR directory. They are slightly different, but I merge them into one database. I 
have three measures for cross-listing. The first measure is ADR; it is a dummy variable equal to 
1 for all cross-listed firms in the United States after the cross-listing happens. It  is equal to zero 
for times before ADR and for all other firms. The second measure, again a dummy variable, is  
high ADR and contains only cross-listings in the NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX. The third 
measure, again a dummy variable, is Capital dummy which contains the ADRs for which capital 
was raised in the host country. Canadian companies listed on U.S. exchanges are all considered 
high ADR. I merge my data from the Worldscope, Capital IQ, and ADR directories into one file 
and winsorize my continuous variables at a 1% level. The data cover the period between 1996 





with my cultural index and legal environment data and drop observations with missing legal and 
cultural information. Additionally, I drop observations from countries with fewer than 10 firms 
in the database. My final database has firms from 31 countries. 
My dependent variable is binary and equal to 1 in the year that turnover happens. As 
table 1 panel A shows 23 percent of my firms experience CEO turnover. It is likely that Capital 
IQ does not catch all CEO turnovers; however, 23 percent turnover in a 17-year window seems 
like a reasonable number.  ADR, high ADR, and capital dummy are equal to 1 at that time and in 
all subsequent years when ADR, high ADR, or capital raising happens; otherwise, all equal zero. 
9 percent of firms in my sample experience ADR. My sample most probably suffers from size 
bias, as the data for international firms is mostly available for the largest firms and not all of 
them. 
 Size is the lagged logarithm of total assets in U.S. dollars. The first performance measure 
is net income over total assets (ROA), both lagged and in U.S. dollars. The second performance 
measure is the stock return over a 12-month period, from the beginning to the end of the year, it 
is lagged. I get the total compensation from Capital IQ. Literature shows that total compensation 
has a negative correlation with probability of turnover. I create my market to book ratio as the 
market capitalization of the firm over the book value of its total assets; it is lagged. Tenure and 
age are also calculated based on the data provided in Capital IQ. Age is the difference between 
the current year and the year the executive was born; both are provided in the database. Tenure is 
calculated by assuming CEO starts her job as CEO on the first year she appears in the database 
and she ends her career as CEO the last time she appears in the database as the CEO of that 
specific firm. Table 1 panel B shows that the average of CEO age in my database is 51 and 





old as the literature shows most of the CEO turnovers for CEOs above 65 is  retirement rather 
than a forced one. I check if the CEO subject to turnover appears in the database over the next 
two years following the turnover. If he appears, I drop the turnover event from my database and I 
consider it a voluntary leaving. If he does not appear in the database as a CEO in a two-year 
window, I consider it a forced turnover.   
The legal environment data is taken from Laporta's law and finance paper (2001). I use 
the rule of law,  effective judiciary, and anti-director indexes from that database. The rule of law 
variable measures the law and order tradition in a country. International Country Risk (ICR) an 
entity which measures country risk created this measure. The rule of law for the US is 10, the 
highest possible score. The score ranges from 0 to 5. Lower scores mean the lack of tradition for 
law and order. The score is 5 for the United States, mean is 4.29. LaPorta creates the anti-
director index as follow: 
"An index aggregating the shareholder rights which we labeled as anti-
director rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country 
allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (2) shareholders are 
not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ 
Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities 
in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism 
is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than 
or equal to 10 percent (the sample median); or (6) shareholders have 
preemptive rights that can only be waved by a shareholders’ vote. The index 
ranges from 0 to 6." Laporta, Law and Finance, 2001 
Laporta explains the efficiency of the judicial system variable as for how effective the 
judiciary is when it is related to the business community. The index is produced by Business 





In 1980, Hofstede wrote a book where he identified four national culture measures:  
Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism versus Collectivism, Masculinity versus 
Femininity.  He later added Long-Term versus Short-Term Orientation measure based on the 
work done by Michael Harris Bond (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; see also Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede, 
2001). Two decades later, the work by Minkov (2007) led to recalculation of the fifth dimension 
and addition of the sixth, Indulgence versus Restraint. (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010).  
As Hofstede explains, power distance index (PDI) “expresses the degree to which the less 
powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.” Hofstede 
et al. (2010) have the Power Distance Index for 76 countries. The score is  higher for East 
European, Latin, Asian and African countries. It tends to be lower for Germanic and English-
speaking Western countries (Hofstede, 2011). In high power distance societies subordinates are 
expected to follow the rule while in the low power distance societies subordinates expect to be 
consulted. In my research question, it is clearly translated into whether the CEO can be easily 
questioned or replaced.  
Uncertainty Avoidance is about a country's tolerance for ambiguity. The index measures  
how much members of society are comfortable in "novel, unknown, surprising, and different 
from usual" situations . Societies which avoid uncertainty impose behavioral and ethical codes, 
laws and rules. The score is  higher in" East and Central European countries, in Latin countries, 
in Japan, and in German-speaking countries, lower in English speaking, Nordic and Chinese 
culture countries." One interesting aspect of societies with strong uncertainty avoidance culture 
is that it does not favor a change of job. In my research setting, the question is whether the board 





Long-term orientation (LTO) index measures whether people in a country are focused on 
a long-time or short-term horizon. Hofstede explains, “in the business context and in our country 
comparison tool this dimension is related to as ‘(short-term) normative versus (long-term) 
pragmatic’ (PRA).”  In my research setting, LTO means if shareholders and board members 
punish the CEO for short-term shortcomings or stay with him for a longer time and give him a 
chance to improve his performance. In the low LTO societies, it is essential to focus on the short-
term horizon and strict rules. 
I do not see any rationale for the other three indexes to be related to the CEO turnover 
decision. Individualism versus collectivism measures whether individualism is the cornerstone of 
the society or collective identity. Masculinity versus femininity index measures whether the 
society reflects masculine values or feminine ones. Indulgence versus Restraint is about how 
much the society allows its members to indulge their desires. 
The PDI dummy is equal to 1 if PDI is greater than the U.S. PDI. Otherwise, it is zero. I 
expect the PDI to have a statistically significant negative coefficient in model 1, and I expect a 
negative coefficient for the interaction term for countries with a higher PDI than the United 
States and a positive coefficient for the interaction term for firms from countries with a lower 
PDI than the United States. US PDI is 40, the mean PDI in my sample is 47.  
The U.S. LTO dummy is equal to 1 if the LTO is greater than the U.S. LTO. Otherwise, it 
is equal to zero. I expect LTO to have a statistically significant negative coefficient in model 1. 
In model 2, I expect a negative coefficient of the interaction term for countries with a higher 





countries with a lower LTO than the United States. US LTO is 26 while the mean LTO in the 
sample is 44. 
The U.S. UAI dummy is equal to 1 if the UAI is greater than the U.S. UAI. Otherwise, it 
is equal to zero. I expect UAI to have a statistically  negative coefficient in model 1. In model 2, 
I expect a negative coefficient of the interaction term for countries with a higher UAI than the 
United States and a positive coefficient of the interaction term for firms from countries with a 
lower UAI than the United States. US UAI is 46 while the mean UAI is 44.  
Table 1 Panel C, shows the correlation between the legal and cultural variables. The three 
cultural variables have a positive correlation with each other. However, UAI is not very strongly 
correlated with PDI and LTO, in both cases, it is below 0.1 while PDI and LTO have a strong 
0.32 correlation with each other. It is also interesting that PDI and LTO have a negative 
correlation with the rule of law, but UAI has a positive correlation with the rule of law index.  
To summarize my hypothesis development, I make the following statements: 
1. Poor performance increases the probability of CEO turnover. 
2. Increase in the Power Distance, Long-Term Orientation, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index decreases the probability of CEO turnover. 
3. The culture of the host country influences the corporate culture of the cross-listed 
company. 






5. Companies based in countries with higher (lower) cultural indexes than the 
United States become more (less) sensitive to CEO performance in their decision 
on CEO turnover, compared with non-cross-listed companies.  
I use the probit model to examine how the probability of CEO turnover changes with 
regard to different independent variables. 
Pr (turnover) = φ (β1+β2*Performance+β3*legal Indexes+β4*Culture Indexes +β5*Crosslisting 
+ β6*Control Variables)                                                                                   Model 1 
Cross-listing consists of three measures as explained previously. Φ is the standard normal 
cumulative distribution. Errors are clustered at the firm level to correct for possible serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
In model 2, the variable of interest is the interaction effect.  
Pr (turnover) = φ(β1+β2Performance+β3*legal indexes+ β4Crosslisting+ β5* 
(Crosslisting*Performance)+ β6(Control Variables))                                        Model 2 
I run model 2 for two subsets based on the culture dummies, first when they are 1 and then when 
they are 0, to see how the effect varies between the two samples. Both models include the year 
and country fixed effects when it is appropriate.  
2.4 Results and Interpretation 
Table 2 panel A presents the results for the model 1. It shows that higher stock return and 
return on assets are correlated with the lower probability of turnover, which is consistent with the 
theory and literature. Column 1 has only the performance variables and ADR. ADR dummy is 





percent higher chance of being replaced. One percent increase in ROA decreases the probability 
of turnover by 0.15 percent.  
In column 2, I add cultural indexes. In this setting, the performance and ADR variable 
have the previous signs and significance, even though their magnitude decreases; from 12 
percent to 8 percent for ADR. Power distance and long-term orientation are statistically 
significant and negative. A higher PDI is correlated with a lower probability of turnover, 
meaning that the CEO is more secure and less challenged. Long-term orientation leads to a lower 
probability of turnover because it gives the CEO more time to improve performance and make 
decisions that have positive effects in the long term despite potentially adverse short-term 
effects. One unit increase in PDI leads to 2 percent lesser chance of a CEO being replaced, the 
number is 0.3 percent for long-term orientation. The coefficient for uncertainty avoidance is not 
significant but is positive which is not in line with my expectation. 
In column3, I add firm and CEO level control variables: size, market to book, tenure, and 
total compensation. CEOs of larger companies tend to have a higher probability of turnover. 
Same is true for firms with higher market to book ratios; it may be because of the higher 
probability of them being acquired which leads to change of CEO. Tenure is not statistically 
significant but is negative which is in line with the expectation. Its insignificance is probably 
because of the non-linear relation between tenure and turnover. CEO's with higher total 
compensation tend to be replaced less frequently. The results hold for performance measures, 
ADR dummy, and cultural indexes. 
In column 4, I add legal variables to my regression. The efficient judiciary and anti-





judiciary leads to a more frequent replacement of CEOs. Higher anti-director rights score is 
associated with a lower probability of turnover. It is counter-intuitive, but it can be because 
shareholders have more oversight which leads to better performance and decreases the turnover 
probability. Interestingly in this setting, the higher uncertainty avoidance is correlated with a 
lower probability of turnover. If uncertainty avoidance is high, the board may decide not to 
replace a CEO regardless of poor performance because members would like to avoid uncertainty.  
In column 5 and 6 I add the high ADR and capital dummy. Former is equal to 1 if the 
firm is cross-listed in NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX; latter is equal to 1 when capital is raised in 
the process of cross-listing. Both have a positive coefficient, but none are statistically significant. 
In conclusion, the results of Table 2 support the hypothesis that cultural indexes influence CEO 
turnover. 
Table 2 panel B adds, an interaction coefficient to panel A to see what happens to firm's 
sensitivity to performance following the cross-listing. Column 1 includes the ADR dummy and 
its interaction with performance, column 2 includes the high ADR dummy and its interaction 
with the performance and column 3 includes the Capital Dummy and its interaction with the 
performance. The coefficient for compensation and tenure are statistically significant and 
negative. The coefficient for size is statistically significant and positive. Performance variables 
have negative and statistically significant coefficients. The interaction coefficient is only 
significant for the ADR variable and is negative which means the firm becomes more sensitive to 
lousy performance after cross-listing. The interaction coefficient is negative for the other two 
ADR variables but not significant. The ADR variables alone have positive coefficient which 
means firms who do ADR tend to have higher CEO turnover, though the result is significant only 





In Table 3 panel A, I divide the data into two parts based on the PDI dummy variable 
which is 1 for PDI higher than the US PDI. Higher PDI is associated with a lower probability of 
CEO turnover.  I test the hypothesis that firms form origin countries with a PDI higher (lower) 
than the U.S. PDI become more (less) sensitive to performance, in their decision to replace the 
CEO, after cross-listing compared with the non-cross-listed firms. I expect the interaction of 
performance (ROA) and ADR variable for the sample of PDI Dummy equal to one to be 
negative. The results from column 1 show that the interaction term for the sample with the PDI 
higher than the U.S. PDI is significant and negative. I only interpret the sign of the coefficient 
and not its magnitude.  This outcome means that the cross-listed companies from countries with 
a higher PDI become more sensitive to poor performance following the cross-listing in 
comparison with the non-cross-listed firms from the same countries. The interaction term for the 
sample with a PDI lower than the U.S. PDI is significant and positive, which means that the firm 
becomes less sensitive to the bad performance. The results suggest that cross-listing changes 
corporate culture based on a difference between the national culture of the home and host 
countries. The coefficients for the high ADR and capital dummy interaction term are not 
significant. The performance variables are both negative and significant. Size and market to book 
are significant and positive, in line with the previous results. Tenure is not significant. 
In table 3 panel B, I add the legal variables. The goal is to see if my results still hold in 
the presence of legal variables. In column 1 and 2, I have ADR and its interaction with the return 
on asset. Column 1 presents the results for the subsample of PDI dummy equal to 1. Column 2 
presents the results for the subsample of PDI dummy equal to zero. In column 1, performance 
variables are both negative and significant. Size and market to book are significant and positive, 





Interestingly, they are only significant in column 1.  In column 2, they are all insignificant. This 
strengthens my argument that the cultural dimensions of the origin and host countries have some 
serious implications which cannot be explained by legal variables. The rule of law is significant 
and positive which means as the rule of law increases the probability of CEO being replaced 
increases too. The coefficient is negative for the efficient judiciary and positive for anti-director 
rights. The sign has changed in comparison with the previous setting. I refrain from interpreting 
the change of the sign, but it is worth more exploring in the future. The coefficient on ADR and 
interaction is negative and significant which means the firm becomes more sensitive to bad 
performance. 
In column 2, most of the variables are insignificant except the performance variables, size 
and total compensation which also have the expected signs. The interaction has the expected sign 
and is positive but is insignificant.  In column 3 and 4, I add the high ADR and its interaction. 
The results for non-ADR variables do not change qualitatively. In column 3, the interaction is 
not significant, even though it has the expected negative sign. In column 4, the interaction is 
positive and significant, in line with my prediction that when firms cross-list from low PDI to 
higher PDI (the United States), they become less sensitive to bad performance.   
In column 5 and 6, I add the Capital Dummy variable and its interaction with ROA. The 
results are similar to what we saw in column 3 and 4. In column 5, the interaction is not 
significant, even though it has the expected negative sign. In column 6, the interaction is positive 
and significant, in line with my prediction that when firms cross-list from low PDI to higher PDI 
(the United States), they become less sensitive to bad performance. One should take note that the 
non-legal variables do not change sign and significance level between the two sub-samples, but it 





also replicate panel A and panel B using the sample without the Canadian firms. The result does 
not change. I do not report the results. I also run the interaction of ADR variables with my price 
performance, the results again do not change. I do not present the results.  
In Table 4, I use the LTO dummy to divide the sample based on their long-term 
orientation dimension. As explained before, higher long-term orientation score is associated with 
a lower probability of CEO turnover.  The main dummy variable for LTO is equal to 1 if the 
LTO index is larger than the U.S. LTO value; otherwise, the value is zero. I use two more 
dummies as a robustness check; the results do not change. The first is based on the median value; 
those with an index greater than the median have the dummy equal to 1. The second dummy is 
based on the ratio of the index over the U.S. index. If the ratio is greater than 2, then the dummy 
is equal to 1. I also run the same tests, using the sample without the Canadian firms. The result 
does not change qualitatively. I do not report the results. I also run the interaction of ADR 
variables with my price performance, the results again do not change qualitatively. I do not 
present the results.  
The coefficient of the interaction term between the ADR and performance is negative and 
significant when the LTO dummy is equal to 1. This finding suggests that cross-listed firms from 
countries with a higher LTO value are more sensitive to the poor performance in comparison 
with non-cross-listed firms from the same country. For the firms in the countries with a lower 
LTO index than that of the United States, the interaction term is positive, which means the firms 
become less sensitive to poor performance.  
Like the previous setting, in panel A I have all variables except the legal variables. 





the results for the subsample of LTO dummy equal to zero. The performance variables are both 
negative and significant. Size and market to book are significant and positive while total 
compensation is significant and negative, in line with the literature and my previous results. 
Tenure is not significant. The interaction coefficient in column 1 is negative and significant. The 
coefficient in column 2 is positive but insignificant.  
Similar to table 3, in column 3 to 6, I add the other two ADR variables, High ADR and 
Capital Dummy, and their interactions with ROA. Again, performance variables are both 
negative and significant. Size and market to book are significant and positive while total 
compensation is significant and negative, in line with the literature and my previous results. 
Similar to the results in table 3, the interaction coefficients in column 3 and 5 are negative but 
insignificant. In column 4 and 6, the interaction coefficients are positive and significant, even 
though at 10 percent level.  
In panel B, I add legal variables to the regression. I see the same trend as I saw in table 3. 
The coefficient of interest shows the same behavior as it did in panel A. In other words, the 
inclusion of legal variables does not alter my results. What I see is that firms which cross-list 
from countries with higher long-term orientation than the U.S. become more sensitive to bad 
performance in their decision in replacing the CEO and as a result the probability of turnover 
increases. Firms which cross-list from countries with lower long-term orientation than the U.S. 
become less sensitive to bad performance in their decision in replacing the CEO and as a result 
the probability of turnover decreases. These results are robust to the deduction of Canadian 
firms, and different measures to interact the performance variables and cross-listing variables 





In table 5, I run the same regression for my uncertainty avoidance variable. The results in 
table 5 are counterintuitive. They are in line with my expectation, in the sense that they show a 
two-way effect. However, the effect is not in line with what we saw in table 2, 3, and 4. Table 2 
confirmed the expectation that as uncertainty avoidance index increases the probability of 
turnover decreases. As a result, I expected that when firms from higher UAI index cross-list in 
the U.S. their sensitivity to negative performance should have risen and vice versa. As explained 
before the concept of UAI is more in line with the interpretation that a higher UAI should lead to 
a lower chance of replacing a CEO. This is confirmed by the results in table 2. Even though the 
first two columns of table 2 have a positive coefficient, suggesting that as UAI increases the 
probability of turnover goes up, but the coefficients are not significant. In the rest of the 
columns, the coefficient is negative and significant. It is worthy of notice that the UAI 
coefficient is negative when the legal variables are added. Results in table 5 confirm part of my 
hypothesis, the two-way effect of the cultural indexes, but does not confirm the direction of the 
effect that I had predicted.   
The results confirm the impact of the cultural dimensions on CEO turnover. Additionally, 
they show that the effect goes beyond the legal environment and bonding theory and that it goes 
both ways. That is, when firms from countries with higher cultural indexes cross-list in the 
United States, the effect is different from when  firms from countries with lower cultural indexes 
cross-list in the United States. 
2.5 Conclusion 
I investigate how cross-sectional differences in national culture dimensions influence the 





event. I find that three of the Hofstede indexes (long-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance, and 
power distance) have a statistically significant positive effect on the probability of CEO turnover. 
Additionally, I find that when firms do cross-list in the United States, those from countries with 
higher indexes become more sensitive to negative performance in comparison with non-cross-
listed firms. Consequently, the two-way effect of the national culture of the host country (the 
United States) on the cross-listed firm can lead to the conclusion that cultural exchange affects 
the organization exchange; that is, it can work in a direction opposite to that of legal bonding. 
Therefore, the results suggest that cross-listing alters corporate culture through the national 
culture of the host country. 
This paper adds the cultural dimension to the cross-listing and international CEO-
turnover literature. Furthermore, it contributes to the corporate governance literature by showing 
that cultural dimension, even in the presence of the legal environment variables, has significant 
explanatory power in elucidating the CEO turnover decision made by firms.  
The direction of the effect for the uncertainty avoidance is different from the other two 
and the expected direction based on the definition of the index. This requires further examination 












Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A describes the data at in terms of number of ADRs ad CEO turnovers and related ratios. ADR ratio is the number of firms 
doing ADR in each country over the number of firms form that country. Turnover ratio is the number of firms in each country who 
experienced turnover over the number of firms in that country. 
Panel B describes the distribution of variables used in the study. The variables are explained in the data and method section of the 
paper. 



















Table 2.1.A Turnover and Cross-Listing Statistics 
Country Name #Firm #Turnover (firm-level) #ADR (firm-level) Turnover Ratio ADR Ratio 
Australia 1993 580 163 29% 8% 
Austria 48 8 16 17% 33% 
Belgium 89 10 16 11% 18% 
Canada 2673 837 203 31% 8% 
Chile 28 2 3 7% 11% 
Denmark 64 18 12 28% 19% 
Finland 127 50 23 39% 18% 
France 333 66 56 20% 17% 
Germany 436 93 66 21% 15% 
Greece 19 1 0 5% 5% 
Hong Kong 1053 272 164 26% 16% 
India 1958 331 125 17% 6% 
Ireland 119 30 11 25% 9% 
Israel 96 19 11 20% 11% 
Italy 263 35 34 13% 13% 
Japan 138 5 30 4% 22% 
Jordan 81 1 3 1% 4% 
Malaysia 496 39 6 8% 1% 
Netherlands 186 51 19 27% 10% 
New Zealand 112 17 26 15% 23% 
Norway 211 65 15 31% 7% 
Pakistan 156 14 3 9% 2% 
Philippines 63 7 0 11% 2% 
Portugal 25 2 8 8% 32% 
Singapore 35 10 1 29% 3% 
South Africa 382 103 68 27% 18% 
South Korea 101 0 3 0% 3% 
Spain 54 8 12 15% 22% 
Sweden 286 83 31 29% 11% 
Switzerland 253 68 43 27% 17% 
Taiwan 40 0 12 0% 30% 









Table 2.1.B  Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Mean Median SD Max Min p10 p90 
Return on Asset -0.11 0.02 0.54 0.36 -3.96 -0.37 0.13 
12-month Stock return 0.19 0.01 0.89 4.71 -0.95 -0.61 1.07 
Power Distance 47.28 39.00 20.88 100.00 0.00 33.00 77.00 
Uncertainty Avoidance 44.57 48.00 15.66 100.00 0.00 29.00 64.00 
Long-Term Orientation 44.56 50.88 15.61 100.00 16.12 21.16 61.46 
Market to Book 1.53 0.77 2.59 19.09 0.00 0.19 3.21 
CEO Age 50.6 51.00 7.45 65 20.00 41.00 60.00 
CEO Tenure 3.39 3.00 2.45 16.00 1.00 1.00 7.00 
Size 11.48 11.34 2.64 18.47 4.80 8.29 14.98 
Rule of Law 8.26 8.57 2.16 10.00 2.73 4.17 10.00 
Anti-Director Rights 4.29 5.00 1.15 5.00 0.00 2.00 5.00 












Table 2.1.C  Correlation Table of Legal and Cultural Indexes 
  PDI UAI LTO Rule of Law Anti-Director Eff. Judiciary 
PDI 1           
UAI 0.0964 1         
LTO 0.3186 0.084 1       
Rule of Law -0.5088 0.3217 -0.2083 1     
Anti-Director 0.0884 -0.5685 -0.2774 -0.1805 1   



















Table 2.2 CEO Turnover, Cross-Listing, Legal and Cultural Dimensions 
This table on panel A, presents the Probit estimates of the relationship between the probability of CEO turnover and firm performance measured by Lagged 
Earnings Ratio (one-year lagged ratio of net income over total assets). Size measured by natural  logarithm of total asset. Cross-listing presented by three 
measures: ADR, High ADR and CapitalDummy. ADR contains all cross-listing in the US.  High ADR contains cross-listing in NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX. 
Capitaldummy contains those ADR  where capital was raised. Canadian companies listed on US exchanges are all considered High ADR too. Cultural dimension 
from Hofstede index file: Power Distance, Long Term Orientation, Uncertainty Avoidance. The rule of law index, anti-director rights and efficient judiciary are 
taken from Laporta’s database. Total compensation is the  total compensation received by CEO in the last year. Tenure is the number of years the CEO has been 
with the firm. Market to book is the firm's market cap over the book value of its assets. Size is the log of total assets. In Panel B, the table presents model 2 which 
includes the interaction between ADR and performance. Robust standard errors are estimated by clustering in firm level. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 






















Table 2.2.A CEO Turnover, Cross-Listing, Legal and Cultural Dimensions 
Variables turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover 
ROA -0.156 -0.133 -0.182 -0.184 -0.184 -0.184 
 (8.23)*** (6.66)*** (7.02)*** (7.11)*** (7.11)*** (7.12)*** 
Stock Return -0.053 -0.048 -0.063 -0.062 -0.062 -0.062 
 (3.78)*** (3.45)*** (4.17)*** (4.12)*** (4.12)*** (4.13)*** 
ADR 0.121 0.087 0.003 0.013   
 (3.85)*** (2.70)*** (0.10) (0.37)   
High ADR     0.084  
     (1.26)  
Capital Dummy      0.015 
      (0.23) 
PDI  -0.025 -0.028 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (6.00)*** (6.23)*** (2.54)** (2.53)** (2.55)** 
UAI  0.003 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (1.32) (1.57) (2.08)** (2.14)** (2.08)** 
LTO  -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  (2.09)** (3.35)*** (4.04)*** (4.08)*** (4.05)*** 
M2B   0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
   (1.95)* (1.87)* (1.85)* (1.91)* 
Size   0.053 0.045 0.045 0.046 
   (7.69)*** (7.06)*** (7.27)*** (7.36)*** 
Total Comp   -0.047 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
   (4.11)*** (2.13)** (2.16)** (2.12)** 
Tenure   -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
   (0.60) (1.35) (1.41) (1.36) 
Rule of Law    -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
    (0.38) (0.49) (0.38) 
Anti- Director    -0.027 -0.030 -0.028 
    (1.83)* (1.97)** (1.84)* 
Eff Judiciary    0.065 0.067 0.065 
    (4.98)*** (5.07)*** (4.97)*** 
N 32,097 32,052 30,164 30,203 30,203 30,203 








Table 2.2.B Interaction of Cross-Listing and Performance 
 turnover turnover turnover 
Market to Book 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.43) (0.41) (0.45) 
Total Compensation -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 
 (4.35)*** (4.38)*** (4.36)*** 
Tenure -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 
 (2.82)*** (2.91)*** (2.88)*** 
Size 0.053 0.053 0.053 
 (8.89)*** (9.07)*** (9.19)*** 
ROA -0.179 -0.179 -0.180 
 (8.08)*** (8.08)*** (8.09)*** 
Stock Return -0.052 -0.056 -0.056 
 (3.51)*** (3.87)*** (3.84)*** 
ADR 0.018   
 (0.55)   
ADR*Performance -0.095   
 (1.87)*   
High ADR  0.114  
  (1.88)*  
High ADR * Performance  -0.114  
  (1.28)  
Capital Dummy   0.058 
   (0.95) 
Capital Dummy * Performance   -0.111 
   (1.45) 











Table 2.3 CEO Turnover, Cross-Listing and Power Distance Index 
This table presents the Probit estimates of the relationship between the probability of CEO turnover and firm performance measured 
by Lagged Earnings Ratio (one-year lagged ratio of net income over total assets). Size measured by natural  logarithm of total asset. 
Cross-listing presented by three measures: ADR, High ADR and CapitalDummy. ADR contains all cross-listing in the US.  High ADR 
contains cross-listing in NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX. Capitaldummy contains those ADR  where capital was raised. Canadian 
companies listed on US exchanges are all considered High ADR too. PDI dummy is equal to 1 if PDI if greater than US PDI and 
otherwise it is zero. .Cultural dimensions are taken from Hofstede index file: Power Distance, Long Term Orientation, Uncertainty 
Avoidance. The rule of law index, anti-director rights and efficient judiciary are taken from Laporta’s database. Total compensation is 
the total compensation received by CEO in the last year. Tenure is the number of years the CEO has been with the firm. Market to 
book is the firm's market cap over the book value of its assets. Size is the log of total assets. Robust standard errors are estimated by 
clustering in firm level. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Continuous 
































ROA -0.248 -0.175 -0.253 -0.177 -0.256 -0.177 
 (3.47)*** (6.30)*** (3.57)*** (6.36)*** (3.62)*** (6.35)*** 
Stock Return -0.023 -0.083 -0.023 -0.084 -0.023 -0.085 
 (0.91) (4.17)*** (0.91) (4.24)*** (0.91) (4.24)*** 
M2B 0.052 -0.002 0.049 -0.001 0.049 -0.001 
 (4.71)*** (0.35) (4.42)*** (0.11) (4.40)*** (0.09) 
Tenure -0.029 0.006 -0.032 0.006 -0.031 0.006 
 (2.34)** (0.97) (2.59)*** (0.92) (2.53)** (0.94) 
Size 0.111 0.027 0.095 0.030 0.096 0.030 
 (8.54)*** (3.20)*** (7.62)*** (3.56)*** (7.82)*** (3.64)*** 
Total Compensation -0.054 -0.026 -0.057 -0.024 -0.057 -0.024 
 (3.26)*** (1.57) (3.43)*** (1.50) (3.43)*** (1.48) 
ADR -0.194 0.076     
 (2.72)*** (1.91)*     
ADR*Performance -0.756 0.127     
 (2.55)** (0.71)     
H ADR   0.154 0.081   
   (0.66) (1.11)   
H ADR*Performance   -0.281 0.228   
   (0.16) (1.92)*   
Capital      -0.118 0.036 
     (0.70) (0.43) 
Capital *Peformance     1.112 0.199 
     (0.86) (1.73)* 
N 10,240 19,853 10,240 19,853 10,240 19,853 





















ROA -0.259 -0.140 -0.265 -0.142 -0.268 -0.142 
 (5.76)*** (4.43)*** (5.92)*** (4.47)*** (5.99)*** (4.46)*** 
Stock Return -0.063 -0.066 -0.063 -0.067 -0.063 -0.067 
 (2.90)*** (3.06)*** (2.87)*** (3.11)*** (2.88)*** (3.11)*** 
M2B 0.018 0.006 0.015 0.008 0.015 0.008 
 (2.07)** (0.86) (1.70)* (1.10) (1.65)* (1.12) 
Tenure 0.010 -0.012 0.010 -0.012 0.010 -0.012 
 (1.27) (1.60) (1.25) (1.64) (1.28) (1.61) 
Size 0.075 0.030 0.068 0.033 0.069 0.034 
 (7.95)*** (2.88)*** (7.47)*** (3.20)*** (7.67)*** (3.25)*** 
Total Compensation -0.050 -0.034 -0.051 -0.034 -0.051 -0.033 
 (3.47)*** (1.72)* (3.53)*** (1.69)* (3.51)*** (1.67)* 
Rule of Law 0.689 -0.156 0.687 -0.145 0.680 -0.140 
 (3.64)*** (0.96) (3.65)*** (0.87) (3.61)*** (0.85) 
Anti- Director -0.336 0.212 -0.337 0.200 -0.330 0.195 
 (2.25)** (1.31) (2.27)** (1.20) (2.22)** (1.18) 
Eff Judiciary 0.318 -0.048 0.318 -0.024 0.313 -0.016 
 (3.01)*** (0.19) (3.02)*** (0.09) (2.97)*** (0.06) 
ADR -0.063 0.091     
 (1.26) (1.91)*     
ADR*Performance -0.619 0.269     
 (2.59)*** (1.27)     
High ADR   0.054 0.112   
   (0.38) (1.41)   
High ADR*Performance   0.426 0.228   
   (0.36) (1.92)*   
Capital D     -0.132 0.064 
     (0.95) (0.75) 
Capital D*Peformance     1.538 0.190 
     (1.60) (1.67)* 
N 17,493 12,661 17,493 12,661 17,493 12,661 
 









Table 2.4 CEO Turnover, Cross-Listing and Long-Term Orientation 
This table presents the Probit estimates of the relationship between the probability of CEO turnover and firm performance measured 
by Lagged Earnings Ratio (one-year lagged ratio of net income over total assets). Size measured by natural  logarithm of total asset. 
Cross-listing presented by three measures: ADR, High ADR and CapitalDummy. ADR contains all cross-listing in the US.  High ADR 
contains cross-listing in NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX. Capitaldummy contains those ADR  where capital was raised. Canadian 
companies listed on US exchanges are all considered High ADR too. The interaction term measures the change in the predicted 
probability of CEO turnover for a change in both the firm performance and the respective cross-listed dummy. LTO Dummy is equal 
to 1 for firms from countries with LTO higher than US LTO and is zero otherwise. The Median Dummy equals to 1 if  LTO is greater 
than the median of LTO of all of the countries. The other is LTO ratio dummy which is equal to 1 if LTO over the US LTO ratio is 
greater than 2. Robust standard errors are estimated by clustering in firm level. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 

































ROA -0.259 -0.140 -0.265 -0.142 -0.268 -0.142 
 (5.76)*** (4.43)*** (5.92)*** (4.47)*** (5.99)*** (4.46)*** 
Stock Return -0.063 -0.066 -0.063 -0.067 -0.063 -0.067 
 (2.90)*** (3.06)*** (2.87)*** (3.11)*** (2.88)*** (3.11)*** 
M2B 0.018 0.006 0.015 0.008 0.015 0.008 
 (2.07)** (0.86) (1.70)* (1.10) (1.65)* (1.12) 
Tenure 0.010 -0.012 0.010 -0.012 0.010 -0.012 
 (1.27) (1.60) (1.25) (1.64) (1.28) (1.61) 
Size 0.075 0.030 0.068 0.033 0.069 0.034 
 (7.95)*** (2.88)*** (7.47)*** (3.20)*** (7.67)*** (3.25)*** 
Total Compensation -0.050 -0.034 -0.051 -0.034 -0.051 -0.033 
 (3.47)*** (1.72)* (3.53)*** (1.69)* (3.51)*** (1.67)* 
ADR -0.063 0.091     
 (1.26) (1.91)*     
ADR*Performance -0.619 0.269     
 (2.59)*** (1.27)     
High ADR   0.054 0.112   
   (0.38) (1.41)   
High ADR*Performance   0.426 0.228   
   (0.36) (1.92)*   
Capital D     -0.132 0.064 
     (0.95) (0.75) 
Capital D*Performance     1.538 0.190 
     (1.60) (1.67)* 
N 17,493 12,661 17,493 12,661 17,493 12,661 





















ROA -0.259 -0.140 -0.265 -0.142 -0.268 -0.142 
 (5.76)*** (4.43)*** (5.92)*** (4.47)*** (5.99)*** (4.46)*** 
Stock Return -0.063 -0.066 -0.063 -0.067 -0.063 -0.067 
 (2.90)*** (3.06)*** (2.87)*** (3.11)*** (2.88)*** (3.11)*** 
M2B 0.018 0.006 0.015 0.008 0.015 0.008 
 (2.07)** (0.86) (1.70)* (1.10) (1.65)* (1.12) 
Tenure 0.010 -0.012 0.010 -0.012 0.010 -0.012 
 (1.27) (1.60) (1.25) (1.64) (1.28) (1.61) 
Size 0.075 0.030 0.068 0.033 0.069 0.034 
 (7.95)*** (2.88)*** (7.47)*** (3.20)*** (7.67)*** (3.25)*** 
Total Compensation -0.050 -0.034 -0.051 -0.034 -0.051 -0.033 
 (3.47)*** (1.72)* (3.53)*** (1.69)* (3.51)*** (1.67)* 
Rule of Law 0.689 -0.156 0.687 -0.145 0.680 -0.140 
 (3.64)*** (0.96) (3.65)*** (0.87) (3.61)*** (0.85) 
Anti- Director -0.336 0.212 -0.337 0.200 -0.330 0.195 
 (2.25)** (1.31) (2.27)** (1.20) (2.22)** (1.18) 
Eff Judiciary 0.318 -0.048 0.318 -0.024 0.313 -0.016 
 (3.01)*** (0.19) (3.02)*** (0.09) (2.97)*** (0.06) 
ADR -0.063 0.091     
 (1.26) (1.91)*     
ADR*Performance -0.619 0.269     
 (2.59)*** (1.27)     
High ADR   0.054 0.112   
   (0.38) (1.41)   
High ADR*Performance   0.426 0.228   
   (0.36) (1.92)*   
Capital D     -0.132 0.064 
     (0.95) (0.75) 
Capital D*Peformance     1.538 0.190 
     (1.60) (1.67)* 










Table 2.5 CEO Turnover, Cross-Listing, Cultural Indexes, & Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
This table presents the Probit estimates of the relationship between the probability of CEO turnover and firm performance measured 
by Lagged Earnings Ratio (one-year lagged ratio of net income over total assets). Size measured by natural  logarithm of total asset. 
Cross-listing presented by  ADR  contains all cross-listing in the US.  The interaction term measures the change in the predicted 
probability of CEO turnover for a change in both the firm performance and the respective cross-listed dummy. UAI dummy is equal to 
1 if UAI if greater than US UAI and otherwise it is zero. Robust standard errors are estimated by clustering in firm level. Asterisks 


































ROA -0.158 -0.237 -0.161 -0.239 -0.161 -0.241 
 (5.12)*** (4.87)*** (5.20)*** (4.90)*** (5.20)*** (4.93)*** 
Stock Return -0.060 -0.070 -0.061 -0.070 -0.061 -0.070 
 (2.73)*** (3.25)*** (2.78)*** (3.22)*** (2.79)*** (3.25)*** 
M2B -0.002 0.032 -0.001 0.030 -0.001 0.030 
 (0.27) (3.64)*** (0.14) (3.39)*** (0.12) (3.46)*** 
Tenure -0.011 0.009 -0.012 0.009 -0.011 0.009 
 (1.54) (1.17) (1.57) (1.19) (1.53) (1.19) 
Size 0.021 0.082 0.022 0.078 0.023 0.079 
 (2.07)** (8.66)*** (2.17)** (8.37)*** (2.25)** (8.67)*** 
Total Compensation -0.018 -0.058 -0.017 -0.058 -0.016 -0.059 
 (0.92) (3.96)*** (0.88) (3.95)*** (0.86) (4.00)*** 
ADR 0.050 -0.043     
 (1.10) (0.81)     
ADR*Performance 0.002 -0.353     
 (0.01) (1.44)     
High ADR   0.102 0.179   
   (1.39) (1.22)   
High ADR*Performance   0.235 -0.451   
   (1.98)** (0.82)   
Capital D     0.052 -0.042 
     (0.62) (0.34) 
Capital D*Peformance     0.212 -0.214 
     (1.81)* (0.26) 
N 13,855 16,301 13,855 16,301 13,855 16,301 












Figure 2.1  Turnover Ratio, ADR Ratio, Countries  
ADR ratio is number of ADR firm over number of firm form each country. Turnover ratio is the number of firms who experienced turnover over the number of 



































Chapter 3: Geography, Peers Effects, and Capital Structure 
 
“Inequality shapes institutions, institutions affect redistribution, and both institutions and income 
distribution influence the growth of income, while the level of income affects both institutions 
and inequality. Yet if everything is endogenous, identification is impossible: everything is simply 
determined by the initial conditions, which may, in turn, be shaped only by geography.”  
Adam Przeworski, Geography vs. Institutions 
 
“History followed different courses for different peoples because of differences among peoples' 
environments, not because of biological differences among peoples themselves”  
Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies 
 
“Although industry clustering may not be the economic development Holy Grail, an effective 
clustering strategy is still a proven recipe for success.” 
Hal Johnson, President and CEO, Upstate SC Alliance 
3.1 Introduction  
The optimum leverage ratio is the holy grail of corporate finance; many have sought it, 
but no one has ever seen it. The topic of how firms choose their capital structure and determine 
the optimum leverage has long been the subject of extensive discussions in the corporate finance 
literature. Researchers have found that many factors influence a firm’s decisions regarding its 
capital structure and leverage ratios, but much remains unexplained. One of the missing factors 
in the literature is the role of geography in shaping a firm’s leverage ratio, a subject that has 
received scant research attention. The current study elucidates why geography is a critical 
component in the mechanism of setting a target ratio. First and foremost, if no one knows the 





ratio close to that identified by their peers. What are the criteria that determine whether another 
firm is in the same peer group? Clearly, the industry, size, and similar factors should be 
considered. Geography, which is typically omitted, belongs among them. If a firm aims to 
imitate other firms, it should study geographically proximate firms that are operating under the 
same legal, demographic, cultural, and geographical conditions. Focusing on U.S. firms, the 
current paper shows that headquarters’ location has a significant effect on leverage ratios. The 
study demonstrates that geography plays an important role in deciding the leverage ratio, and it 
shows that firms imitate geographically adjacent firms based on two factors: state and distance. 
In the decision on leverage ratios, firms try to avoid being far above or far below the average 
ratio in their peer group. This work shows that in an analysis of how peers group’s decisions 
affect a firm’s capital structure, researchers should include the location of the firm.  
This paper builds on three streams of literature. The first stream is capital structure 
literature. In this venue, the paper relates to how firms choose the target leverage ratio over time. 
The second stream focuses on how geography affects financial decisions of firms, and the third 
stream is the peer effects literature.  
This work contributes to the literature by investigating the effect of headquarters’ 
location on a firm's capital structure. Gao, Ng, and Wang (2011) used MSA-fixed effects to show 
that the location of the headquarters influences a firm's leverage ratio. I introduce new variables 
to measure this effect and show that the geographical average leverage influences the initial 
public offering (IPO) leverage and the firm’s leverage over time. My results suggest that firms 
imitate each other at the state and distance levels. This finding contributes to the peer effect 
literature by introducing the effects of state and distance. Gao, Ng, and Wang (2011) do not 





should mitigate concerns about endogeneity. However, to adequately address the issue of 
endogeneity, I use the idiosyncratic stock return as an exogenous shock, following Leary and 
Roberts (2014).  Previous works have shown that there is a strong relationship between stock 
return and capital structure decision. Equity shocks among peer groups are uncorrelated. They 
are also serially uncorrelated and serially cross-uncorrelated. These shocks are also uncorrelated 
with the usual firm characteristics (profitability, tangibility, size, etc) used to explain capital 
structure decision. I first rn a regression and find that the contemporaneous and lagged equity 
shock of peer firms are uncorrelated with the variables that determine a firm’s financial policy.  
In the second step, I run a regression to see if average equity shock of peer firms predicts 
future variations in firm's leverage decision or not. Leverage ratios are strongly negatively 
correlated with peer firm equity shock, suggesting that equity shock to peer firms affects the firm 
in the same way as firm i’s equity shock. As Leary and Roberts (2014) explain a precise 
interpretation of the sign and magnitude of the coefficient is not easy. The results suggest that 
peer effects, where peer refers to state (i.e., location), play a significant role in explaining the 
variation in leverage ratios. Firms respond to their peers. They look to their peers when they are 
making this decision; in other words, they imitate and learn from other firms.  
The results also show that at least some peer firms' characteristics are correlated with 
variations in leverage ratios. This states that some of the variations also come from the peers' 
characteristics. In this regard, peer firms' market to book ratio and profitability are both 
economically and statistically significant. This result shows that firm responds to its peer firms 
through two channels. The first channel is the change in financial policies of peers firms. The 
second channel is the change in peers firms' characteristics such as profitability and market to 





it is reasonable to think that for defining target leverage, firms consider other firms in the same 
category as themselves (i.e., in the same state and industry or close distance). This is the main 
contribution of the paper. 
I start by running the regular leverage regression with all the regular literature-established 
variables, with the addition of industry and state dummies. I find a state fixed effect component 
influences book leverage, similar to Gao, Ng, and Wang (2011) that used this method to show 
that MSA influences a firm's leverage ratio. I then introduce state, industry, and distance 
leverage, which is defined as the average book leverage of all firms in the same state, in the same 
industry, and within a 50-mile radius of a specific firm in the previous year, excluding the firm 
itself. These variables are significant and robust to the various specifications and subsamples. I 
use the idiosyncratic equity shock to address the issue of endogeneity. Finally, I add the state-
based variables to my baseline regression to determine if they can cause the state and distance 
leverage variables to become insignificant. These new variables measure political culture, 
banking sector characteristics, borrowing habits of residents and state administration, state of 
incorporation, and so forth. While many of these variables have explanatory power in the 
absence of the state and distance leverage, they cannot make the state leverage and distance 
leverage insignificant; in fact, they become insignificant when the state leverage and distance 
leverage are introduced. The results suggest that CEOs imitate each other, which is reasonable 
because an optimum leverage ratio is difficult to calculate and verify.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in four additional sections. Part 2 reviews the 






3.2 Literature Review  
This paper relates to three streams of literature pertaining to the capital structure, the 
location effect, and the peers effect. In the capital structure context, Fischer, Heinkel, and 
Zechner (1989), Leland (1994, 1998), and Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) show that 
firms periodically readjust their capital structure toward a target ratio. Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008) show that the majority of changes in leverage ratio are caused “by an unobserved 
time-invariant effect that generates surprisingly stable capital structures.” Lemmon et al. (2008) 
show that this factor is present before the IPO, and they conclude, “variation in capital structures 
is primarily determined by factors that remain stable for long periods of time.” In the last section 
of this paper, I look at this effect and whether geography can explain it. 
There is a growing interest in studying the effect of geography on firm characteristics and 
financial decisions. Studies have shown that the location of a firm affects its financing and 
strategic decisions. In this paper, focusing on U.S. firms, I show that the headquarters location 
has a significant effect on capital structure.  
Several studies show that geography has a significant effect on equity investing. Coval 
and Moskowitz (1999) and Grinblatt and Keloharjou (2001) show that investors prefer to buy the 
stock of local firms. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) “apply a geographic lens to mutual fund 
performance,” and find that mutual funds gain abnormal returns through investment in nearby 
firms. They also find that while the average fund shows only a small bias toward local stocks, 
some funds are very biased toward local stocks. The researchers demonstrate that being held by 
close investors is positively correlated with a firm’s future expected return. Their results support 





invest more in geographically close firms whose CEO has the same cultural background and 
native language. Alli, Ramirez, and Yung (1991) show that market reacts to the announcement of 
relocation of headquarters by a significant abnormal stock return.  
Using location as a proxy for information asymmetries, Loughran and Schultz (2005) 
show that rural and urban firms differ with regard to the quantity and quality of investors. Fewer 
institutions own rural firms, and Loughran and Schultz (2005) show that the level of information 
asymmetry is higher for rural firms. Rural firms issue fewer seasoned equity offerings, they 
require more time to complete an IPO, and they often use more debt. Ivković and Weisbenner 
(2005) look at the investments made by more than 30,000 households in the United States 
between 1991 and 1996. They find that the “average household invests 31% of its portfolio in 
stocks located within 250 miles. If investors had held the market portfolio instead, only 13% of 
the average household’s investments would be this close”. Geography affects coverage by 
security analysts, which will in turn affect the firm’s ability to attract market investors. Malloy 
(2005) concludes that analysts are more accurate when they cover geographically close firms.  
Established literature also exists around the effect of headquarters location on a firm’s 
ability to finance itself through debt. In general, the literature states that loan conditions are 
related to the distance between the borrower and the lender as well as the distance between the 
borrower and the lender's top competitor. Arena and Dewally (2011) show that a firm’s 
geographical location has a significant effect on corporate debt policies. They show that rural 
firms have higher debt yield spreads and attract smaller and less prestigious bank syndicates in 
comparison with urban firms. As a result, rural firms try to reduce their informational 





In addition, the greater the distance between the firm and competing banks, the higher the 
loan rates. Degryse and Ongena (2005) show that the distance between the lender and borrower 
decreases the loan rate decreases too for certain kinds of loan. Degryse and Ongena (2005) 
conclude that a higher number of local bank branches leads to easier access to funds by small 
firms and entrepreneurs, which can have a significant effect on the economy. Hollander and 
Verriest (2012) conclude that reliance on covenants in syndicated loan contracts is positively 
associated with borrower-lender distance, confirming that distance has a significant effect on 
characteristics of debt and greater distance leads to a more unfavorable debt characteristic for a 
borrowing firm. 
One crucial question is that given the rapid development of information technology 
whether distance still matters. Although Peterson and Rajan (2002) document considerable 
increases in the distance between small firms and lenders in the United States from 1973 to 1993, 
Brevoort, Holmes, and Wolken (2010) show that distance remains essential. They investigate the 
change in average distance between small businesses and the credit suppliers from 1993 to 2003. 
They find that distance increased more rapidly from 1993 to 1998 than Petersen and Rajan 
(2002) predicted, but the increase in the distance seemed to have stopped, or even reversed, from 
1998 to 2003. Brevoort et al. (2010) show that the increase in distance between 1993 and 2003 
was perceived differently across diverse type of financial institutions, firms, and credit supplies. 
They showed that in comparison with lower-quality credit firms, high-quality credit firms 
received credit from closer sources in 1993. By 2003, high and low-quality credit firms received 
credit from suppliers at equal distances. Furthermore, for firms with more experienced owners, 
distance increased compared with firms that had less experienced owners. Brevoort et al. (2010) 





for relationships involving lines of credit or bundles of credit products. They additionally found 
that the increase in distance was more substantial for older firms. In 1993, older firms received 
credit from suppliers close to them while younger firms tend to go farther to get credit. By 2003, 
older firms started to receive credit at greater distances in comparison with younger firms. 
Finally, Brevoort et al. (2010) conclude that the importance of geographic proximity still exists 
in small business lending. Gao, Ng, and Wang (2011) show that MSA influences firm's leverage 
ratio. They used the F-statistics to reject the joint hypothesis that state dummies do affect the 
leverage ratios. 
Not only does geography influence debt and equity financing, but it also affects firm 
strategic decisions. John and Knyazeva (2008), Graham and Kumar (2006), and Becker, Ivković, 
and Weisbenner (2011) conclude that geography is an essential determinant in how a firm makes 
dividend policy decisions. Francis, Hasan, John, and Waismann (2008) show geography affects 
compensation plans. Gao, NG, and Wang (2011) show that geographically-close firms have 
similar financing policies. They advocate that "local culture and social interactions among 
managers" influence the financial policies of firms which are in the same metropolitan area. 
Zarutskie (2006) shows that the condition of local financial sector affects the financial decisions 
made by the firm. Almazan, Motta, Titman, and Uysal (2010) show that firms in the industry-
clusters make more acquisitions. These firms have lower leverage ratios and hold more cash in 
comparison with their competitors outside the clusters. Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) and Garvey 
and Hanka (1999) show that state statutes have a significant effect on decisions made by firms. 
Not only the state of the headquarters is important, but the state of incorporation also 
affects firm's financial decisions with respect to capital structure. Wald and Long (2007) study 





previous research found that antitakeover legislation was negatively related with the leverage of 
affected firms, Wald and Long (2007) find no direct impact on leverage over the long term. 
Nevertheless, they find that the payout restriction has a significant effect on capital structure. 
Firms incorporated in states with a stronger payout restriction had lower leverage ratio. 
Cook and Tang (2010) show that firms adjust their leverage toward their target faster in 
good macroeconomic conditions. Their finding is robust to variation in financial constraints. 
Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) show the rate and size of changes in capital structure and 
debt capacity are related to macroeconomic conditions. Because firms in different states are 
subject to different gross state products, their leverage ratios can differ. 
The third stream of literature looks at the effect of peer firms and how firms and CEOs 
imitate and learn from each other. Determining an optimum leverage ratio is an art, almost 
impossible to fully quantify, so learning from others and imitating them to avoid being an outlier 
can be a solution. Leary and Roberts (2014) studied the effect of peer firms in determining 
corporate capital structures and financial policies. They show that the primary factor in financing 
decisions is the decision made by the firm's peers. A less important factor in their view is the 
characteristics of the peer firms. They show that these peer effects are more important for capital 
structure determination than most previously identified determinants.  I follow their methodology 
and find similar results for the location effect. 
 Bouwman (2011) considers how geography affects CEO compensation and finds 
evidence for an effect. He finds that one CEO sees an increase in compensation (0.3%) if another 
CEO close by also receives an increase in compensation (1%) during the previous year. He offers 





market competition for CEOs; (ii) local hiring of similar CEOs; (iii) the effect of “leading firms” 
in the vicinity; and (iv) envy among geographically close CEOs. He concludes that these results 
are most consistent with the final item, envy. Bursztyn et al. (2012) look at how investors follow 
each other’s decisions. The researchers show that social learning and social utility factors have 
significant effects on investment decisions.  
3.3 Data and Method  
I get the accounting data from COMPUSTAT, macroeconomic and banking information 
from the Federal Reserve, the zip codes data and the related longitude and latitude from the 
Census Bureau, and the data about the result of presidential elections from various sources on the 
web. 
I gather accounting data for all firms from COMPUSTAT from 1963 to 2013 to have half a 
century of data. I exclude public-sector firms (SIC = 9), financial institutions (SIC = 6), utilities 
(SIC = 49), and non-U.S. firms.  
My main leverage regression is as below: 
Leveragei,s,j,t= a + b*controlsi,t-1 + c*State leverage –i,s,t-1 + d*industry leverage -i,j,t-1 + e*distance 
leverage -i,t-1 + f*(State-based variables) + h*(fixed effects) +εi,s,j,t  
 
Leverage variables are book leverage and market leverage. I generally use book leverage nut 
check the market leverage as robustness check. I don't report the results for market leverage. 
Book leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt (Compustat item dltt) and short-term debt 





defined as total debt (Compustat item dltt+dlc) over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-
year-end share price (Compustat item prcc_f) times the number of common shares outstanding 
(Compustat item csho).  
Control variables are the usually used variables in the literature. Profitability (return on assets) 
is defined as operating income before depreciation (Compustat item oibdp) over the book value 
of assets (Compustat item at). Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat 
item at) Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item ppent), 
over the book value of assets (Compustat item at). Market/book or M2B is constructed as in 
Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing price [prcc_f] times common 
shares used to calculate earnings per share [cshpri] + the liquidation value of preferred stock 
[pstkl] + long-term debt [dltt] + short-term debt [dlc] – deferred taxes and investment tax credits 
[txditc]) / total assets [at]. Initial leverage is defined as the IPO year leverage.  
The regressions have many state-based variables. The most important ones are as follow. Payout 
Restriction for California and Alaska is equal to 1.25, for Delaware, Maine, Oklahoma, and 
South Dakota is equal to 0, and for the remaining states is equal to 1.  
GSP growth rate is the real annual growth rate in gross state product (GSP) using data obtained 
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. GSP per capita obtained for the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Republican states is dummy for those state that consistently voted for 
republican party since 1988. Federal Spending Ratio is funds received from federal government 
over money paid to the federal government by state. Spending dummy is equal to 1 for federal 
spending ratio above 1 and 0 otherwise. Bank depth is commercial loan held by banks in a state 
over the total sale of firms in state in one year. Non performer loans is ratio of non-current loan 





I exclude firm-years with negative or missing values for my main variables. I do not 
retain firms with book leverage above one or a negative cash holding ratio; independent variables 
are trimmed at the 1% level, the dependent variable is not trimmed. 
 Next, I calculate state leverage, industry leverage, and distance leverage. The state 
leverage is the average leverage in the previous year of all the firms in the state in which the 
headquarters are located, excluding the firm itself. Industry leverage is the average leverage in 
the previous year for all firms in the industry, excluding the firm itself. Distance leverage is the 
average leverage of all firms within a 50-mile radius of the firm’s headquarters. I use latitude and 
longitude, based on the zip code of each firm, to calculate distance.  
state-leverage i,s,t = (∑leverages,t-1 ) ÷ (N-1)  
industry-leverage i,k,t = (∑leveragej,t-1 ) ÷ (N-1) 
distance-leverage i,d,t = (∑leveraged,t-1 ) ÷( N-1) if d ≤ 50 miles 
To calculate the distance, I use the zip codes and their associated latitude and longitude. I 






With the exclusion of the firm itself, the state leverage, industry leverage, and distance 
leverage variables are not directly related to the firm's leverage. In addition to the exclusion of 
the firm, I add a lag function to allay concerns about mechanical relation and endogeneity. The 
inclusion of the distance variable strengthens the argument that the effect is related to the 





located within 50 miles in any direction. As mentioned before, the possible endogeneity problem 
is an important issue. The nature of the variables of interest should mitigate this concern, Even 
though I exclude the firm from my distance and state leverage, the concern about the 
endogeneity of the reflection problem (Manski, 1993) is legitimate. In Manski's own words: 
"The reflection problem arises when a researcher observing the 
distribution of behavior in a population tries to infer whether the average 
behavior in some group influences the behavior of the individuals that 
comprise the group. It is found that inference is not possible unless the 
researcher has prior information specifying the composition of reference 
groups. If this information is available, the prospects for inference 
depend critically on the population relationship between the variables 
defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes. 
Inference is difficult to impossible if these variables are functionally 
dependent or are statistically independent. The prospects are better if the 
variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting 
outcomes are moderately related in the population." (Charles F. Manski, 
1993) 
To fully offset the endogeneity problem, I follow Leary and Roberts’ (2013) paper using 
the idiosyncratic equity shock as an exogenous shock which I explain in section 4-1. The final 
sample includes 138,210 firm-year for 13,117 firms. The need to lag some additional variables, 
along with the gaps in data for some firms and non-availability of some variables over certain 
periods, reduced the sample size used in some regressions. In some regressions, I require that at 
least 20 observations exist in each state-year cluster. When I use state leverage, the entire sample 
yields a more conservative result as compared with the sample with the above constraint. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables. It shows that 58,623 observations 
(42%) are in five states, including California, New York, Texas, New Jersey, and Illinois. In 





3.4 Result  
Table 2 presents evidence that state fixed-effect component exists in firm book leverage. 
I find the same result for market leverage, although this is not reported in tabular format. Table 2 
is basically a replication of Gao, Ng, and Wang (2011)'s work. I expect the F-statistics to reject 
the joint hypothesis that state dummies do not affect the leverage ratios; that is, coefficients are 
zero. Book leverage is the dependent variable. In column 1, the widely used control variables in 
the literature, such as size, market-to-book ratio, profitability, and so forth, are shown. The 
coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected signs which attest that the data is 
reliable and in line with the results found in the literature. Furthermore, I add age, age squared, 
and initial leverage in column 2 as additional control variables. R
2
 jumps from 20 percent to 27 
percent, a 35 percent increase in the R
2
. I add age because I expect as firm matures its ability to 
absorb higher leverage, issuing more debts and receiving more loans increase because its 
credibility increases among lenders. However, that capability stops growing after some time and 
reaches its limit, that is why I add age squared. However, the results show that age has a negative 
effect on leverage while age squared has a positive coefficient. In other words, the data shows a 
totally inverse trend. Initial leverage is included for comparison with Lemmon et al.’s (2008) 
paper, which shows that "factors driving cross-sectional variation in leverage ratios are stable 
over long horizons" and go "back to the beginning". I use initial leverage to control for this effect 
partially. 
 In column 3 of Table 2, I add state-fixed effects in the form of F-Statistics to my 
industry-fixed effect. I reject the joint hypothesis that states do not affect the leverage ratios. In 
columns 1, 2, and 3, the results for regression over the whole sample is shown. In columns 4, 5, 





more than 20 firms. The sample decreases from 137,183 to 128,073 observations. This step 
should remove the possibility that the explanatory power of state dummies is caused by state-
years with very few observations. The F-statistics for the state-fixed effect in column 4 do not 
change compared with column 3. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is divided into two subsamples, 
after 1992 and before 1992, with the cutoff point being arbitrary. The goal is to make sure that 
the results are not driven by a specific subsample in terms of time. The F-statistics for both 
subsamples is strongly significant. Table 2 shows that a fixed state component is present in the 
leverage ratio, and it is robust for several specifications. The same result holds for market 
leverage, for the sake of saving space, I do not present the results. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. I cluster them in the state level as well, and the results do not change significantly, 
the results are not shown 
Table 3 introduces three new variables: state leverage, industry leverage, and distance 
leverage. I use these variables to materialize better what Gao, Ng, and Wang (2011)found with 
their F-statistics test for their MSA dummies. State and distance leverage unlike the state 
dummies in Gao, Ng, and Wang (2011) paper are fixed each year but vary over time. I use 
distance leverage to distinguish between the state effect and location effect. Distance leverage 
can include leverage of the firms in different states; as a result, it only takes into effect the 
location effect. State leverage is the average book leverage of all the firms in the state of 
headquarters location in a previous year, excluding the firm itself. Industry leverage is the 
average book leverage of all the firms in the industry of headquarters location in a previous year, 
excluding the firm itself. Distance leverage is the previous year’s average leverage of all the 
firms within a 50-mile radius of the firm headquarters. All regressions include state and industry 





 I anticipate that state leverage and distance leverage affect firm leverage, and the 
coefficient is positive; that is, an increase in average leverage of other firms in the state or 
defined distance in the previous year is associated with an increase in leverage of the firm. I am 
also looking to see if distance leverage in the presence of state leverage has any significance or 
not. In the presence of state leverage, distance leverage captures the location effect; if it is 
significant it means, geographical proximity explains variations in leverage ratio. 
Column 1 and 2 are a replication of table 2. Column 3 and 4 of Table 3 shows that 
introducing state and industry leverage reduces the explanatory power of the state and industry 
fixed dummies. Comparing columns 2 and 3 reveals that the F-statistic has decreased 
significantly, from 2.04 to 1.09. The analysis compares columns 3 to 2 because both require the 
number of firms for each year-state to be more than 20. Similar to column 1, in column 4, I do 
not have such a restriction, and the state-fixed effect does not have explanatory power in the 
presence of the state leverage variable. The outcome shows that the introduced variable 
represents the state effect. The F-statistic decreases from 2.05 in column 1 to 1.24 in column 4. 
This means state and industry leverage capture the state and industry fixed effects.  
In column 3, the magnitude of state leverage and industry leverage is considerable. A 1% 
increase in the industry leverage leads to a 0.22% increase in firm leverage in the next year and a 
1% increase in the state leverage leads to a 0.16% increase in firm leverage in the subsequent 
year. The magnitude decreases in column 4 where I do not have the minimum 20 observation for 
each state-year.  
 In columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, I add the distance leverage variable to the regression. In 





significant and have almost the same magnitude. 1 percent increase in state leverage or distance 
leverage is associated with 0.05 percent increase in the firm's leverage. In column 6, I do not 
have the initial leverage which leads to an increase in the effect of both distance and state 
leverage. 1 percent increase in state leverage is associated with 0.07 percent increase in the firm's 
leverage and 1 percent increase in distance leverage is correlated with 0.09 percent increase in 
the firm's leverage ratio. The results suggest that both distance and state are important 
geographical factors in a firm’s decision regarding its leverage. The result shows that state 
leverage does not explain all the changes in leverage. In the presence of state leverage, distance 
leverage is still significant. This finding strengthens the argument that firms are mimicking each 
other’s behavior. 
Notably, the result on the whole sample for state leverage is the most conservative. For 
example, if in one state-year cluster we only have two firms, a situation occurs in which the state 
leverage is equal to the leverage of only one firm. It is less likely that the other firm follows that 
one firm’s leverage. The whole sample result is retained to show that the result is very robust and 
holds even in the most conservative case. The results imply that after taking out all the state and 
industry time-invariant effects from state leverage and industry leverage, these two variables 
remain significant, while the state-fixed effect becomes insignificant. This result opens the way 
to suggest that the State effect is caused by the geographical peers effect. In the next section, I 
use the equity shock to prove my argument that this is caused by the peers effect. 
3.4.1 Endogeneity 
As Robert and Leary (2014) show, peer firms in the industry significantly influence 





factor in the peer effect. Table 2 and 3 suggest that geography is an important omitted factor in 
this equation. Even though I exclude the firm from my distance and state leverage, the concern 
about the endogeneity of the reflection problem (Manski, 1993) is legitimate. To address this 
issue, I follow the method developed by Leary and Roberts (2013) and use peer firms’ 
idiosyncratic equity returns as an exogenous shock. They show that after controlling for firm's 
characteristics, the financial decision of interest, leverage ratio here, is correlated with the peer 
firms' idiosyncratic equity return or equity shock. Previous works have shown that there is a 
strong relationship between stock return and capital structure decision. Equity shocks among 
peer groups are uncorrelated. They are also serially uncorrelated and serially cross-uncorrelated. 
These shocks are also uncorrelated with the usual firm characteristics (profitability, tangibility, 
size, etc) used to explain capital structure decision.  
To extract the equity shock I start with a market model which includes state factor. 
𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀 (𝑟𝑚𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒(?̅?−𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) +  𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡 
𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 is return of firm i in month t in state j. (𝑟𝑚𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return. 
(?̅?−𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of a portfolio of firms in the same state at month t excluding 
firm i's return. Using monthly data, I estimate this equation for each firm on a rolling annual 
basis where I require at minimum 24 months of data and use up to 60 months of historical prices. 
The βs in this estimation are firm-specific and time varying but constant in a calendar year. The 
idiosyncratic shock or equity shock will be the difference between the expected return and the 
realized return.  





I compound and convert the equity shock to get an annual measure to be consistent with 
the accounting data time dimension. I then take the average of this annual equity shock for all the 
firms in the peer group, in other words, firms in the same state and the same year excluding the 
firm itself, and then lag it 1 year, ?̅̂?−𝑖𝑗𝑡. I then run two regressions where the lagged and 
contemporaneous average peer firms' equity shocks are dependent variable, respectively. The 
independent variables are the firm's characteristics (market to book, profitability, size, and 
tangibility) and peers firms' characteristics (market to book, profitability, size, and tangibility). 
Peer firms characteristics are the average value of each variable for all firms in the peers group, 
in the state, excluding the firm itself. I'd like to see that firm's characteristics do not predict 
current or near future average equity shock of peer firms. 
Table 4 shows that the contemporaneous and lagged equity shock of peer firms are 
uncorrelated with the variables that determine a firm’s financial policy. The firm's characteristics 
are not statistically significant. The coefficients are also very small, most are close to zero. In 
other words, variables such as market to book, profitability, size, and tangibility do not predict 
peer firms equity shock.  
Next, I run a regression to see if average equity shock of peer firms predicts future 
variations in firm's leverage decision or not. Table 5 presents the data when the dependent 
variable is leverage ratios, market and book leverage. Independent variables include firm equity 
shock, peer firms equity shock, market to book, size, profitability, and tangibility for the firm and 
its peers. Peer in this context refers to the firms in the same state. All regressions contain year, 
industry, and state fixed effects. Column 1 presents the results for book leverage as a dependent 
variable, and column 2 exhibits data for market leverage. Both factors are strongly negatively 





in the same way as firm i’s equity shock. As Leary and Roberts (2014) explain a precise 
interpretation of the sign and magnitude of the coefficient is not easy. The results provided in 
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that peer effects, where peer refers to state (i.e., location), play a 
significant role in explaining the variation in leverage ratios. Firms respond to their peers. They 
look to their peers when they are making this decision; in other words, they imitate and learn 
from other firms.  
The results show that at least some peer firms' characteristics are correlated with 
variations in leverage ratios. This states that some of the variations also come from the peers' 
characteristics. In this regard, peer firms' market to book ratio and profitability are both 
economically and statistically significant. This result shows that firm responds to its peers firms 
through two channels. The first channel is the change in financial policies of peers firms. The 
second channel is the change in peers firms' characteristics such as profitability and market to 
book ratio. The results prove that location has a significant effect on the firm's financial decision, 
and it is reasonable to think that for defining target leverage, firms consider other firms in the 
same category as themselves (i.e., in the same state and industry or close distance). This is the 
main contribution of the paper. 
 In the rest of the paper, I try to find out which location characteristics can explain the 
variation in leverage ratios. In other words, by introducing state-based variables, I am trying to 
make state and distance leverage variables insignificant and to reject the hypothesis that firms 





3.4.2 State of Incorporation  
Not only is the state location of the headquarters important, but the state of incorporation 
also affects a firm’s financial decisions, especially with respect to capital structure. Wald and 
Long (2006) show that the state of incorporation affects capital structure measures. Zwiebel 
(1996) and Novaes and Zingales (1995) show that CEOs employ leverage to decrease the 
probability of a hostile takeover. As a result, firms in states with strong antitakeover regulations, 
tend to have lower leverage. The payout restriction asks that firm's debt to book capital ratio 
should not go above a certain level before it can pay dividends or buy back its shares. 
Stronger payout restrictions impose a limit on how much debt firms can issue, which 
leads to lower leverage ratios (Wald & Long, 2007). I add state of incorporation variables to my 
baseline regression. Table 6 presents the results. I have two states of incorporation variables in 
this table, Delaware dummy and payout restriction. Many of the firms are incorporated in 
Delaware, which has the lowest level of payout restriction. Following Wald and Long (2007), I 
create my payout restriction variable as follow: 
 California and Alaska=1.25; Delaware, Maine, Oklahoma, and South Dakota=0; Other states=1 
I expect that firms incorporated in Delaware will have a higher leverage ratio. Firms 
incorporated with stronger payout restriction will have  lower leverage ratios, but the lower 
leverage ratio does not negate state or distance leverage explanatory power. 
In column 1 I add Delaware dummy to my baseline regression without the three leverage 
ratios. Delaware dummy is statistically significant and incorporation in Delaware leads to 1.3 
percentage of higher leverage. In column 2, I add industry leverage and state leverage, both are 





firm's leverage. In column 3, I add distance leverage. I find that both state and distance leverage 
are statistically significant and have almost the same coefficient. In column 4, I drop the 
Delaware dummy and add my payout restriction variable. I find that higher payout restriction 
leads is correlated with lower leverage. As before, in column 5 I add industry and state leverage. 
Table 6, shows that payout restriction has a negative coefficient and Delaware dummy has a 
positive coefficient. In the presence of these two variables, distance and state leverage are still 
significant. One may argue that the result is driven by the state of incorporation and state of 
headquarter location being the same. However, while it does not affect the imitation story, a 
rerun of the regression with only those observations that state of incorporation and state of 
headquarters location are not the same finds that the results do not change. I do not report the 
results here.  
3.4.3 State culture and ratio leverage 
Between 1992 and 2012, 13 states voted Republican consecutively. I relate persistent 
consecutive vote for the Republican Party in presidential elections to a capitalist point of view. 
The relation between capitalism and risk taking is believed to be positive because capitalism is 
identified by innovation, risk-taking, and entrepreneurship. Higher leverage means a higher level 
of risk. I expect CEOs of firms in Republican states to show affinity toward capitalism and such 
characteristics and I anticipate this would be reflected in their financing decisions. An alternative 
interpretation would be to relate Republicanism to fiscal conservatism. If that relationship is real, 
we should expect a lower level of leverage for firms in Republican states. One may argue that the 
fiscal conservatism effect is unlikely for two reasons. First, fiscal conservatism is about how to 
run government, not a company. Second, we observe that states controlled by the Republican 





on what they receive from the federal government. Table 7 shows the results for a regression 
with a dummy for Republican states. I predict that firms with headquarters in these states should 
have higher leverage. I also would like to see if the Republican state dummy explains the state 
leverage and distance leverage variable.  
Table 7 presents the results of testing the above hypothesis. While the coefficient on Republican 
state dummy is positive and significant in the univariate settings, this coefficient becomes 
negative when other variables are added. To my surprise, the results actually show that the fiscal 
conservativism argument is valid even though it is not very statistically robust, it is in the 10 
percent significant region. State leverage and distance leverage are positive and significant.  
Another cultural factor can be seen as borrowing habit of the state administration. If state 
administration has a culture of borrowing (i.e., financing a considerable part of state expenses 
through the federal government), one can assume that it affects corporate culture. Firms in those 
states should be more eager to borrow and should have a higher level of debt. I calculate federal 
spending ratio as the ratio of the amount a state government receives from the federal 
government to the amount it sends to the federal government. If this is above one, I define 
federal spending dummy equal to 1. I expect the coefficient on both to be positive. I expect that 
higher proportion of receiving funds from the federal government by a state to be correlated with 
higher leverage ratio, but does not negate the explanatory power of the state or distance leverage 
variable. 
Results are presented in Table 8. Federal spending ratio has a positive significant coefficient, but 





When I consider both state leverage and distance leverage, distance leverage is insignificant, but 
it is not enough to conclude that state leverage is the dominant factor.  
Another cultural factor is individual borrowing habit. Using a Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) dataset, I measure borrowing habits of people in each state. The FDIC 
provides data on individual loans in different categories. I scale these variables by population 
and per capita gross state product (GSP). Table 9 presents the results. I expect higher individual 
loan per capita and higher ratio of individual loan to GSP to be correlated with higher book 
leverage. My hypothesis is that Higher individual loan per capita and higher ratio of loan to GSP 
is correlated with higher leverage ratio, but it does not negate the explanatory power of the state 
leverage variable. 
Table 9 presents the expected results. Individual loan-related variables are positive and 
significant absence of location variables, but they lose significance after the state leverage 
variable is introduced. 
3.4.4 State Banking Sector  
Local banking conditions can affect the financing policies of a firm. I use a set of 
variables to measure the effect of the banking system of the state on the leverage ratio. Using the 
FDIC database and following the literature, I select two variables: bank depth and nonperformer 
loans. Bank depth is calculated as the ratio of the sum of commercial and industrial loans held by 
commercial banks in the state divided by the sum of sale by firms in the state. The nonperformer 
loan ratio is equal to noncurrent loan over total loan and lease in a state in a given year. I expect 
a positive coefficient on bank depth and a negative coefficient on the nonperformer ratio. Results 





but it holds in the presence of variables of interest. The hypothesis is that firms in financial hub 
states or cities and in states with higher bank depth have higher leverage and firms in states with 
higher nonperformer loan ratios have lower leverage ratio, but these variables do not negate the 
explanatory power of the state leverage variable. 
Table 10, panel B, shows how being in a state that is a financial hub or in a city that is a financial 
hub affects the leverage. Results show that being in a financial hub state is positively correlated 
with higher leverage, but it does not retain significance in the presence of the state leverage 
variable.  
In Table 11, and as a robustness check, I gather a number of previously discussed 
variables and cluster the standard errors at the firm, state, and industry levels to make sure that 
the t-statistics are not overestimated. I find that results are robust to clustering standard errors at 
different levels. Finally, I focus on the persistence issue. I have shown that my new variable is 
significant in the presence of initial leverage. In these data, I first show that the state leverage 
variable has a persistent effect on leverage ratios. I then show that initial leverage is determined 
by the state leverage variable around an IPO date. 
3.4.5 Persistence of leverage ratio 
Lemmon et al. (2008) state that a change in leverage ratios is caused by an unobserved 
time-invariant effect. This time invariant effect generates stable leverage ratios over time. They 
show that firms with high leverage remain highly levered, same is true for firms with low 
leverage. They show that this effect is present even before IPO and cannot be explained by the 





In Table 12, I run my base model with different lags of state leverage. My base model 
includes profitability, market to book, size, R&D, tangibility, industry leverage, and initial 
leverage. The dependent variable is book leverage. Standard errors are clustered in the firm level. 
As a robustness check, I cluster errors at the state level. The result does not change very much. 
Table 12 shows that the coefficient on state leverage is consistently significant with up to nine 
lags at the 5% significance level. The number of lags goes beyond nine for the 10% significance 
level. The magnitude and significance decrease in a consistent and smooth way. As shown in 
Table 4, this state leverage variable remains stable for long periods of time.  
Table 13 includes two measures for initial leverage. Initial leverage 1 is equal to the first 
book leverage of the firm after IPO. Initial leverage 2 is equal to the average of the first three 
book leverage points. I use the first year-firm characteristics as a proxy for pre-IPO firm 
characteristics. My state leverage and industry leverage are the average leverage in state and 
industry the year before the IPO. Year, industry, and state fixed effects are used, and errors are 
clustered at the firm level. Table 13 shows that industry, state, and distance leverage influence 
both measures of initial leverage. This outcome suggests that initial leverage follows a target 
ratio decided by the firm based on the state, distance and industry leverage.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The paper relates to three streams of literature: capital structure, geography effect, and 
peers effect. The paper presents data which support the claim that location significantly 
influences the capital structure.  
Using the average equity shock of peers firms, firms in the same state, as an exogenous 





actions and characteristics influence the firm's capital structure. This approach eliminates the 
concern about endogeneity issue. The results show that firm responds to its peers firms through 
two channels. The first channel is the change in financial policies of peers firms. The second 
channel is the change in peers firms' characteristics such as profitability and market to book 
ratio. The results prove that location has a significant effect on the firm's financial decision 
Furthermore, by introducing state and distance leverage variables, I explore how the 
leverage ratio of peers firms influences a firm's leverage ratio. These new variables explain the 
location effect and are robust to the introduction of several state-based variables, different 
specification, and different sample selections. This introduces a new component to the process of 
choosing target leverage ratio by firms.  
The paper also relates to the Lemmon et al. (2008) paper in which the new variable 
shows persistence in its effect and can predict the firm’s leverage for the next 10 years at 5% 
significance. It is significant in the presence of initial leverage and it can predict the initial 
leverage (i.e., leverage at the time of IPO). The evidence provided in the paper suggests that the 
state of headquarters location affects firm leverage through imitation. Choosing a leverage ratio 
is not as clear as many other financial decisions. In such a situation, it is reasonable to choose a 










Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A 
The sample consists of all nonfinancial firms in the Compustat Industrial Annual database between 1963 and 2013. I 
require that all firm-year observations have non-missing data for book assets and that the leverage ratios (both book 
and market) lie in the closed unit interval. All the other variables in the multivariate analysis are required to have 
non-missing data and are trimmed at one-percentile. Total book leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt and 
short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Long-term market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of 
long-term debt and the fiscal-year-end share price times the number of common shares outstanding . Profitability 
(return on assets) is defined as operating income before depreciation over the book value of assets .Firm size is 
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment, over 
the book value of assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end 
closing price times common shares used to calculate earnings per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + 




























Table 3.1.A  – Summary Statistics 
 
 










variable N Mean SD Median P25 P75
Total asset (Million $) 138210 845.2 3605.4 95.7 26.7 403.5
Sale (Million $) 138210 799.6 2678.0 114.4 31.2 471.6
Total Debt (Million $) 138210 237.9 1077.5 13.8 2.0 88.6
Long Term Debt (Million $) 138210 204.8 942.2 8.6 0.6 69.3
Market Equity (Million $) 138210 910.6 5141.8 69.9 16.1 363.8
Net Debt Issue 138210 0.043 0.246 0.000 -0.024 0.060
Market to Book Ratio 138210 1.360 1.311 0.987 0.695 1.553
Book Leverage 138210 0.242 0.199 0.219 0.069 0.364
Market Leverage 138210 0.272 0.250 0.211 0.050 0.436
Cash Holding Ratio 138204 0.137 0.168 0.069 0.025 0.182
Tangibility 138197 0.299 0.212 0.253 0.132 0.420
Age 138210 12.8 10.0 10.0 5.0 18.0
Profitability 138145 0.095 0.181 0.124 0.060 0.181
R&D Ratio 138210 0.034 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.033
Initial Leverage 137183 0.180 0.223 0.134 0.018 0.280
3-Year Initial Leverage 136119 0.197 0.239 0.162 0.048 0.294
Average Book Leverage (State-Year) 138210 0.242 0.052 0.247 0.215 0.274
Average Book Leverage (Industrt - Year) 138210 0.242 0.077 0.237 0.193 0.284
CA NY TX NJ IL MA PA OH FL MN
19331 12751 12412 7100 7029 6764 6518 6119 6105 4493
CT GA VA MI CO NC WA MD TN MO
3865 3817 3643 3580 3316 2942 1931 2102 2116 2449
CA TX NY MA FL NJ IL PA OH CO MN
2300 1241 1186 689 660 649 536 533 413 399 383
GA CT VA MI NC WA MD AZ TN MO OK








Table 3.2 State Fixed Effects 
The sample consists of all nonfinancial firms in the Compustat Industrial Annual database between 1963 and 2013. I require that all firm-year observations have 
non-missing data for book assets and that the leverage ratios (both book and market) lie in the closed unit interval. All the other variables in the multivariate 
analysis are required to have non-missing data and are trimmed at one-percentile. Dependent variable is Book Leverage. Book leverage is defined as the sum of 
long-term debt and short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-year-end 
share price times the number of common shares outstanding . Profitability (return on assets) is defined as operating income before depreciation over the book 
value of assets .Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment, over the book value of 
assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing price times common shares used to calculate earnings 
per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + short-term debt – deferred taxes and investment tax credits. Initial leverage is defined as 
the IPO year leverage. Column 5 includes observation before 1991 and column 6 includes observations after that. In column 7 variables are first-differenced. All 


















 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
 Book leverage Book leverage Book leverage Book leverage Book leverage Book leverage 
Profitability -0.272 -0.261 -0.259 -0.256 -0.183 -0.456 
 (33.74)*** (33.04)*** (32.89)*** (31.79)*** (20.71)*** (36.03)*** 
Size 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.006 
 (9.32)*** (11.32)*** (11.56)*** (11.57)*** (12.82)*** (5.18)*** 
Tangibility 0.225 0.194 0.193 0.198 0.214 0.162 
 (24.86)*** (19.80)*** (19.84)*** (19.64)*** (17.63)*** (15.18)*** 
Market2Book -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.001 
 (17.52)*** (14.57)*** (14.49)*** (14.45)*** (16.03)*** (0.72) 
R&D -0.506 -0.416 -0.392 -0.384 -0.292 -0.534 
 (24.51)*** (17.21)*** (16.76)*** (16.28)*** (12.72)*** (11.51)*** 
Age  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
  (10.07)*** (10.22)*** (9.76)*** (5.11)*** (4.14)*** 
Age
2 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (7.64)*** (7.73)*** (7.42)*** (2.38)** (2.08)** 
Initial Lev  0.245 0.242 0.235 0.165 0.419 
  (6.66)*** (6.60)*** (6.33)*** (4.87)*** (23.50)*** 
R
2
 0.20 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.35 
N 138,210 137,183 137,183 128,073 70,883 66,300 
       
F – Industry 
 
26.19 7.23 6.36 6.38 6.96 2.05 
Prob > F =  0 0 0 0 0 0 
F - State NA NA 2.05 2.04 2.49 1.88 
Prob > F =  NA NA 0 0 0 0 











Table 3.3 State, Distance, and Industry Leverage 
The sample consists of all nonfinancial firms in the Compustat Industrial Annual database between 1963 and 2013. I require that all firm-year observations have 
non-missing data for book assets and that the leverage ratios (both book and market) lie in the closed unit interval. All the other variables in the multivariate 
analysis are required to have non-missing data and are trimmed at one-percentile. Dependent variable is Book Leverage. Book leverage is defined as the sum of 
long-term debt and short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-year-end 
share price times the number of common shares outstanding . Profitability (return on assets) is defined as operating income before depreciation over the book 
value of assets .Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment, over the book value of 
assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing price times common shares used to calculate earnings 
per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + short-term debt – deferred taxes and investment tax credits. Initial leverage is defined as 
the IPO year leverage. State (industry) leverage is defined as average book leverage of all the firms in that state (industry) in previous year excluding the firm 
itself. In column 2,3,4 I require that Number of firms in state-year cluster should be greater than 20. Distance leverage is defined as average book leverage of all 
the firms in a circle with a 50 miles radius and with the firm as the center of the circle. The firm’s book leverage is excluded. All regression include year, state, 

















 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
 Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
Profitability -0.259 -0.256 -0.284 -0.287 -0.276 -0.281 
 (32.89)*** (31.79)*** (30.85)*** (31.84)*** (48.56)*** (29.84)*** 
Size 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.012 
 (11.56)*** (11.57)*** (11.28)*** (11.32)*** (28.07)*** (11.79)*** 
Tangibility 0.193 0.198 0.181 0.177 0.186 0.223 
 (19.84)*** (19.64)*** (18.51)*** (18.83)*** (46.77)*** (22.06)*** 
Market2Book -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 
 (14.49)*** (14.45)*** (12.18)*** (12.29)*** (20.83)*** (15.40)*** 
R&D -0.392 -0.384 -0.384 -0.394 -0.385 -0.475 
 (16.76)*** (16.28)*** (15.95)*** (16.60)*** (30.60)*** (20.04)*** 
Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
 (10.22)*** (9.76)*** (9.94)*** (10.59)*** (22.06)*** (10.97)*** 
Age
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (7.73)*** (7.42)*** (7.72)*** (8.19)*** (17.51)*** (8.03)*** 
Initial Lev 0.242 0.235 0.308 0.312 0.304  
 (6.60)*** (6.33)*** (16.02)*** (16.91)*** (37.04)***  
State Lev   0.165 0.057 0.049 0.075 
   (4.05)*** (1.76)* (2.70)*** (2.00)** 
Industry Lev   0.220 0.223 0.226 0.248 
   (6.95)*** (7.43)*** (14.58)*** (7.10)*** 
Distance Lev     0.053 0.089 
     (2.61)*** (2.65)*** 
R
2
 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.22 
N 137,183 128,073 112,245 120,064 106,552 107,233 
       
F-Industry 6.36 6.38 3.13 3.1   
Prob > F =  0 0 0 0   
F-State 2.05 2.04 1.09 1.24   
Prob > F =  0 0 0.339 0.118   








Table 3.4 Endogeneity – First Step 
To extract the equity shock a market model is used which includes state factor. 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀 (𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) +  𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒(?̅?−𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) +  𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡  
𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡  is return form i at month t in state j. (𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) is the market excess return. (?̅?−𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) is the excess return of a portfolio of firms in the same state at 
month tو excluding firm i's return. Using monthly data, I estimate this equation for each firm on a rolling annual basis where I require at minimum 24 months of 
data and use up to 60 months of historical prices. The βs in this estimation are firm-specific and time varying but constant in a calendar year. The idiosyncratic 
return or equity shock will be the difference between the expected return and the realized return. Equity shock is compounded and annualized. 
 
 
 Peer Firm Average Equity Shock 
 Contemporaneous Lagged 
M2B 0.000 0.000 
 (0.53) (1.45) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.52) (0.91) 
Profitability -0.001 -0.000 
 (1.16) (0.59) 
Tangibility 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.50) (0.06) 
Peer Firm Average Characteristics Yes Yes 
   
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
   
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
   
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
   
R
2
 0.96 0.96 
N 102,266     90,755 









Table 3.5 Endogeneity – Second Step 
 
 Column 1 Column 2 
 Book Leverage Market Leverage 
Equity Shock (firm level) -0.009 -0.022 
 (6.50)*** (13.56)*** 
Equity Shock (state level) -0.039 -0.078 
 (1.98)** (3.43)*** 
Profitability -0.303 -0.439 
 (48.30)*** (61.27)*** 
Size 0.011 0.012 
 (30.80)*** (29.75)*** 
Tangibility 0.215 0.193 
 (50.93)*** (40.56)*** 
M2B -0.013 -0.052 
 (21.83)*** (69.63)*** 
R&D -0.490 -0.644 
 (38.50)*** (48.64)*** 
M2B (state level) -0.010 -0.009 
 (2.64)*** (2.04)** 
Tangibility (state level) 0.038 0.061 
 (1.61) (2.23)** 
Size (state level) 0.006 0.007 
 (1.95)* (1.91)* 
Profitability (state level) 0.207 0.193 
 (7.34)*** (5.96)*** 
R
2
 0.22 0.33 
N 96,822 96,822 










Table 3.6 State of Incorporation 
This table shows how state leverage predicts initial leverage. Dependent variable is Book Leverage. Book leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt and 
short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-year-end share price times 
the number of common shares outstanding . Control variables are not shown. Control variables include profitability, size, market to book, tangibility, R&D, 
initial leverage, age, age squared, industry leverage. Errors are clustered in firm level. Profitability (return on assets) is defined as operating income before 
depreciation over the book value of assets .Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and 
equipment, over the book value of assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing price times common 
shares used to calculate earnings per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + short-term debt – deferred taxes and investment tax 
credits. Initial leverage is defined as the IPO year leverage. State (industry) leverage is defines as average book leverage of all the firms in that state (industry) 
in previous year excluding the firm itself. Payout Restriction for California and Alaska, is equal to 1.25, for Delaware, Maine, Oklahoma, and South Dakota is 





















 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
Profitability -0.266 -0.292 -0.278 -0.266 -0.292 -0.278 
 (33.34)*** (31.70)*** (29.46)*** (33.34)*** (31.69)*** (29.45)*** 
Size 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 
 (11.46)*** (11.50)*** (10.71)*** (11.49)*** (11.52)*** (10.73)*** 
Tangibility 0.228 0.216 0.225 0.227 0.216 0.225 
 (25.26)*** (22.35)*** (22.38)*** (25.24)*** (22.34)*** (22.36)*** 
Market2Book -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 
 (19.40)*** (16.35)*** (15.58)*** (19.40)*** (16.34)*** (15.57)*** 
R&D -0.474 -0.499 -0.479 -0.473 -0.498 -0.479 
 (22.48)*** (21.48)*** (20.17)*** (22.48)*** (21.48)*** (20.16)*** 
Delaware 0.013 0.014 0.016    
 (4.20)*** (4.32)*** (4.89)***    
State Lev  0.093 0.080  0.093 0.080 
  (2.67)*** (2.12)**  (2.66)*** (2.11)** 
Industry Lev  0.244 0.248  0.244 0.248 
  (7.51)*** (7.12)***  (7.51)*** (7.12)*** 
Distance Lev   0.088   0.089 
   (2.61)***   (2.62)*** 
Payout Rest    -0.012 -0.013 -0.016 
    (4.12)*** (4.25)*** (4.83)*** 
R
2
 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22 
N 137,340 120,433 107,233 137,340 120,433 107,233 














Table 3.7 State's Political Culture 
This table shows how state political culture influences firm’s book leverage. Dependent variable is Book Leverage. Book leverage is defined as the sum of long-
term debt and short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-year-end 
share price times the number of common shares outstanding . Control variables are not shown. Control variables include profitability, size, market to book, 
tangibility, R&D, initial leverage, age, age squared, industry leverage. Errors are clustered in firm level. Profitability (return on assets) is defined as operating 
income before depreciation over the book value of assets .Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, 
plant, and equipment, over the book value of assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing price 
times common shares used to calculate earnings per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + short-term debt – deferred taxes and 
investment tax credits. Initial leverage is defined as the IPO year leverage. State (industry) leverage is defines as average book leverage of all the firms in that 
state (industry) in previous year excluding the firm itself. Since 1992, 13 states have voted republican consecutively. RepDummy is equal to 1 for firms with 





















 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Republican 0.038 -0.000 -0.010 
 (6.22)*** (0.02) (1.69)* 
Profitability  -0.210 -0.200 
  (23.23)*** (19.02)*** 
Size  0.016 0.014 
  (15.28)*** (12.21)*** 
Tangibility  0.245 0.169 
  (26.13)*** (15.88)*** 
Market2Book  -0.017 -0.017 
  (19.47)*** (15.28)*** 
R&D  -0.454 -0.329 
  (22.06)*** (14.31)*** 
State Lev   0.212 
   (5.13)*** 
Industry Lev   0.488 
   (15.97)*** 
Distance Lev   0.086 
   (2.53)** 
R
2
 0.01 0.18 0.21 
N 71,513 71,513 59,250 








Table 3.8  State Administration’s borrowing Culture 
This table shows how State Administration’s borrowing Culture influences firm’s book leverage. Dependent variable is Book Leverage. Book leverage is 
defined as the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of long-term debt 
and the fiscal-year-end share price times the number of common shares outstanding . Control variables are not shown. Control variables include profitability, 
size, market to book, tangibility, R&D, initial leverage, age, age squared, industry leverage. Errors are clustered in firm level. Profitability (return on assets) is 
defined as operating income before depreciation over the book value of assets .Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined 
as net property, plant, and equipment, over the book value of assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end 
closing price times common shares used to calculate earnings per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + short-term debt – deferred 
taxes and investment tax credits. Initial leverage is defined as the IPO year leverage. State (industry) leverage is defines as average book leverage of all the 
firms in that state (industry) in previous year excluding the firm itself. Since 1992, 13 states have voted republican consecutively. Federal Spending Ratio is 
equal to funds received by state from Federal Government divided by fund given to federal government by state. Spending dummy is equal to 1 for state with 
spending ratio greater than 1 and 0 otherwise. Control variables are not shown. 
 
 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Fed Spending 0.008  -0.001 
 (2.11)**  (0.23) 
Spending Dummy  0.003  
  (0.76)  
State Lev   0.205 
   (3.70)*** 
Industry Lev   0.555 
   (13.67)*** 
Distance Lev   0.044 
   (1.40) 
R
2
 0.16 0.16 0.21 
N 28,489 28,489 24643 








Table 3.9.A Individuals’ Borrowing Habit Panel A – Individual Loans 
 
This table shows how Individuals’ Borrowing Habit influences firm’s book leverage. Dependent variable is Book Leverage. Book leverage is defined as the 
sum of long-term debt and short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-
year-end share price times the number of common shares outstanding . Control variables are not shown. Control variables include profitability, size, market to 
book, tangibility, R&D, initial leverage, age, age squared, industry leverage. Errors are clustered in firm level. Profitability (return on assets) is defined as 
operating income before depreciation over the book value of assets .Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined as net 
property, plant, and equipment, over the book value of assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing 
price times common shares used to calculate earnings per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + short-term debt – deferred taxes 
and investment tax credits. Initial leverage is defined as the IPO year leverage. State (industry) leverage is defines as average book leverage of all the firms in 
that state (industry) in previous year excluding the firm itself. leverage ratio. IndivLoanPerCapita is individual loan held by banks in the state divided by 



















 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
IndivLoanPerCapita 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (2.04)** (1.84)* (1.31) (1.16) 
Profitability -0.289 -0.294 -0.316 -0.294 
 (35.10)*** (31.29)*** (33.18)*** (31.38)*** 
Size 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.010 
 (11.78)*** (10.27)*** (11.56)*** (10.40)*** 
Tangibility 0.227 0.165 0.212 0.160 
 (30.46)*** (20.20)*** (26.42)*** (19.55)*** 
Market2Book -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 
 (20.86)*** (16.04)*** (16.73)*** (15.78)*** 
R&D -0.604 -0.497 -0.596 -0.467 
 (30.31)*** (22.83)*** (26.99)*** (21.33)*** 
State Lev  0.499  0.483 
  (19.32)***  (18.65)*** 
Industry Lev   0.316 0.249 
   (9.95)*** (7.97)*** 
R
2
 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.20 
N 131,307 114,928 114,928 114,928 















Table 3.9.B – Individuals’ Borrowing Habit – Individual Loans 
This table shows how Individuals’ Borrowing Habit influences firm’s book leverage. Dependent variable is Book Leverage. Book leverage is defined as the 
sum of long-term debt and short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-
year-end share price times the number of common shares outstanding . Control variables are not shown. Control variables include profitability, size, market to 
book, tangibility, R&D, initial leverage, age, age squared, industry leverage. Errors are clustered in firm level. Profitability (return on assets) is defined as 
operating income before depreciation over the book value of assets .Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined as net 
property, plant, and equipment, over the book value of assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing 
price times common shares used to calculate earnings per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + short-term debt – deferred taxes 
and investment tax credits. Initial leverage is defined as the IPO year leverage. State (industry) leverage is defines as average book leverage of all the firms in 






















 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
IndivLoan/GSP 0.029 0.026 0.019 0.016 
 (2.15)** (1.96)* (1.40) (1.21) 
Profitability -0.193 -0.182 -0.208 -0.183 
 (19.18)*** (16.09)*** (18.03)*** (16.19)*** 
Size 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.015 
 (13.54)*** (11.44)*** (12.78)*** (11.31)*** 
Tangibility 0.260 0.181 0.243 0.174 
 (24.33)*** (14.84)*** (21.12)*** (14.26)*** 
Market2Book -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 
 (16.77)*** (13.77)*** (14.45)*** (13.39)*** 
R&D -0.416 -0.328 -0.406 -0.303 
 (18.19)*** (13.20)*** (15.99)*** (12.11)*** 
State Lev  0.504  0.490 
  (15.43)***  (14.92)*** 
Industry Lev   0.291 0.229 
   (6.63)*** (5.33)*** 
R
2
 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.21 
N 47,914 42,532 42,532 42,532 















Table 3.10.A Banking Sector Condition – Bank Depth and Non - Current Loans 
This table shows how banking sector condition influences firm’s book leverage. Dependent variable is Book Leverage. Book leverage is defined as the sum of 
long-term debt and short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-year-end 
share price times the number of common shares outstanding . Control variables are not shown. Control variables include profitability, size, market to book, 
tangibility, R&D, initial leverage, age, age squared, industry leverage. Errors are clustered in firm level. Profitability (return on assets) is defined as operating 
income before depreciation over the book value of assets .Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, 
plant, and equipment, over the book value of assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing price 
times common shares used to calculate earnings per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + short-term debt – deferred taxes and 
investment tax credits. Initial leverage is defined as the IPO year leverage. State (industry) leverage is defined as average book leverage of all the firms in that 
state (industry) in previous year excluding the firm itself. leverage ratio. Bank depth is calculated as ratio of sum of commercial and industrial loan held by 
commercial banks in the state divided by sum of sale by firms in the state. Non-Current loan ratios is equal to non-current loan over total loan and lease in state 



































 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Profitability -0.284 -0.233 -0.233 
 (30.76)*** (38.05)*** (38.03)*** 
Size 0.010 0.011 0.011 
 (11.19)*** (26.19)*** (26.18)*** 
Tangibility 0.181 0.194 0.193 
 (18.46)*** (41.15)*** (41.14)*** 
Market2Book -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 
 (12.23)*** (23.22)*** (23.21)*** 
R&D -0.384 -0.349 -0.350 
 (15.95)*** (26.93)*** (26.95)*** 
State Lev 0.140 0.072 0.056 
 (3.41)*** (2.39)** (1.85)* 
Industry Lev 0.219 0.142 0.141 
 (6.86)*** (6.56)*** (6.55)*** 
Bank Depth 0.000  0.000 
 (2.32)**  (3.05)*** 
Non Current Ratio  0.064 0.018 
  (0.98) (0.27) 
R
2
 0.29 0.28 0.28 
N 111,170 79,243 79,243 
    
Fixed Effects    
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
State Yes Yes Yes 
Time period 1967-2012 1984-2012 1984-2012 









Table 3.10.B – Banking Sector Condition – Financial Hubs 
This table shows how banking sector condition influences firm’s book leverage. Dependent variable is Book Leverage. Book leverage is defined as the sum of 
long-term debt and short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-year-end 
share price times the number of common shares outstanding . Control variables are not shown. Control variables include profitability, size, market to book, 
tangibility, R&D, initial leverage, age, age squared, industry leverage. Errors are clustered in firm level. Profitability (return on assets) is defined as operating 
income before depreciation over the book value of assets .Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, 
plant, and equipment, over the book value of assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing price 
times common shares used to calculate earnings per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + short-term debt – deferred taxes and 
investment tax credits. Initial leverage is defined as the IPO year leverage. State (industry) leverage is defines as average book leverage of all the firms in that 
state (industry) in previous year excluding the firm itself. leverage ratio. This table looks at how being in a state which is financial hub or in a city which is 




















 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 
Financial hub (state) 0.016  0.009  0.011 0.005 0.006 0.001 
 (4.18)***  (2.67)***  (3.15)*** (1.30) (1.74)* (0.29) 
Financial hub (city)  0.019  0.006     
  (3.41)***  (1.29)     
Profitability   -0.197 -0.197 -0.197 -0.223 -0.271 -0.300 
   (24.93)*** (24.79)*** (25.41)*** (25.01)*** (33.70)*** (32.25)*** 
Size   0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 
   (11.06)*** (11.00)*** (9.56)*** (9.82)*** (9.24)*** (9.43)*** 
Tangibility   0.255 0.255 0.238 0.223 0.225 0.213 
   (34.34)*** (34.38)*** (26.02)*** (22.74)*** (24.91)*** (21.96)*** 
Market2Book   -0.022 -0.023 -0.019 -0.020 -0.014 -0.014 
   (28.19)*** (28.40)*** (23.84)*** (21.13)*** (17.45)*** (14.49)*** 
State Lev      0.350  0.273 
      (11.35)***  (8.93)*** 
R&D       -0.502 -0.504 
       (24.22)*** (21.98)*** 
R
2
 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 
N 138,210 138,210 138,210 138,210 138,210 120,842 138,210 120,842 







Table 3.11 Clustering for Different Levels 
 
 
 COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 
Profitability -0.198 -0.198 -0.198 
 (19.24)*** (19.69)*** (8.55)*** 
Size 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (10.02)*** (8.42)*** (6.57)*** 
Tangibility 0.151 0.151 0.151 
 (14.82)*** (14.37)*** (7.69)*** 
Market2Book -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 (13.08)*** (7.43)*** (7.46)*** 
R&D -0.274 -0.274 -0.274 
 (11.66)*** (7.83)*** (5.78)*** 
Initial Lev 0.262 0.262 0.262 
 (10.81)*** (11.08)*** (9.13)*** 
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (5.92)*** (2.94)*** (3.17)*** 
Age
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (3.84)*** (2.08)** (2.30)** 
Delaware Dummy 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (2.63)*** (2.34)** (2.92)*** 
Rep Dummy -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (1.12) (2.33)** (1.04) 
Financial hub (state) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.36) (0.60) (0.37) 
Financial hub (city) 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.26) (0.30) (0.19) 
Bank Depth 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.10) (0.56) (0.11) 
Non Performer ratio 0.105 0.105 0.105 
 (0.66) (0.67) (0.50) 
State Lev 0.155 0.155 0.155 
 (4.08)*** (3.78)*** (3.14)*** 
Industry Lev 0.386 0.386 0.386 
 (13.10)*** (13.77)*** (8.61)*** 
R
2
 0.27 0.27 0.27 
N 61,711 61,711 61,711 






Table 3.12 Persistence 
This table shows the persistence of state leverage over time.. Dependent variable is Book Leverage. Book leverage 
is defined as the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Market leverage is 
defined as total debt over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-year-end share price times the number of common 
shares outstanding . Control variables are not shown. Control variables include profitability, size, market to book, 
tangibility, R&D, initial leverage, age, age squared, industry leverage. Errors are clustered in firm level. Profitability 
(return on assets) is defined as operating income before depreciation over the book value of assets .Firm size is 
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment, over 
the book value of assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end 
closing price times common shares used to calculate earnings per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + 
long-term debt + short-term debt – deferred taxes and investment tax credits. Initial leverage is defined as the IPO 
year leverage. State (industry) leverage is defines as average book leverage of all the firms in that state (industry) 



























 Book Leverage  
State Lev 0.153          
 (5.31)**          
L.State Lev  0.159         
  (5.17)**         
L2.State Lev   0.163        
   (4.97)**        
L3.State Lev    0.168       
    (4.89)*
* 
      
L4.State Lev     0.176      
     (4.86)*
* 
     
L5.State Lev      0.169     
      (4.44)**     
L6.State Lev       0.165    
       (4.13)**    
L7.State Lev        0.141   
        (3.35)**   
L8.State Lev         0.124  
         (2.82)**  
L9.State Lev          0.103 
          (2.22)* 
           
           
R
2
 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 
N 120,064 106,005 94,085 84,635 76,771 69,915 63,816 58,292 53,238 48,670 








Table 3.13 Initial Leverage 
This table shows how state leverage predicts initial leverage. Dependent variable is Book Leverage. Book leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt and 
short-term debt, over the book value of assets. Market leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-year-end share price times 
the number of common shares outstanding . Control variables are not shown. Control variables include profitability, size, market to book, tangibility, R&D, 
initial leverage, age, age squared, industry leverage. Errors are clustered in firm level. Profitability (return on assets) is defined as operating income before 
depreciation over the book value of assets .Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and 
equipment, over the book value of assets. Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing price times common 
shares used to calculate earnings per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + short-term debt – deferred taxes and investment tax 
credits. Initial leverage is defined as the IPO year leverage. State (industry) leverage is defines as average book leverage of all the firms in that state (industry) 
in previous year excluding the firm itself. The market-to-book is taken from the IPO year characteristics, the rest are lagged variables using Compustat data. 
Initial Lev (3-year) is defined as Average Leverage of the first 3 years after IPO 
 Initial Lev Initial Lev(3-year) 
Profitability -0.183 -0.092 
 (14.25)*** (7.23)*** 
Size 0.022 0.022 
 (14.98)*** (13.85)*** 
Tangibility 0.215 0.201 
 (17.83)*** (15.51)*** 
Market2Book -0.013 -0.012 
 (10.52)*** (8.90)*** 
R&D -0.409 -0.317 
 (14.10)*** (11.41)*** 
State Lev 0.353 0.235 
 (5.46)*** (3.34)*** 
Industry Lev 0.722 0.670 
 (13.56)*** (11.79)*** 
R
2
 0.35 0.29 
N 8,056 8,056 
 








Appendix 3.1 Variable Description  
Total book leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt (Compustat item dltt) and short-term debt (Compustat item dlc), over the book value of assets 
(Compustat item at). 
Long-term market leverage is defined as tot debtal (Compustat item dltt+dlc) over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-year-end share price (Compustat 
item prcc_f) times the number of common shares outstanding (Compustat item csho). 
Profitability (return on assets) is defined as operating income before depreciation (Compustat item oibdp) over the book value of assets (Compustat item at). 
Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat item at)  
Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item ppent), over the book value of assets (Compustat item at). 
Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing price [prcc_f] times common shares used to calculate 
earnings per share [cshpri] + the liquidation value of preferred stock [pstkl] + long-term debt [dltt] + short-term debt [dlc] – deferred taxes and investment tax 
credits [txditc]) / total assets [at]. 
GSP growth rate is the real annual growth rate in gross state product (GSP) using data obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
GSP per capita obtained for the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Republican states is dummy for those state that consistently voted for republican party since 1988. 
Federal Spending Ratio is funds received from federal government over money paid to the federal government by state. 
Spending dummy is equal to 1 for federal spending ratio above 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Bank depth is commercial loan held by banks in a state over the total sale of firms in state in one year. 
Non performer loans is ratio of non-current loan over total loan in state s in year t.  
State leverage is equal to average book leverage of all the firm in state s in year t-1 excluding the firm itself. 
Industry leverage is equal to average book leverage of all the firm in industry j in year t-1 excluding the firm itself. 
Distance leverage is the average leverage of all firms within a 50-mile radius of the firm’s headquarters. 
Initial leverage is defined as the IPO year leverage. 
Payout Restriction for California and Alaska, is equal to 1.25, for Delaware, Maine, Oklahoma, and South Dakota is equal to 0, and for the remaining states is 
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